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Monica Fletcher, etc. v. University Hospitals of Cleveland et al., Case no. 2007-1529
8th District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
State of Ohio v. Douglas Centafanti, Case no. 2007-1744
5th District Cout of Appeals (Stark County)
State of Ohio v. Davon Winn, Case no. 2007-1842
2nd District Court of Appeals (Montgomery County)
Christina Lynn Byrd n.k.a. Reeder v. Brian Kelly Knuckles, Case no. 2007-1913
12th District Court of Appeals (Clermont County)
Is Plaintiff’s Failure to File ‘Affidavit of Merit’ Basis For Summary Dismissal of Medical Liability Suit?
Monica Fletcher, etc. v. University Hospitals of Cleveland et al., Case no. 2007-1529
8th District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: When a civil plaintiff asserting an apparent medical liability claim fails to file with her complaint an affidavit of merit signed by a medical expert as required by Civil Rule 10(D)(2), should the defendant be able to seek summary dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint “for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” under Civil Rule 12(B)(6), or should the defendant be required to file a motion for “a more definite statement” under Civil Rule 12(E) to clarify whether the plaintiff’s complaint is subject to the affidavit requirement?
BACKGROUND: In response to legislation enacted by the General Assembly in 2004, the Supreme Court of Ohio in 2005 adopted Civil Rule 10(D)(2), which requires that any plaintiff filing a medical liability lawsuit in a state court must file with that complaint an “affidavit of merit” signed by a medical expert. This case asks the Court to resolve a dispute about the proper procedural course to be followed by a defendant named in a medical liability suit when the plaintiff fails to file the required affidavit of merit.
In March 2006, Monica Fletcher refiled a previously-dismissed wrongful death suit against University Hospitals of Cleveland and Dr. Raymond Onders in her capacity as administrator of the estate of Victor Shaw. The suit alleged that Mr. Shaw died as the result of negligent medical care. The complaint filed by Fletcher did not include an affidavit of merit as required by Civ.R.10(D)(2), and she did not file any subsequent motion for an extension of time to file the required affidavit.
University Hospitals filed a motion in the trial court seeking dismissal of Fletcher’s suit under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), which provides for summary dismissal if a plaintiff’s complaint “fails to state a claim upon which the court can grant relief.” The court granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that Fletcher’s failure to file the required affidavit of merit rendered her complaint legally insufficient and therefore not a valid claim that could be pursued through the court. Fletcher appealed the dismissal. On review, the Eighth District Court of Appeals reinstated her suit, ruling that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing her complaint as not stating a justiciable claim. The court of appeals held that the hospital should instead have followed the procedure set forth in Civ.R.10(B)(1) for clarifying an unclear or ambiguous complaint by filing a motion seeking “a more definite statement” of the plaintiff’s claim under Civ.R. 12(E).
University Hospitals sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the Eighth District’s ruling. Attorneys for the hospital assert that because the language of Civ.R.10(B)(2) makes it mandatory for the plaintiff in any medical liability action to include an affidavit of merit with his or her filing, the absence of such an affidavit rendered Fletcher’s complaint legally incomplete and invalid, and she therefore failed to present the court with a claim on which it could grant relief. They argue that the legislative intent underlying Civ.R.10(B)(2) is to prevent the filing of frivolous medical liability lawsuits by requiring plaintiffs to immediately produce enough evidence of possible malpractice to obtain the preliminary assent of a medical professional. In cases where a plaintiff does not meet this threshold test, they argue, the legislature intended for courts to promptly dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint as legally insufficient, as the trial court did in this case, rather than requiring defendants to file additional motions and go through additional pretrial proceedings to obtain dismissals to which they are legally entitled.
Attorneys for Fletcher point out that her initial complaint against the hospital and Dr. Onders, filed in 2003, did not include an affidavit of merit because it was filed prior to the adoption of Civ.R.10(B)(2), which established the affidavit requirement. They also ask the Court to note that it was not clear from case law in place at the time of her 2006 refiling that a wrongful death claim such as Fletcher’s fell within the statutory definition of a “medical liability” suit for which the affidavit requirement was applicable. Rather than allowing trial courts to summarily dismiss any complaint that appears to be a medical liability claim for failure to include an affidavit of merit, they urge the Court to instead require defendants to move for a more definite statement of the complaint, require trial courts to notify the plaintiff that its claim falls within the requirements of Civ.R.10(B)(2), and allow the plaintiff an opportunity to remedy the defect by filing the required affidavit before dismissing the case.
Contacts
Thomas J. Travers, 330.533.1700, for Monica Fletcher, administratrix of the estate of Victor Shaw.
Kevin M. Norchi, 216.514.9500, for University Hospitals of Cleveland.
Does Prisoner’s ‘Letter of Availability’ to Court Clerk Trigger Speedy Trial Time Limit on Pending Charges?
State of Ohio v. Douglas Centafanti, Case no. 2007-1744
5th District Cout of Appeals (Stark County)
ISSUE: Does delivery of a prisoner’s letter directed to a clerk of courts and municipal and county prosecutors advising them of his current place of incarceration and availability to answer pending criminal charges or warrants constitute “substantial compliance” with R.C. 2941.401 and trigger the running of the speedy-trial time limit within which the prisoner must be brought to trial on the pending charges?
BACKGROUND: Under Ohio’s “speedy trial” statute, R.C. 2945.71, if the state fails to bring a defendant to trial on a criminal charge within a specified number of days after he is arrested or a complaint is entered against him on that charge, the charge must be dismissed. The statute provides for certain circumstances under which the running of the speedy-trial time limit after arrest or indictment is stopped or “tolled.” One of those circumstances is when court officials are unable to serve notice of pending charges on a defendant because he cannot be located.
R.C. 2941.401 provides a procedure by which a person who is currently incarcerated can notify court officials in a given jurisdiction that he is available to answer criminal charges or warrants that are pending against him in that jurisdiction, and can request that the court proceed with disposition of those pending matters. Compliance with the notification requirements of R.C. 2941.401 formally places the state on notice of the prisoner’s availability and desire to proceed with disposition of pending charges, and triggers the running of a statutory 180-day “speedy trial” time limit.
In this case, the Alliance Municipal Court issued criminal complaints and arrest warrants for Douglas Centafanti on July 25, 2005, on charges of grand theft of a motor vehicle, attempted breaking and entering and obstructing official business. Centafanti was not arrested, and the warrants remained pending for several months.
In February 2006 an attorney representing Centafanti sent letters to the clerks of the Alliance Municipal Court and Stark County Court of Common Pleas, with copies to the municipal and county prosecutors, advising them that Centafanti was currently a prisoner serving a six-month term at the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center in Hubbard for a federal court conviction. The letters advised the addressees that Centafanti was “available for final adjudication of any and all indictments, informations, probation violations and/or complaints which are or may now be pending against him in your jurisdiction.” No action was taken by the municipal or county prosecutors in response to the letters.
In August 2006, following his release from jail, Centafanti was arrested and charged with the offenses set forth in the July 25, 2005, complaints. He subsequently entered motions for dismissal of all charges on speedy trial grounds, based on the state’s failure to bring him to trial within 180 days of receipt of his February 2006 letter of availability. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, convicted Centafanti on all three counts and sentenced him to nine months in prison, but stayed execution of the sentence pending his appeal of the denial of his speedy-trial motion. On review, the Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed all charges. The court of appeals ruled that Centafanti’s February 2006 letter had “substantially complied” with the notification requirements of R.C. 2941.401, and the state had violated his speedy trial rights by failing to bring him to trial within 180 days of receiving that notification.
Attorneys for the Stark County prosecutor’s office now ask the Supreme Court to overrule the Fifth District and reinstate Centafanti’s convictions. They argue that the court of appeals erred by not requiring Centafanti to strictly comply with the procedures set forth in R.C. 2941.401, which they say requires a prisoner to transmit his notification of availability through the warden of the penal institution in which he is housed, and to specifically request “final disposition” of charges or warrants pending against him.
Attorneys for Centafanti point out that the notification process set forth in R.C. 2941.401 presumes that the state has notified a prisoner of pending charges through the warden of the prison in which he is incarcerated. They urge the Court to affirm the Fifth District’s finding that, because the warden of the Hubbard facility had received no notification and had no independent knowledge of any charges or warrants pending against Centafanti, it was practically impossible for Centafanti to have “strictly complied” with the process set forth in the statute.
They argue that while Centafanti’s letter used the word “adjudication” in place of “disposition,” the clear legislative intent underlying the speedy trial and notification statutes is to require the state to act with reasonable diligence in bringing pending charges against already-incarcerated persons to trial once it has received notice that a prisoner is available and requests that the court proceed on those charges. In this case, they assert, Centafanti did everything in his power to advise the Alliance and Stark County prosecutors and court officials of his availability and desire to proceed with the complaints pending against him in their jurisdiction, and the state violated his speedy trial rights by failing to take any action in response to that notification.
Contacts
Kathleen O. Tatarsky, 330.451.7780, for the state and Stark County prosecutor’s office.
Jean Madden, 330.451.7200, for Douglas Centafanti.
Are Kidnapping and Aggravated Robbery ‘Allied Offenses of Similar Import’ That Must Be Merged?
State of Ohio v. Davon Winn, Case no. 2007-1842
2nd District Court of Appeals (Montgomery County)
ISSUE: When a criminal defendant is charged with both kidnapping and aggravated robbery based on the same incident, and a trial court finds that both crimes were committed, must the kidnapping count be merged with the robbery count for purposes of conviction and sentencing, or may the defendant be convicted and sentenced separately on both charges?
BACKGROUND: Ohio’s “multiple-count” statute, R.C. 2941.25, requires that when a defendant is charged with “allied offenses of similar import” based on the same conduct, and both crimes were based on the same “animus” (unlawful intent), if a trial court finds that both offenses were committed, it must merge the two charges into a single conviction and impose a sentence based on that single conviction. Court decisions interpreting R.C. 2941.25 require that in making its initial determination regarding whether two charges are “allied offenses of similar import,” a trial court should consider the statutory elements of the two crimes in the abstract, and should not rely on the specific facts of the defendant’s case in making that determination.
In this case, Davon Winn of Dayton was charged with kidnapping, aggravated robbery and several other charges based on his involvement in a January 2006 home-invasion incident. Winn and two co-defendants broke into the apartment of an acquaintance to steal what they believed was a cache of drugs and/or money hidden there. They unexpectedly encountered the acquaintance’s grandmother, with whom he lived. The defendants confronted the grandmother at gunpoint, forced her to go back to her bedroom and lay on the bed with a pillow over her head, and demanded that she tell them where the money was hidden. While Winn and his accomplices were still in the apartment, police, who had been summoned by a neighbor, arrived and arrested them. Winn was convicted on separate counts of kidnapping, aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, all with firearm specifications, and was sentenced to a total of 10 years in prison.
Winn appealed, asserting among other claims that the trial court erred when it failed to merge the kidnapping and aggravated robbery charges into a single conviction and sentence because those two crimes are “allied offenses of similar import” and were committed with the same animus. Citing language from a 1978 decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio, State v. Logan, the Second District Court of Appeals agreed with Winn’s argument that the offense of kidnapping is implicit in the commission of an aggravated robbery, and remanded the case to the trial court with a directive that the two charges be merged into a single conviction and that Winn be resentenced accordingly.
Attorneys for the Montgomery County prosecutor’s office, supported by an amicus curiae brief filed by the office of he Ohio Attorney General, sought and were granted Supreme Court review of the Second District’s ruling. They argue that the Supreme Court’s Logan decision is no longer valid precedent because the Court’s later decision in State v. Rance (1999) required that in order for two crimes to be allied offenses of similar import that are subject to merger, the statutory elements of those crimes must be analyzed in the abstract and found to “correspond to such a degree that the commission of one offense will necessarily result in the commission of the other.” They point out that the statutory elements of aggravated robbery, amended since Logan was decided, now include a requirement that the offender be in possession of a deadly weapon during or when fleeing the scene of a theft offense, whereas the statute defining kidnapping has no deadly weapon requirement but merely requires that the defendant move or restrain the movement of the victim “by force, threat or deception.” Thus, they contend, the trial court was not required to merge the kidnapping and robbery counts in Winn’s case because an abstract analysis of the elements of those crimes does not show that committing one offense will necessarily result in committing the other.
Attorneys for Winn urge the Court to affirm its reasoning in Logan that robbery and kidnapping are allied offenses of similar import because “...when a person commits the crime of robbery, he must, by the very nature of the crime, restrain the victim for a sufficient amount of time to complete the robbery.” They argue that the above analysis has not been overruled by Rance or any subsequent Supreme Court decisions, and cite several later decisions that they say reinforced the non-syllabus language in Logan. They contend that the state’s argument focusing on a single divergence in the elements of the two crimes is contrary to the Supreme Court’s recent holding in State v. Cabrales (April 2008) that trial courts determining whether criminal counts are subject to merger “are not required to find an exact alignment of the elements” of those crimes.
Contacts
Jill R. Sink, 937.225.4117, for the state and Montgomery County prosecutor’s office.
Jeremy J. Masters, 614.466.5394, for Davon Winn.
May Juvenile Court Adopt Parents’ Agreement To Reduce or Forgive Child Support Arrearage?
Christina Lynn Byrd n.k.a. Reeder v. Brian Kelly Knuckles, Case no. 2007-1913
12th District Court of Appeals (Clermont County)
ISSUE: Does Ohio law allow a juvenile court to ratify an agreement to reduce or forgive an existing arrearage in child support payments when that agreement has been voluntarily entered into by the obligor and obligee parents? If so, does a court abuse its discretion by refusing to adopt an agreement between parents to forgive or abate a child support arrearage without making findings supporting a conclusion that the abatement agreement between the parents is unreasonable?
BACKGROUND: In this case, the Court is asked to determine whether Ohio’s child support statutes barred the Clermont County Juvenile Court from adopting a reduction in the amount of a pre-existing child support arrearage to reflect an agreement between Brian Knuckles, a father who was delinquent in paying child support, and Christina Byrd Reeder, the custodial mother to whom that support was owed. In their out-of-court agreement, Knuckles and Reeder agreed to a 50 percent reduction in Knuckles’ child support debt to Reeder in consideration of his assistance in accomplishing the adoption of the couple’s child by Reeder’s new husband.
After the adoption of the child was completed, the court released Knuckles from its order requiring him to pay future child support. But when Knuckles filed a subsequent motion to have the court alter its record to reflect the agreed-upon 50-percent reduction in his arrearage for prior support payments he had failed to make, the court ruled that it had no authority to adopt such an adjustment. Knuckles appealed, and the 12th District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, citing its own earlier ruling in a 2005 decision Bonenfant v. Bonenfant, that under R.C. 3119.83 a court cannot retroactively modify an obligor’s duty to pay past-due child support.
Attorneys for Knuckles now ask the Supreme Court to overrule the trial court and 12th District. They point to decisions from several other Ohio courts of appeals holding that juvenile courts may adopt an adjustment or elimination of a pre-existing child support arrearage based on an agreement of the parties where the consideration received for the abatement is fair and reasonable and there is no involvement of public assistance or a support processing fee. They argue that neither a juvenile court nor a child support enforcement agency has an ownership interest in a child support arrearage, and assert that the law should not be read to grant either agency an absolute “veto” that prevents the obligor and obligee of such a debt from entering into a private agreement that adjusts the debt to their mutual satisfaction so long as the terms of the agreement are reasonable and no public funds are implicated.
Attorneys for the Clermont County Division of Child Support Enforcement, supported by amicus curiae (friend of the court) briefs filed by the Butler County Child Support Enforcement Agency and the Ohio Child Support Directors Association, also urge the Court to overrule the decisions of the Clermont County Juvenile Court and 12th District Court of Appeals and hold that juvenile courts may and should ratify voluntary agreements between parents to reduce or forgive past child support arrearages so long as they are reasonable, have not been coerced, and reflect true and valuable consideration.
They contend that the language of R.C. 3119.83 bars a juvenile court or support enforcement agency from taking action on their own to “retroactively modify an obligor’s duty to pay delinquent support payment,” but should not be interpreted as preventing a court’s adoption of a voluntary agreement in which the parties to a child support order have freely consented to an adjustment of an arrearage based on their own determination that such an adjustment is mutually beneficial.
Contacts
George E. Pattison, 513.732.3800, for Brian Knuckles.
Theresa B. Ellison, 513.732.7429, for the Clermont County Child Support Enforcement Division.
These informal previews are prepared by the Supreme Court's Office of Public Information to provide the news media and other interested persons with a brief overview of the legal issues and arguments advanced by the parties in upcoming cases scheduled for oral argument. The previews are not part of the case record, and are not considered by the Court during its deliberations.
Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.