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2007-0996. VIL Laser Sys., L.L.C. v. Shiloh Industries, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2008-Ohio-3920.
Shelby App. No. 17-07-02. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Moyer, C.J., and Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
Pfeifer and Cupp, JJ., dissent.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-3920.pdf
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(Aug. 13, 2008) In a ruling announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a trial court order allowing a plaintiff a period of time in which to choose between “remittitur” (a judicially reduced damage award) and a new trial on the issue of damages is not a final, appealable order that starts the running of the 30-day time limit for filing an appeal. The Court’s 5-2 decision was authored by Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger.
The case involved a dispute between two businesses in which VIL Laser Systems asserted claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment against Shiloh Industries in the Shelby County Court of Common Pleas. The court granted VIL’s motion for summary judgment finding Shiloh liable in the case, and conducted a jury trial to determine VIL’s damages. The jury awarded VIL damages totaling $2,290,000. Shiloh filed a motion alleging that the jury’s damage award was not supported by the evidence and asking the judge either to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, order a new trial on the issue of damages, or exercise the option of remittitur. The power of remittitur authorizes a trial court to reduce a jury award that the court finds excessive to an amount that the court finds to be supported by the evidence, and to offer the plaintiff the option either to accept the remittitur amount as full compensation for its damages or go through a new trial.
On Dec. 15, 2006, the trial court entered an order setting aside the jury’s damage award and granting a new trial on damages or, in the alternative, remittitur to VIL in the amount of $2,016,416.22, including prejudgment interest. The order included language indicating that it was “an appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(3),” and gave VIL 14 days to accept or reject the remittitur. On Dec. 29, VIL filed a written acceptance of the remittitur. On Jan. 25, 2007, Shiloh filed an appeal of the trial court’s judgment in the 3rd District Court of Appeals. VIL entered a motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis that it had not been filed within 30 days after the trial court entered its Dec. 15, 2006, order granting a new trial or remittitur. The 3rd District granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the 30-day time limit within which Shiloh was required to appeal had begun to run on Dec. 15, and therefore had expired before Shiloh’s appeal was filed on Jan. 25. Shiloh sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 3rd District’s ruling.
In today’s decision the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the 3rd District. Justice Lanzinger wrote: “VIL argues that the trial court’s December 15 order was final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02(B)(3), which defines as final an order that ‘vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial.’ VIL argues that the December 15 order alternatively granted two of the remedies contemplated by R.C. 2505.02(B)(3) because it set aside the judgment and granted a new trial on damages. The trial court also specifically stated that the order was ‘an appealable order under 2505.02(B)(3)’”
“If the trial court had simply granted a new trial, the order undoubtedly would have been a final, appealable order. However, this court has held that a trial court cannot order remittitur without the plaintiff’s consent. … When the trial court in this case issued its order, it explicitly stated that ‘[j]udgment shall be entered against Defendant Shiloh Industries, Inc. for Total Contract Damages in the amount of $1,580,568.52 upon the consent of the Plaintiff.’ (Emphasis added.) Therefore, by the explicit terms of the trial court’s order, judgment could not have been entered until VIL made a decision about the remittitur. The order was not final until the plaintiff elected either the new trial on damages or the remittitur, notwithstanding the trial court’s language calling it final and appealable. R.C. 2505.02(B)(3) does not apply, because the trial court’s order did not simply grant a new trial. The court granted a new trial contingent on VIL’s election of a remedy at some future point.”
While noting that there are no prior Ohio court decisions addressing when an order offering a new trial or remittitur becomes final for purposes of appeal, Justice Lanzinger cited multiple federal court cases, including two U.S. Supreme Court decisions and a 2001 decision of the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that such orders are not final and appealable.
She concluded: “We think that the federal approach is logical and meets the goals of finality of judgments and judicial economy. A posttrial order that sets forth a time frame for the exercise of an option by a party is not a final, appealable order until the party’s choice is made or until the time for choosing has expired. In light of the foregoing, we hold that an order allowing a plaintiff a period of time in which to choose between remittitur and a new trial on damages is not a final, appealable order. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Shelby County and remand the cause to that court.”
Justice Lanzinger’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O’Connor and Terrence O’Donnell.
Justice Robert R. Cupp entered a dissent, joined by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, stating that in his view: “The trial court order in question falls squarely within R.C. 2505.02(B)(3). That provision specifically defines a final, appealable order as one that ‘vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial.’ The trial court’s order in this case did just that – it set aside the judgment and granted a new trial on damages.”
While acknowledging that the trial court order also offered VIL the option of accepting remittitur in lieu of a new trial, Justice Cupp wrote: “The order was still final and appealable even with the optional language because it disposed of the merits of the case and left nothing for the determination of the court. ... The only remaining issue – plaintiff’s consent to remittitur – was merely ‘mechanical’ and involved only a ‘ministerial task.’ Accordingly, I believe the court of appeals was correct to dismiss the appeal and cross-appeal as untimely. I would therefore affirm its judgment.”
Contacts
Thomas D. Warren, 216.621.0200, for Shiloh Industries, Inc.
James L. Thieman. 937.492.1271, for VIL Laser Systems LLC.