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| Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Citation / County | Decided | Posted | WebCite |
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State v. K.W.
| 113160 | R.C. 2953.32; application to seal record of conviction; competing interests; abuse of discretion; rehabilitation. The trial court abused its discretion in denying an application to seal a record of conviction where it conflated expungement with sealing a record and therefore improperly weighed the competing interests at play. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1778 |
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State v. Washington
| 112872 | Presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea; Crim.R. 32.1; abuse of discretion. Summary: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Washington’s presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea. Washington was not coerced into pleading and a mere change of heart is not sufficient reason to withdraw a guilty plea. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1784 |
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McDermott v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals
| 113123 | Zoning, R.C. 713.15, use variance, R.C. Chapter 2505, R.C. Chapter 2506, administrative appeal, questions of law, “grandfather clause,” C.C.O. 359.01, C.C.O. 329, unnecessary hardship, abuse of discretion. BZA denied a variance to a property owner who built a structure without a permit. The trial court affirmed. After a thorough review of all the evidence in the record, we cannot say as a matter of law that the BZA’s denial of appellant’s requested variance is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence on the whole record. As such, the trial court did not err in coming to the same conclusion. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1780 |
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Song v. Rom
| 112770 | Res judicata; claim preclusion; summary judgment; judgment on the pleadings. Appellants’ third lawsuit was barred by res judicata where their original lawsuit was tried to resolution and subsequent litigation attempted to reach the parties involved in the original lawsuit as well as parties in privity with the original parties where the claims arose out of the same transactions that were the basis of the original lawsuit and the claims in the current case could have or should have been raised in the original lawsuit. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1787 |
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Parnell v. Zielinski
| 112778 | Manifest weight of the evidence; expert witness; stipulated negligence. The defense verdict rendered by the jury was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the verdict was supported by credible and competent evidence that goes to all the essential elements of the case. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1789 |
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State v. Lewis
| 112730 | Sufficiency; manifest weight of the evidence; imposition of sentence on firearm specification; S.B. 201 constitutionality. Sufficient evidence was presented regarding the identity of the perpetrator where a witness who knew appellant identified him from surveillance footage of the incident and other witnesses and DNA evidence connected appellant to the additional crime of leaving the scene of an accident. Additionally, the convictions were supported by the manifest weight of the evidence where the primary witness on identification knew appellant and maintained that identification throughout the case. Although the witness received a favorable plea deal on her charges for testifying in court, the witness identified appellant prior to receiving that deal, there was no evidence of a prior statement that she changed after receiving the deal, or evidence that the witness held animosity towards appellant due to relationship issues. The trial court did not err in sentencing appellant to a firearm specification that was attached to a count that merged based on State v. Bollar, 171 Ohio St.3d 678, 2022-Ohio-4370, 220 N.E.3d 690. Finally, appellant’s sentence under S.B. 201 was not unconstitutional based on State v. Hacker, 173 Ohio St.3d 219, 2023-Ohio-2535, 229 N.E.3d 38. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1786 |
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Cleveland v. Brown
| 113084 | Modification of community-control sanctions; final appealable order. Appeal dismissed. The trial court’s judgment removing a portion of Brown’s community-control sanctions was not a final, appealable order that is reviewable by this court. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1782 |
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Berner v. New Leaf Residential Servs., Inc.
| 112841 | Motion to dismiss; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); political subdivision immunity; R.C. Chapter 2744; de novo review; four corners of the complaint; exception to immunity; physical defect of building; notice pleading; sufficient operative facts. The trial court did not err in denying CCBDD’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) because both the amended complaint and the crossclaim alleged sufficient facts under which they might plausibly demonstrate that the R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) exception to immunity was applicable. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1788 |
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State v. Moore
| 113041 | Complicity; felonious assault; ineffective assistance of counsel; joinder; Crim.R. 14; severance; Batson; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence. Affirmed. The appellant’s four assignments of error claiming that error occurred are without merit. Appellant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to sever under Crim.R. 14; the state’s use of a peremptory challenge did not rise to a constitutional violation, as defined under federal law, based on the prospective juror’s combined race and gender; and the conviction was based on sufficient, credible evidence. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1783 |
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State v. K.L.
| 113168 | Motion to seal record of conviction; R.C. 2953.32; hearing. Ohio precedent that courts need not hold a hearing for ineligible offenders who have filed a motion to seal their record under R.C. 2953.32 is no longer applicable after the April 2023 amendment of the statute. | Forbes | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1777 |
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State v. Kendricks
| 113143 | Crim.R. 32.1, presentence guilty plea withdrawal. The trial court’s denial of appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea was not an abuse of discretion. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1779 |
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State v. Walker
| 113103 | Sentencing; consecutive sentencing; R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The trial court complied with the mandates of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and made the findings necessary to impose consecutive sentences, and those findings are not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
5/9/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1781 |
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A.E. v. J.E.
| 112847 | Financial misconduct; spousal support; child support; marital property; marital home; temporary spousal support; attorney fees; marital debt; loan; life insurance; proposed shared parenting; parenting time; restraining orders. Trial court erred in finding that husband committed financial misconduct by dissipating marital funds when he liquidated restricted stock units when the court restrained his income and he had no other means of paying his tax liabilities. The trial court erred by ordering husband to pay wife more than half of his income as temporary spousal support. The trial court erred in substituting its own valuation for the marital home based on the court’s review of comparable home values instead of the valuation of husband’s appraiser, who appraised the property one month before trial. Trial court erred in ordering husband to pay wife’s attorney fees when there was no evidence that he was in a superior financial position or that he caused wife to incur an increase in attorney fees. Trial court erred in requiring husband to pay off a loan wife received from her parents when the loan was used to pay college tuitions for the parties’ adult children and to pay real estate taxes on the parties’ marital home, which was wife’s responsibility. Trial court erred in designating wife the beneficiary of a lapsed insurance policy. Trial court erred in not adopting the husband’s shared parenting plan and in finding that a reduction in father’s parenting time was in the child’s best interest. The trial court failed to account for funding missing from wife’s lawyer’s IOLTA account. Trial court erred in leaving all restraining orders in place without specifically identifying the restraining orders and identifying the restrained parties. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/3/2024
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5/9/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1785 |
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State v. Fips
| 113061 | Manifest weight of the evidence; consecutive sentences. The appellant’s convictions are supported by the manifest weight of the evidence, and the imposition of consecutive sentences are supported by the record. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1692 |
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W.G. V. D.G.
| 113108 | Distribution of marital property; de facto termination date of marriage; R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(b); abuse of discretion; R.C. 3119.82; award of deduction to nonresidential parent. Wife and Husband separated in 2012, and Husband obtained a child support order and paid that order from that time. The parties lived apart and did not intertwine their finances. Husband paid child support from March 23, 2012. The trial court used the date of the child support order as the de facto date of termination of the marriage for the purposes of dividing property and thus awarded Husband his pension, which he obtained interest in after the de facto date of termination. Further, although a disparity in Husband’s and Wife’s reported incomes existed, the trial court awarded Husband the federal tax deductions for their children. The date of termination of marriage is presumed to be the date of the final hearing in the divorce case, but the trial court may select dates that it considers equitable in determining the division of marital property pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(b). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by using a de facto date of termination where the parties’ finances were not intertwined, they did not seek to reconcile the marriage other than for the sake of the children, where the parties lived apart for years, and husband obtained an order for and continually paid child support for over a decade. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by using a de facto termination date, it did not abuse its discretion by awarding Husband the entirety of his pension where he obtained interest in the pension after the de facto termination date of the marriage. R.C. 3119.82 provides that a court may award the ability to claim children as dependents for federal income tax purposes to a nonresidential parent if the court determines it would further the best interest of the children and payments for child support are substantially current. Wife argued that because she is the residential parent and reported a low income, she could be eligible for tax benefits. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Husband the deductions where Wife did not submit tax returns or other documentation to support her financial situation and the trial court could not determine the effect of awarding her the deductions with any certainty. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1690 |
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State v. Flanik
| 113145 | Aggravated robbery; R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); complicit; sufficiency; manifest weight; plain error; codefendant; confront; hearsay; harmless error; plain error; prejudice; cross-examination; duress; jury instruction; ineffective assistance of counsel; merger; firearm specifications. Affirmed appellant’s conviction for aggravated robbery and the sentence imposed in the case. Sufficient evidence was presented showing appellant was complicit in commission of the offense, and her conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. No plain error occurred as to the admission of certain testimony, and other evidentiary challenges were deemed harmless error. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding questioning on cross-examination that was deemed hearsay, or in refusing to provide a jury instruction on the defense of duress, which was not warranted by the record. Appellant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court was required to sentence appellant on each of two firearm specifications, notwithstanding merger of the underlying felony offenses. | S. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1689 |
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State v. Jackson
| 113185 | Abuse of discretion; mistrial; discovery; sanction; parole; facility; records; hearsay; exception; nonhearsay; unavailable; harmless error. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defense counsel’s request for a mistrial based on an alleged discovery violation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion from excluding a recorded jailhouse phone call from evidence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1687 |
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Master Nails, Inc. v Master Nails Lana, L.L.C.
| 112677 | Subject-matter jurisdiction; jurisdictional priority; whole issue; common pleas; domestic relations; divorce; division of property; tort; injunction; temporary restraining order. The plaintiff-corporation filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas seeking injunctive relief and damages for certain alleged torts, including conversion and fraud. The defendants argued that the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction by operation of the jurisdictional-priority rule, because there was a pending divorce case in a domestic-relations court between one of the defendants and her husband. That defendant claimed that ownership of the plaintiff-corporation was an issue to be decided in the divorce case. We found that the jurisdictional-priority rule does not apply under the circumstances. The parties and claims were not the same between the two cases. The tort case did not present part of the same whole issue pending in the domestic-relations court. And the domestic-relations court does not have jurisdiction to give the plaintiff the relief to which it may be entitled. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1694 |
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Cleveland Browns Football Co., L.L.C. v. Antonio's Pizza, Inc.
| 113301 | Signatory; arbitration; agreement; jurisdiction; mistake; defense; vacate; appeal; Civ.R. 60(B); confirmation; award; contract. The trial court did not commit reversible error by denying defendant’s motion to vacate the trial court’s confirmation order. The trial court did not commit reversible error by denying defendant’s motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1686 |
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State v. Campbell
| 112958 | Shooting; attempted murder; self-defense; Crim.R. 29; manifest weight of the evidence; attempted murder; felonious assault; transferred intent; authentication; firearm specifications; consecutive sentences. Judgment affirmed. The weight of the evidence supported the convictions. A self-defense claim is generally an issue of credibility and the jury’s decision to believe the defendant’s self-defense as to one victim but not the other victim was not incredible. Under the theory of transferred intent, the felonious assault convictions as to the remaining victims were supported by the weight of the evidence. The evidence demonstrates that those victims were innocent bystanders in the crosshairs of the defendant’s line of firing. There was no plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel based on the court’s failure to instruct the jury on the concept of transferred intent of self-defense. It is not definitively established in this district that the doctrine of transferred intent applies to self-defense claims. Therefore, such an instruction would have been inappropriate. The defendant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. In regard to one victim, the defendant told her he was shooting at her and would continue to do so. The defendant did continue to shoot at the victim even after she had dropped her weapon. In regard to the other two bystander victims, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions against the defendant under the theory of transferred intent. Further, circumstantial evidence demonstrated venue. Statements made and injuries documented by a treating nurse did not have the primary purpose of being testimonial. Rather, they were made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment. There was no violation of appellant’s confrontation rights regarding the nurse’s testimony and the admission of the medical records. A witness’s testimony that she recognized the scene depicted in a video, recognized the person being videotaped, and that the video was a fair and accurate representation of how the taped person appeared at the time in question was sufficient for authentication. The imposition of consecutive sentences on the firearm specifications was lawful and appropriate under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), which creates an exception to the general rule that a trial court may not impose multiple sentences for firearm specifications for crimes committed as part of the same transaction. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1693 |
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Forsyth Fin., L.L.C. v. Chaney
| 113099 | Retail installment sales contract; motion for judgment on the pleadings; Civ.R. 12(C); R.C. 1307.01; statute of limitations; Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code; Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1691 |
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State v. Anderson
| 113159 | Attempted menacing by stalking; maximum prison term; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); R.C. 2929.11; R.C. 2929.12. The trial court did not err in imposing a maximum prison term where the sentence was within the statutory range and was not otherwise contrary to law. | Kilbane | Cuyahoga |
5/2/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1688 |
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State ex rel. Onunwor v. Deputy Clerk of Courts
| 113724 | R.C. 149.43(B)(8), Sup.R. 44-47, prospective application, criminal case records, public records. Because the relator’s criminal case occurred prior to the effective date of Sup.R. 44-47, R.C. 149.43 controlled the relator’s request for records from that case. Because the relator did not obtain the necessary judicial approval required by R.C. 149.43(B)(8), the relator was not entitled to the records. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
4/30/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1685 |
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Mallory v. Gallagher
| 113761 | Mandamus; R.C. 2969.25(A); affidavit of prior civil actions; R.C. 2969.25(C); certified institutional cashier’s statement. The realtor has failed to comply with R.C. 2969.25, which requires the inclusion of a sworn affidavit of prior civil actions and a certified copy of the institutional cashier’s statement setting forth the balance in the inmate’s account. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/26/2024
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5/2/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1684 |
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Cleveland v. White
| 112720 | Telecommunications harassment; CCO 621.10; text messages; emails; sufficiency of the evidence; jury instruction; plain error; prejudice; admission of testimony; Evid.R. 1002; harmless error; manifest weight of the evidence; criminal complaint; defect in indictment; Crim.R. 12(C)(2); R.C. 2941.29; ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not err in misstating the date of the offense, treating the criminal complaint as charging two offenses, or admitting testimony from the victim regarding the content of text messages. Appellant’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Finally, appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1584 |
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State v. Kirby
| 112518 | Attempted rape; abduction; Rape Shield Statute; R.C. 2907.02(D); exclusion of evidence; balancing test; sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence; conflicting testimony; credibility determination. Defendant was convicted after trial of attempted rape and abduction. Defendant asserted on appeal the trial court erred by excluding evidence pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(D). The trial court excluded evidence that was specific to the victim’s past sexual activity and, by allowing general testimony that conversations between defendant and complainant were of a sexual nature, the trial court balanced defendant’s due process rights against the state’s interest in precluding evidence under the Rape Shield Statute. The convictions were based on sufficient evidence where the complainant’s testimony went to all elements of the crimes charged. Further, the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim’s testimony was not inherently incredible, the testimony was bolstered by defendant’s apologies, and where the determination of credibility and resolving conflicts in testimony and evidence rests solely with the finder of fact. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1582 |
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State v. Harris
| 112269 | Aggravated murder, murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, felonious assault, and having a weapon while under disability; sufficiency; manifest weight; mistrial; unadmitted evidence to jury; expert testimony; Evid.R. 702; Crim.R. 16; harmless error; authentication; Evid.R. 901; missing evidence; prosecutor opening statement; misstatement. Judgment affirmed. Court’s exhibit No. 5 was included with the trial exhibits in error, but no harm came to the defendant by way of the momentary possession of the court’s exhibit by the jury. Certain portions of testimony by forensic video analyst Ciula in this case consisted of expert testimony as set forth in Evid.R. 702. However, the harmless error analysis applies to those portions of Ciula’s testimony that were expert opinion testimony, and the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt in this case means that the outcome of trial would not have been different. Crim.R. 16 was complied with because the trial court exercised its discretion and found that the expert’s report was not new discovery, and even if it was, it could have been discussed when it was received, which was four days before the jury was sworn in. The state’s exhibits defendant challenges were properly authenticated by the state and admissible. Furthermore, defendant fails to demonstrate how the missing crime-scene log would have been material to the case and cannot demonstrate that the failure to preserve the crime-scene log was in bad faith. There is sufficient evidence to sustain defendant’s convictions and his convictions are not against the weight of the evidence based on the testimony of the four eyewitnesses combined with the defendant’s own admission, the ankle monitor GPS data and the surveillance video identifying defendant and the shooter and placing at the scene of the crime. Lastly, the prosecutor’s isolated misstatement did not prejudicially affect the outcome of his case because defense counsel immediately brought the misstatement to the jury’s attention and the prosecutor also admitted to the jury through a witness’s testimony that he made a mistake. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1579 |
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State v. Woods
| 113100 | Guilty plea; voluntary; pro se motion to continue; Crim.R. 11(C). The trial court did not err when it accepted Woods’s guilty plea after it addressed the defendant personally at the plea hearing, engaged in the required colloquy with him, and fully complied with Crim.R. 11(C). The trial court did not have a duty to address a pro se motion for continuance that the defendant filed the day before pleading guilty. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1589 |
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Euclid v. Amiott
| 112675 | Right to speedy trial; R.C. 2945.71; extension of time; tolling; R.C. 2945.72; reasonable continuance; motion to dismiss; expiration; prima facie case for dismissal; state’s burden of production; statutory time limit; first-degree misdemeanor; 90 days after arrest or service of summons; recusal of trial judge; visiting judge assigned; no time waiver executed; sua sponte continuance; journal entry containing reasons for continuance. The trial court erred in proceeding to trial after the speedy-trial time had elapsed where appellant had not waived his right to a speedy trial. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1583 |
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Trainer v. Trainer
| 112384 | Divorce; spousal support; modification; change in circumstances; indefinite support; long term marriage; imputed income; retirement; magistrate’s decision; abuse of discretion; R.C. 3105.18. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it modified Husband’s spousal support obligation to $2,500 per month. Husband voluntarily retired at the age of 69 years old, with a change in his employer’s administration leadership and declining health. This constitutes a substantial change in circumstances that makes the existing award of $12,000 per month unreasonable, given his estimated post-retirement income reduced to $109,300 from $643,197. The court considered all the R.C. 3105.18 factors and made findings for each, ultimately explaining how they impacted the decision to modify Husband’s spousal support obligation. The court did not abuse its discretion when it imputed to Wife a $25,000 annual income because the court considered and weighed the spouses’ relative earning abilities along with other factors to arrive at a reasonable spousal support amount and term. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding indefinite spousal support because marriage was of long duration (28 years) and statutory findings were supported by competent credible evidence. | Boyle | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1581 |
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State v. Keith
| 113131 | R.C. 2929.14(C); R.C. 2907.05; gross sexual imposition; R.C. 2907.03; disseminating matter harmful to juveniles; maximum sentence. Appellant’s maximum consecutive sentence totaling 30 months in prison for gross sexual imposition and disseminating matter harmful to juveniles was not contrary to law and appellant could not show that the record did not clearly and convincingly support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings. There was no evidence of judicial bias or favoritism. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1591 |
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State v. Hale
| 113078 | Aggravated murder; murder; felonious assault; attempted felonious assault; menacing by stalking; Evid.R. 404(B); other-acts evidence; severance; joinder; inferior offenses; jury instructions; aggravated assault; voluntary manslaughter; mitigating evidence; sudden passion or fit of rage; autopsy photos; sufficiency and manifest weight. The trial court did not err when it denied Hale’s motion to sever the menacing by stalking charge from the other charges because the evidence was simple and direct, and the state would have been able to present evidence of the other crimes at separate trials had it tried them separately. The other-acts evidence was relevant to a permissible purpose under Evid.R. 404(B)(2) and not unfairly prejudicial under Evid.R. 403(A). The trial court did not improperly allow the state to amend the indictment through its notice of intent to use other-acts evidence; the state was permitted to present evidence of past events to establish a pattern of conduct and mental distress for menacing by stalking. Nor did the trial court err when it denied Hale’s request for jury instructions on aggravated assault and voluntary manslaughter, inferior offenses of felonious assault, murder, and aggravated murder because (1) Hale’s provocation was not caused by the victim, and (2) even if it was, Hale did not act with a sudden passion or fit of rage. The trial court also did not err when it admitted ten autopsy photos. Finally, the defendant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Sheehan | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1587 |
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A.E. v. J.E.
| 112847 | Financial misconduct; spousal support; child support; marital property; marital home; temporary spousal support; attorney fees; marital debt; loan; life insurance; proposed shared parenting; parenting time; restraining orders. Trial court erred in finding that husband committed financial misconduct by dissipating marital funds when he liquidated restricted stock units when the court restrained his income and he had no other means of paying his tax liabilities. The trial court erred by ordering husband to pay wife more than half of his income as temporary spousal support. The trial court erred in substituting its own valuation for the marital home based on the court’s review of comparable home values instead of the valuation of husband’s appraiser, who appraised the property one month before trial. Trial court erred in ordering husband to pay wife’s attorney fees when there was no evidence that he was in a superior financial position or that he caused wife to incur an increase in attorney fees. Trial court erred in requiring husband to pay off a loan wife received from her parents when the loan was used to pay college tuitions for the parties’ adult children and to pay real estate taxes on the parties’ marital home, which was wife’s responsibility. Trial court erred in designating wife the beneficiary of a lapsed insurance policy. Trial court erred in not adopting the husband’s shared parenting plan and in finding that a reduction in father’s parenting time was in the child’s best interest. The trial court failed to account for funding missing from wife’s lawyer’s IOLTA account. Trial court erred in leaving all restraining orders in place without specifically identifying the restraining orders and identifying the restrained parties. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1585 |
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State v. Jones
| 113082 | Motion to dismiss; preindictment delay; actual prejudice; deceased witness; rape; R.C. 2907.02(A)(2); kidnapping; R.C. 2905.01(A)(4); sufficiency of the evidence; manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss due to preindictment delay where defendant did not show that he sustained actual prejudice as a result of the preindictment delay. Considering each item of allegedly “lost” or “unavailable” evidence, including lost recording of 911 call, lost clothing, lost photographs and lost medical records, in light of other evidence available at the time of the indictment and the relevance of the allegedly unavailable evidence to the defense, defendant failed to show that the items, if available, would have meaningfully impacted his case. Speculation that deceased or missing witness could have had information favorable to defense likewise did not meet defendant’s burden of showing actual prejudice. Defendant’s convictions for rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where victim testified that sex was not consensual, witnesses testified regarding the victim’s injuries following the incident and the state presented DNA evidence from the victim’s sexual-assault examination kits that linked defendant to the rape. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1588 |
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Water Street Condominium Owners' Assn., Inc. v. Ferguson
| 113183 | Motion to dismiss; condominium board election; quo warranto. The core issue raised in the instant complaint is the validity of the election of Plaintiff Board and, as such, is to be determined in a quo warranto action. Because the complaint fails to raise a cause of action cognizable by the forum, we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the complaint for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1592 |
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Biotricity, Inc. v. DeJohn
| 113216 | Federal Arbitration Act; arbitration agreement; motion for protective order; motion to stay discovery; motion to compel arbitration. - Trial court’s denial of appellants’ motions to stay discovery and for a protective order while appellants’ motion to compel arbitration remained pending was immediately appealable under the Federal Arbitration Act, which applied to the arbitration agreements at issue, because the orders effectively denied appellants’ motion to compel arbitration. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1593 |
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Nationstar Mtge., Inc. v. Scarville
| 112270 & 113139 | Dormancy; motion to intervene; Civ.R. 24(A); Civ.R. 24(B); untimely. Trial court properly overruled motion to intervene filed by successors-in-interest to the debtor in foreclosure action because they failed to timely file the motion. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1580 |
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State v. Kennedy
| 112879 | Evid.R. 404(B), ineffective assistance of counsel, sufficiency, and manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court’s admission of evidence during appellant’s bench trial did not violate Evid.R. 404(B). The evidence was provided to the defense prior to trial, was presented for a legitimate purpose, and the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The admission did not overcome the presumption of regularity afforded the trial court to know and follow the law. Counsel did not fail to address the issue of secondary DNA transfer and thus was not ineffective. The evidence was not insufficient as a matter of law nor were the convictions against the manifest weight of the evidence. | Laster Mays | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1586 |
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State v. Fontanez
| 113105 | Guilty plea; motion to withdraw; change of heart. Denial of presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea affirmed where trial court failed to expressly state that a guilty plea constitutes a complete admission of guilt where the fact of the admission was obvious and the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice. Denial of presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea was not an abuse of discretion where trial court considered all factors necessary for evaluating a plea withdrawal request under Crim.R. 32.1. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1590 |
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Thrasher, Dinsmore & Colan, LPA v. Ross
| 113298 | Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); unjust enrichment; unpaid attorney fees. - Trial court properly granted summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C) on plaintiff’s unjust-enrichment claim for unpaid attorney fees regarding services plaintiff law firm rendered to defendants where there was no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff provided legal services, defendants knew the plaintiff was providing legal services on its behalf, and it would be unjust for defendants to retain the benefit of those services without paying for them. | Keough | Cuyahoga |
4/25/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1594 |
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State ex rel. Henderson v. Gallagher
| 113694 | Procedendo; motion to vacate; and mootness. The court dismissed a procedendo action to compel a ruling on a motion to vacate, because the respondent judge had issued a ruling on the subject motion. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/24/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1596 |
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Garg v. Scott
| 113583 | Mandamus; prohibition; community-control sanctions; corporate formalities; abuse of discretion; personal jurisdiction; mootness; and ripeness. The relators who are the owner of a property on community control and other corporate entities who are owned by the owner commenced this mandamus and prohibition action because the municipal housing court threatened to require the owner to disclose all of his other corporate entities and their properties and to hold any housing violation by them as a community control violation against the original company. The relators alleged that the housing court did not have jurisdiction to hold the defendant company liable for any violations by the owner or his other companies. This court denied the applications for writs of mandamus and prohibition. The defendant company’s appeal was an adequate remedy at law to protect the owner and his other companies. Moreover mandamus does not lie to control judicial discretion, but appeal can remedy abuses of discretion. Prohibition very rarely lies for lack of personal jurisdiction. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/19/2024
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4/25/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1595 |
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Cleveland v. Oliver
| 113330 | Driving under the influence; C.C.O. 433.01(a); administrative license suspension; initial appearance; R.C. 4511.191(D)(2); R.C. 4511.196(A). Trial court did not err in denying motion to dismiss underlying criminal charges when defendant’s initial appearance was not held within five-day time frame specified in R.C. 4511.191(D)(2) and 4511.196(A). The purpose for requiring initial appearance to be held within five days was to provide defendant with the opportunity to appeal the administrative license suspension, and trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss as it related to the administrative license suspension. | E.A. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/18/2024
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4/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1477 |
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State v. Smith
| 113035 | Search warrant; sufficiency; possession of controlled substances; criminal tools; medical marijuana; fruit of the search; manifest weight; possession; immediately within reach; marijuana dispensary; direct physical control; constructive possession; knowingly exercises dominion. Judgment reversed and convictions vacated. The appellant’s convictions for drug possession and criminal tools were not supported by sufficient evidence. The state failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant had constructive possession of drugs or criminal tools where the state offered no evidence that the appellant had dominion or control over the area of the home where the illegal quantity of marijuana was found in the home she shared with her spouse, who held a medical marijuana license. | Groves | Cuyahoga |
4/18/2024
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4/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1473 |
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State v. James
| 112741 | Abuse of discretion; evidentiary rulings; sufficiency of evidence; weight of evidence; speedy trial; ineffective assistance of counsel; jury instruction; consecutive sentences. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting certain evidence. The state immediately alerted the defense to newly discovered evidence as soon as it became known to the state. It was established that the state’s failure to provide it earlier was not a willful violation of Crim.R. 16. The source of the newly discovered evidence was not a surprise to appellant; the person who provided the evidence was named in discovery and the evidence was statements made by appellant. Appellant has failed to demonstrate how the evidence was prejudicial to him. Other evidence admitted by the trial court was relevant to demonstrate appellant’s self-interest in the case and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by prejudice. The testimony of the sole eyewitness to the shooting was sufficient to support the murder conviction. The testimony was sufficient to support the aggravated robbery convictions; the fact that nothing was taken from the victims was not dispositive because the governing statute provides that an attempt to commit a theft offense is sufficient. The convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury’s credibility determination was not incredible. The video evidence was properly authenticated, and the witness testimony established a proper chain of custody. Appellant’s speedy trial rights were not violated. The delay in this case was overwhelmingly attributed to appellant’s constant change of counsel, requests for continuances, and numerous motions. Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. The testimony appellant complains that his counsel failed to object to was not hearsay. The evidence for which appellant contends there was no authentication or chain of custody was properly authenticated and a chain of custody was established. The record supports the imposition of consecutive sentences. The robberies and fatal shooting, on which consecutive terms were imposed, were separate and distinct acts, separated by a period of time. We are not able to say that the records clearly and convincingly do not support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/18/2024
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4/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1469 |
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State v. Francis
| 113012 | Consecutive; maximum sentence; involuntary manslaughter. Judgment affirmed. The trial court made the statutorily required findings for the imposition of consecutive sentences. We are unable to say that the record clearly and convincingly does not support the court’s findings. The trial court was not required to make any findings in imposing maximum sentences. The trial court considered the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 and sentenced the defendant within the statutory range. We do not find that the defendant’s maximum sentences were clearly and convincingly unsupported by the evidence. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/18/2024
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4/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1472 |
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Crenshaw v. Mooningham
| 112835 | Motion for summary judgment; de novo review; defamation; evidence; affidavit; conclusory assertions; genuine issue of material fact; intentional infliction of emotional distress; severe, debilitating emotional injury; spoliation of evidence; disruption of plaintiff’s case; vexatious litigator; R.C. 2323.52; vexatious conduct. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on appellant’s claims where appellant did not present evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact remained as to any of her claims. | Celebrezze | Cuyahoga |
4/18/2024
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4/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1470 |
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State v. Hempstead
| 113051 | Sentence; jail-time credit; specification; firearm; mandatory; contrary to law; prison term; resentencing. The sentence imposed on defendant for involuntary manslaughter with a firearm specification was contrary to law because the trial court had improperly applied jail-time credit to defendant’s mandatory firearm-specification sentence. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/18/2024
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4/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1474 |
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Heigel v. MetroHealth Sys.
| 112900 | Civ.R. 56; summary judgment; App.R. 16; App.R. 12; at will employment; wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; clarity element. Appellant fails to separately argue her assignments of error, but in the interest of judicial fairness, we address the assigned errors. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees when appellant was unable to show that there were genuine issues of material fact. Although there is a clear public policy favoring workplace safety, appellant was unable to identify a public policy exception to the at will employment doctrine that is applicable to her claims. | Ryan | Cuyahoga |
4/18/2024
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4/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1471 |
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Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Cleveland
| 113116 | Political-subdivision immunity; negligence; res ipsa loquitur; defense; R.C. Chapter 2744; R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). Plaintiff established prima facie case of negligence through doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where defendant was the last contractor to have access at the site where the damage occurred. Decisions by city employees about where to excavate an area to repair a water line is not the kind of decision to which political-subdivision immunity attaches. | E.T. Gallagher | Cuyahoga |
4/18/2024
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4/18/2024
| 2024-Ohio-1475 |
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