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by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer
Somewhere in Huron County, up in northern Ohio, there’s a corridor of property that was once owned by a railroad. Not surprisingly, the property once had railroad tracks running along its length. But sometime prior to 1979, the railroad ceased its operations and removed the track, ties, and other fixtures from its property.
That’s when Richard Houck, Ronald Sparks, Eldon Smith, and the Stieber Brothers moved onto the property. Houck and the others are farmers who had property near the railroad corridor. When they entered the railroad property they constructed a road, installed a cable to limit access to the road, planted crops, and otherwise used a drainage ditch in cultivating their farmland.
Houck and the other farmers hadn’t actually purchased the land. Rather, they had acquired it through what’s known as adverse possession. Under the doctrine of adverse possession, a plaintiff can acquire legal title to another person’s real property if he or she proves exclusive possession and open, notorious, and continuous use adverse to the owner for a period of 21 years.
But in 1997, the Northwest Ohio Rails to Trails Association, Inc. (NORTA) actually purchased the railroad property. A year later NORTA sold the property to six park districts in the area for the purpose of constructing a segment of a recreational trail that will run through several northern Ohio counties.
In February 2001, the Huron County Park Department sent a letter to Houck and his associates explaining that the railroad property would be used for a recreational trail when finances permitted, but until then, they were welcome to continue farming the property.
In October 2003, Houck and the others filed suit seeking title to the property, arguing they had acquired it through adverse possession. But the trial court held that a park district is immune from a claim of adverse possession and that the park districts’ purchase of the railroad property in 1998 terminated the farmers’ continuous possession of the property at 19 years – two years short of the 21 years required by adverse possession. The court of appeals affirmed that ruling, and then the case came before us – the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The question before us was this: can adverse possession be applied against a park district? By a six-to-one vote, our court determined that the underlying legal principles of adverse possession do not apply to park districts.
Generally speaking, adverse possession does not apply against the state. Early court cases, dating back to the 1800s, recognized that the state was not subject to adverse possession, but those cases declined to extend that immunity to other subdivisions of the state.
In 1969, our court addressed whether adverse possession could be invoked against a school district. The court back then determined that a school district had authority to acquire, hold, possess, and dispose of property, and thus it was subject to a claim of adverse possession.
Houck and his associates argued that the school district case should apply to their situation, because a park district has the same authority to acquire, hold, and possess property. But the majority didn’t agree.
According to the majority, the school district case doesn’t apply because a school district is distinguishable from a park district on grounds of public policy. The very purpose of a park district, the majority argued, is the “preservation of good order within and adjacent to parks and reservations of land, and for the protection and preservation of the parks, parkways, and other reservations of land under its jurisdiction and control and of property and natural life therein.”
I cast the dissenting vote in this case in part because I think the majority’s public-policy arguments were misplaced.
In the past, our court has recognized that a park district’s “conservation of natural resources” serves the “health and general welfare of the community.” Thus the majority concluded that “to permit adverse possession of park-district property would interfere with the public’s enjoyment and use of park lands as well as with a park district’s obligation to conserve and protect park property.”
But in this case, the park district actually encouraged Houck and his fellow farmers to keep using the land until the park district needed it. The park district’s long-term plan was not conservation but the development of a bicycle path. The parkland at issue includes a railbed and a drainage ditch as its most prominent features – not exactly the stuff of postcards.
The bike path is a project of the future and probably always will be – the drainage ditch may sooner become the Grand Canyon of Huron County. Public policy does not require that park districts be able to hold property ad infinitum with vague dreams of one day improving it.
The majority also argues that a park district should not be expected to be as vigilant in monitoring its property for trespassers as a private property owner. Several other park districts that were interested in this case argued that park-district property boundaries are difficult to monitor for several reasons: the large size of the property and its remote nature; the lack of resources to adequately monitor property boundaries; the lack of boundary markers; and environmental covenants with the Ohio EPA that prevent fencing of some park property.
But a once-every-21 year walkabout does not seem like too heavy a burden even for the most financially strapped park district. After all, to successfully assert adverse possession, the claiming party must show that his use was “open” and “notorious.” Someone seeking adverse possession shouldn’t be that difficult to spot. Moreover, park districts should attempt to be aware of any dangerous areas that might be accessed by citizens using the property.
For these reasons, I would have held that Houck and his associates should be granted title to the property through adverse possession. Nevertheless, the majority saw things differently and thus the ruling of our court is that property owned by a park district is not subject to adverse possession.EDITOR'S NOTE: The case referred to is Houck v. Bd. of Park Commrs. Of the Huron Cty. Park Dist., 116 Ohio St.3d 148, 2007-Ohio-5586. Case No. 2006-1517. Decided Oct. 25, 2007. Majority opinion written by Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton.