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2007-0525. Nadra v. Mbah, Slip Opinion No. 2008-Ohio-3918.
Franklin App. No. 06AP-829, 2007-Ohio-501. Judgment reversed.
Moyer, C.J., and Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Pfeifer and Lanzinger, JJ., dissent.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-3918.pdf
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(Aug. 12, 2008) In a case that questioned whether Ohio’s deadline for filing civil rights actions under Section 1983, Title 42 of the U.S. Code is two years or four years, the Supreme Court of Ohio held today that such cases are subject to the two-year time limit imposed by Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.10, which the Court identified as Ohio’s “general statute of limitations” for personal injury actions. The Court’s 5-2 majority opinion was written by Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton.
Following an investigation of reports that Iyabo Nadra of Columbus was abusing her minor son, two employees of Franklin County Children Services (FCCS), Susan Mbah and Mindy Grote, filed a complaint in juvenile court on Jan. 3, 2002, that resulted in an order granting temporary custody of the child to FCCS. On Aug. 20, 2002, the juvenile court terminated FCCS’s temporary custody and granted permanent custody of Nadra’s son to the child’s father.
In February 2005, Nadra filed a civil lawsuit against Mbah and Grote asserting multiple claims including that the child abuse complaint against her was false and that FCCS, Mbah and Grote had violated her rights under Section 1983, Title 42 of the federal civil rights act.
In response to Nadra’s suit, Mbah and Grote entered a motion seeking summary judgment in their favor. They argued that Nadra had not filed her complaint within the statute of limitations (time limit) applicable to her legal claims, which they asserted was two years from the date of injury. The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas awarded summary judgment in favor of Mbah and Grote on all claims, finding that the two-year time limit set forth in Ohio R.C. 2305.10 and R.C. 2744.04 was applicable to all of Nadra’s claims, and that her February 2005 suit had not been filed within that time limit.
On review, the 10th District Court of Appeals partially reversed the trial court. The appellate panel held that the statute of limitations applicable to Nadra’s Section 1983 claims was four years, as provided in R.C. 2305.09(D). Since Nadra’s civil rights claims had been asserted within four years of the events on which they were based, the 10th District reinstated those portions of her suit and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Mbah and Grote sought and were granted Supreme Court review of the court of appeals ruling.
Writing for the majority in today’s decision, Justice Stratton traced the judicial history of Section 1983 lawsuits against state officials from 1871 to the present. She noted that because the federal statute does not set forth its own time limit for filing suit under its provisions, and different states have established different statutes of limitations for various types of tort claims, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Owens v. Okure (1988) that the filing of Section 1983 claims in each state is subject to that state’s “general statute of limitations” applicable to personal injury actions.
In this case, Justice Stratton wrote: “(T)he court of appeals held that for purposes of Section 1983 claims, R.C. 2305.09(D) is Ohio’s residual statute of limitations for unspecified personal-injury actions. Appellants argue that R.C. 2305.10 is the appropriate statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions.”
In comparing the two statutes, Justice Stratton wrote: “Clearly, R.C. 2305.10 applies to most cases involving bodily injury. For example, we have recognized that ‘[w]hen bodily injury results from negligence, the two-year statute of limitations, R.C. 2305.10, is the appropriate statute of limitations.’ Love v. Port Clinton (1988) ... We have also held that claims of humiliation and loss of reputation allege ‘personal injury’ and are governed by the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.10, not the four-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.09(D). Lawyers Coop. Publ’g Co. v. Muething (1992). ... Thus, R.C. 2305.10 applies to personal injury, including bodily injury, harassment, and loss of reputation.”
“We also find that, compared to R.C. 2305.10, R.C. 2305.09(D) applies to a relatively narrow range of personal injury claims. In Okure, the court rejected intentional-tort statutes of limitation as governing Section 1983 claims finding an intentional tort analogy ‘particularly inapposite in light of the wide spectrum of claims which § 1983 has come to span.’ We similarly find that the range of actions governed by R.C. 2305.09(D) is too narrow to apply to Section 1983, because R.C. 2305.09(D) specifically excludes claims governed by R.C. 2305.10, which applies to a host of personal-injury actions. ... Therefore, we hold that R.C. 2305.10 is Ohio’s general statute of limitations for personal injury applicable to all claims under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code, filed in state court.”
Applying the two-year statute of limitations to Nadra’s Section 1983 claims against Mbah and Grote, Justice Stratton concluded: “The child-abuse complaint was filed on January 3, 2002, and the permanent custody of Nadra’s child was awarded to the child’s father on August 20, 2002, thereby effectively terminating FCCS’s authority over Nadra’s child. The cognizable events in this case for purposes of the statute of limitations were the filing of the child-abuse complaint and the award of permanent custody. Both occurred more than two years prior to the filing of Nadra’s complaint on February 25, 2005. Thus, Nadra’s complaint is barred by the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.10. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.”
Justice Stratton’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Paul E. Pfeifer entered a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger, in which he asserted that the majority’s analysis was unnecessary since R.C. 2305.09(D) deals specifically with the types of claim that Nadra raised. He wrote that the court had previously held in 1946 St. Clair Corp. v. Cleveland (1990) that the essence of a Section 1983 claim is that the conduct of a person acting under color of state law “ ‘deprive the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.’ ”
Justice Pfeifer wrote that R.C. 2305.09(D) addresses such an injury: “R.C. 2305.09(D) provides a four-year limitations period for ‘an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on contract nor enumerated in sections 1304.35, 2305.10 to 2305.12, and 2305.14 of the Revised Code.’ What is a claim brought pursuant to Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code but an allegation of an ‘injury to the rights of the plaintiff”?” wrote Justice Pfeifer. “Ohio has a statute of limitations that exactly applies to the injuries Nadra alleges. Instead of applying it, the majority undergoes a laborious, United States Supreme Court -authorized analysis to determine that the sky is chartreuse. It merely had to look up to see that it’s blue.”
Contacts
R. Matthew Colon, 614.462.3520, for Susan Mbah and Mindy Grote.
Iyabo Nadra, pro se: No contact information available.