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by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer
In most crime novels and television courtroom dramas the focus is on the part of the trial that proves the guilt of the defendant. The more mundane sentencing phase of the trial is usually mentioned only in passing, if at all. But determining the appropriate sentence is an important part of the criminal justice process, even if it’s not exciting enough for TV.
The issue of sentencing provided the focus of a case that we recently reviewed here at the Ohio Supreme Court involving a man named Kevin Johnson. A jury found Johnson guilty of four counts of rape, each with a finding that the victim was under ten years old.
The trial court sentenced Johnson to a mandatory term of life imprisonment for each of his four convictions, and ordered him to serve his convictions consecutively. The trial court found that “since the conviction on each count requires a mandatory sentence,” in accordance with the mandatory sentencing law, “the Court is required by law to run each sentence consecutively.”
What is the trial court referring to when it mentions the mandatory sentencing law? Some years ago, the Ohio General Assembly enacted legislation that established definitive sentences for an array of offenses. The law limited a court’s ability to reduce sentences unless particular criteria were met, such as participation in certain programs or credit for confinement while awaiting trial.
So, in Johnson’s case, the court ruled that the sentences must run consecutively “since the conviction on each count requires a mandatory sentence.” Later, when the court of appeals reviewed the case, it affirmed that judgment.
The court of appeals determined that the mandatory sentencing law implicitly required the imposition of consecutive prison terms for multiple rape convictions. “Anything less would diminish the intended effect of the mandatory sentences, and would render such sentences not truly mandatory.”
The court of appeals went on to say that it did not interpret the language of the mandatory sentencing law “to allow for the possibility of a ‘volume discount,’ where a defendant essentially serves one term for the commission of multiple, serious crimes for which mandatory prison terms are required.”
When the case came to our court, the question before us was this: Is a trial court required to impose consecutive sentences when a defendant is convicted of multiple counts of an offense that is listed in the mandatory sentence law?
In arguing his case, Johnson acknowledged that the law requires a court to impose mandatory prison terms for convictions for any of the offenses enumerated in the statute. He maintained, however, that nothing in the plain language of the statute requires a court to impose those mandatory prison terms consecutively when an offender is convicted of multiple offenses.
Johnson argued that when the legislature intends to require sentencing courts to impose mandatory sentences consecutively, it explicitly states its intention.
The state, countering that argument, said the mandatory sentencing law provides that “the court shall impose a prison term or terms,” and then it limits the court’s ability to reduce the offender’s sentence. The state maintained, therefore, that the statute requires a sentencing court to impose the terms for multiple convictions consecutively.
The state argued that permitting an offender to serve the mandatory sentences for multiple convictions concurrently would impermissibly reduce the sentences and render them not truly mandatory.
So which is it? Does the law require the sentences to be served consecutively? Or can they be served concurrently?
The mandatory sentencing law lists a host of offenses which require the court to impose a sentence that cannot be reduced. The list includes aggravated murder or murder, gross sexual imposition or sexual battery, aggravated vehicular homicide, and certain felony drug offenses. Also included in this list is “any rape, regardless of whether force was involved and regardless of the age of the victim…”
Further along, the law enumerates additional offenses and circumstances under which an offender shall serve his sentences consecutively. One section of the law requires consecutive sentences if a person carries a firearm while committing a felony. For instance, if a person commits the felony of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, “the offender shall serve any mandatory prison term…consecutively to any other mandatory prison term” previously imposed.
When courts are trying to construe a statute, a “preeminent concern” is the legislative intent in enacting that statute. A court must apply an unambiguous statute in a manner consistent with the plain meaning of the statutory language.
The plain language of the law in question in this case requires the sentencing court to impose a prison term for certain serious offenses. And it limits that court's discretion to reduce that term except in certain enumerated circumstances. But the word “consecutive” never appears in the statute. When the legislature intends a sentencing court to impose multiple sentences consecutively, it explicitly states that intention.
In writing the majority opinion for our court, Justice Terrence O’Donnell said that while the mandatory sentencing law “reveals the intent of the legislature that a sentencing court impose mandatory prison terms” for certain offenses, “our review of that statute reveals no language demonstrating any legislative intent to require a sentencing court to impose those terms consecutively to each other or to any other sentence.”
Therefore, we determined – by a seven-to-zero vote – that the statute in question does not require a sentencing court to impose consecutive sentences for multiple rape convictions. “Instead,” Justice O’Donnell wrote, “after the sentencing court imposes a separate prison term for each conviction, it may exercise its discretion to determine whether consecutive sentences are appropriate based upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case.”
In this case, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences for Johnson’s four rape convictions based upon its mistaken belief that the law required it to do so. With our decision, the case goes back to the trial court, which may now exercise its discretion to determine whether the particular facts and circumstances warrant the imposition of consecutive sentences.EDITOR'S NOTE: The case referred to is State v. Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 541, 2008-Ohio-69. Case No. 2006-2154. Decided Jan. 16, 2008. Majority opinion written by Justice Terrence O'Donnell.