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2007-1478. State v. Jeffries, Slip Opinion No. 2008-Ohio-3865.
Lake App. No. 2005-L-057, 2007-Ohio-3366. Judgment reversed.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-3865.pdf
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(Aug. 7, 2008) In a 7-0 decision announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a rule of evidence (Evid.R. 410) that bars the state from using a defendant’s statements made during plea discussions as evidence against her at trial does not extend to statements made outside the context of a plea discussion, even if those statements were later provided to the state in the course of plea discussions. The Court’s opinion was written by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer.
The case involved Jennifer Jeffries of Lake County, who was a suspect in a drug-related murder. After the crime had been under investigation for more than 18 months without an indictment, Jeffries gave her attorney a different account of the events surrounding the crime than she had initially reported. To test the veracity of this “new story,” in which Jeffries stated that she had no knowledge of or responsibility for the murder and identified her husband as the killer, defense counsel retained the services of a private polygraph operator to whom Jeffries gave a voluntary written statement and who subsequently tested her regarding her new account of the crime.
Jeffries and her attorneys subsequently entered into a cooperation agreement with prosecutors which was to grant her immunity from all charges related to the murder. Before entering into the agreement, an assistant public defender informed the state that Jeffries had previously passed a polygraph test and described some of the questions that had been asked. Additionally, the statement that Jeffries had submitted to the polygraphist was provided to the state. The agreement required Jeffries to cooperate with prosecutors and submit to a polygraph to confirm her truthfulness. Jeffries failed the polygraph and fled the jurisdiction, and the agreement became void. Consequently, she was indicted on several charges arising from the murder.
Prior to trial, Jeffries’s counsel asked the court to suppress the statement she had made to the polygraphist. The court denied the request. At trial, Jeffries was convicted of trafficking in cocaine; tampering with evidence; involuntary manslaughter, with a firearm specification; complicity to robbery, with a firearm specification; and murder, with a firearm specification.
On review, the 11th District Court of Appeals reversed Jeffries’ convictions, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by not suppressing her statement to the polygraphist. The court of appeals based its holding on its conclusion that the statement was made “in the course of plea negotiations” and was therefore inadmissible at trial under Evid.R. 410.
In today’s decision, the Supreme Court unanimously overturned the ruling of the 11th District and reinstated Jeffries’ convictions.
“It is clear from the language of Evid.R. 410(A)(5) that the rule protects statements that were originally made in the course of plea discussions – not statements that were made prior to plea negotiations and later provided to the state,” wrote Chief Justice Moyer. ... “We have held that in order for statements to be protected by Evid.R. 410, it is necessary that ‘at the time of the statements, the accused had a subjective expectation that a plea was being negotiated.’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Frazier (1995). ... We also held that the subjective belief of the accused must have been ‘reasonable under the circumstances.’ Frazier thus stands for the principle that Evid.R. 410 protects the statements of an accused when, at the time the statements were originally made, the accused had both a subjective and an objectively reasonable expectation that a plea was being negotiated. Frazier does not stand for the principle that Evid.R. 410 protects the statements of an accused when, at the time the statements were provided to the state by the accused or his or her attorney, the accused had an expectation that a plea was being negotiated.”
“A defendant cannot protect existing statements by providing them to the prosecution in the course of plea discussions. ... The statement at issue here was made far in advance of plea discussions, and there is no evidence that Jeffries believed that her statement to the polygraphist was made in the course of plea discussions. Indeed, the court of appeals recognized that the parties ‘were not engaged in active plea negotiations in October 2002’ and that Jeffries ‘may not have had a subjective expectation that her counsel was preparing for a plea negotiation at the time the statement was given.’ That conclusion should have directed the court of appeals to simply apply the plain words of the rule to the facts in the record and affirm the judgment of the trial court. That the statement was later provided to the prosecution in the course of plea discussions is irrelevant. Jeffries’s statement was not protected by Evid.R. 410.”
Contacts
Karen A. Sheppert, 440.350.2683, for the state and Lake County prosecutor’s office.
Vanessa R. Clapp, 440.350.3200, for Jennifer Jeffries.