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Case CaptionCase No.Topics and IssuesAuthorCitation / CountyDecidedPostedWebCite
State v. Thyot C-170178; C-170179APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL - CRIM.R. 12 (K) - MOTION IN LIMINE - AUTHENTICATION: The state may appeal from the granting of a motion in limine that is, in effect, a motion to suppress evidence, which renders the state's proof with respect to the pending charge so weak in its entirety that any reasonable probability of effective prosecution has been destroyed. The appellate court is without authority to review the prosecutor's Crim.R. 12(K) certification and may not dismiss the prosecutor's appeal for want of a final, appealable order based on the merits of the prosecutor's certification. When a motion in limine is the functional equivalent of a motion to suppress, the appellate court should use the standard of review applicable to a motion to suppress. The state adequately authenticated a video taken in the ordinary course of business outside of a gas station where the regional manager for the company that operated the gas station testified that the video was a recording of the area outside of a store with which he was familiar, he knew how the video security system recorded and stored videos in the ordinary course of business, he knew the system to be accurate, and he had used the system in previous investigations, even though he had no personal knowledge of the contents of the video and he was not present when it was burned onto a DVD.MockHamilton 2/21/2018 2/21/2018 2018-Ohio-644
State v. Carter C-170231DEATH PENALTY - SENTENCING - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL - SIXTH AMENDMENT: Ohio's death-penalty statute does not require judicial fact finding before the defendant can be sentenced to death, because the jury must find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of an aggravating factor for the death penalty to be a sentencing option; and therefore, Ohio's death-penalty statute does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. (Hurst v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), distinguished.)MillerHamilton 2/21/2018 2/21/2018 2018-Ohio-645
State v. Howell C-170158AUTOS/CRIMINAL - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - OVI: The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the unlawful stop of her car and all evidence gathered as a result of the unlawful stop where the arresting state trooper had erroneously determined that defendant had committed a violation of R.C. 4513.15(A)(1): the trooper's mistake of law was not reasonable where the statute unambiguously regulated the distribution of light to be used when a driver approaches an oncoming vehicle, and the trooper had testified that defendant had failed to dim her headlights while traveling on the interstate behind and in the same direction as the trooper. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop of defendant's vehicle did not provide a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant had committed, or was engaged in committing, a crime. [But see DISSENT: At the time of the traffic stop, the trooper possessed a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant was driving while impaired where he had witnessed her vehicle "bouncing" within the marked lane, she had failed to dim her headlights when she approached him from behind, she had failed to pass him on the interstate when he slowed to 55 m.p.h., and he testified that he "continued to follow her just to see if there were any other signs."]MyersHamilton 2/16/2018 2/16/2018 2018-Ohio-591
State v. Braden C-170097EVIDENCE - BURGLARY - DOUBLE JEOPARDY - RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY: The trial court erred in convicting defendant of second-degree burglary under R.C. 2911.12(A)(2) where the state did not prove an element of the offense-that "any person other than an accomplice of the offender is present or likely to be present"-beyond a reasonable doubt; and where defendant stipulated to committing third-degree burglary under R.C. 2911.12(A)(3), a conviction for third-degree burglary is not barred by double jeopardy even though defendant's previous conviction for receiving stolen property under R.C. 2913.51 involved the same property.MillerHamilton 2/14/2018 2/14/2018 2018-Ohio-563
State v. Finnell C-160815COUNSEL - EVID.R. 606(B) - JURORS: Trial counsel was deficient in failing to notify the trial court of a stipulation of potential intimidation of the jurors by defendant and argue that the stipulation was sufficient under Evid.R. 606(B) to entitle defendant to the release of juror information under seal to secure juror testimony for a motion for a new trial where a different judge, who was unaware of the previous stipulation, presided over the hearing on the new-trial motion.ZayasHamilton 2/14/2018 2/14/2018 2018-Ohio-564
State v. Jones C-160908EVIDENCE - DANGEROUS DOG: The trial court erred in convicting defendant of failing to confine a dangerous dog under R.C. 955.22(D) where defendant's dog had not been previously designated dangerous under R.C. 955.11.MillerHamilton 2/14/2018 2/14/2018 2018-Ohio-565
State v. Dotson C-170214SEARCH AND SEIZURE - WAIVER - COUNSEL: A suspect may limit the scope of his or her consent; and where defendant consented to a pat down search for weapons only and the state presented no evidence that the officer who conducted the pat down determined by "plain feel" that a thin straw found on defendant's person was most likely contraband, the seizure of the straw violated the Fourth Amendment. Where defendant affirmatively relinquished his right to challenge the search of his car, he waived review of the issue on appeal. Where the record does not show that any alleged deficiency in defense counsel's representation was outcome-determinative, defendant has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.MillerHamilton 2/9/2018 2/9/2018 2018-Ohio-499
State v. Kinney C-160415GUILTY PLEA - CRIMINAL RULE 11: Defendant's guilty pleas to two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of kidnapping, each with a three-year gun specification, carrying a concealed weapon and vandalism were unknowing, unintelligent and involuntary where the trial court informed the defendant at the plea hearing that he was subject to a mandatory prison term on each of the first-degree felonies, but it misinformed him of the length of the mandatory prison terms and the effect on his eligibility for judicial release; the defendant relied on the trial court's assurances that he would be eligible for judicial release after serving 18 years on the gun specifications; and the trial court sentenced the defendant to 34 years in prison, 33 years of which was mandatory time.DetersHamilton 2/2/2018 2/2/2018 2018-Ohio-404
Stanfield v. Reading Bd. of Edn. C-160895IMMUNITY - POLITICAL SUBDIVISION: The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant board of education on the entirety of plaintiffs' complaint arising from injuries a high-school student suffered during track-and-field practice by an errantly-thrown discus: the physical-defect exception to political-subdivision immunity, R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), does not require that the political subdivision own the grounds where the injury occurs, and therefore, the physical-defect exception applied to plaintiffs' claims alleging that the discus-cage netting had holes and gaped, leading to the student's injury; however, the board of education is immune under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) with regard to plaintiffs' claims that the board failed to adequately supervise the students during track-and-field practice.DetersHamilton 2/2/2018 2/2/2018 2018-Ohio-405
State v. Gage C-160824ASPEEDY TRIAL: Because defendant was charged with both a second-degree misdemeanor and a minor misdemeanor, the state had 90 days, the speedy-trial period for a second-degree misdemeanor, to bring him to trial. Where defendant waived a substantial amount of time, and a substantial amount of time was tolled due to his actions, defendant was tried within the statutory speedy-trial period. The state must exercise reasonable diligence to secure the availability of a defendant incarcerated in the county jail of another Ohio county; the issuance of a capias and execution within a reasonable time constitute reasonable diligence to secure the defendant. Though defendant was not tried for over a year after his arrest on misdemeanor charges, his constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated because much of the delay was attributable to him, he did not assert his speedy-trial right until late in the proceedings, and his defense was not impaired by the delay.MockHamilton 1/26/2018 2/8/2018 2018-Ohio-480
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