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2007-0140. Barnes v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, Slip Opinion No. 2008-Ohio-3344.
Cuyahoga App. Nos. 87247, 87285, 87710, 87903, and 87946, 2006-Ohio-6266. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and cause remanded.
Moyer, C.J., and O'Connor, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Pfeifer, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
Lundberg Stratton and O'Donnell, JJ., dissent.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-3344.pdf
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(July 9, 2008) In a case that raised two separate and unrelated issues of law, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that: 1) a retired judge who was never elected but served as a judge by appointment of the governor is eligible to serve as a private judge under R.C. 2701.10; and 2) a court reviewing an award of punitive damages for excessiveness must independently analyze that award according to three specific standards set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore.
The majority opinion was authored by Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger.
This case involved a civil lawsuit filed against University Hospitals of Cleveland and MedLink, a provider of home health care services, by the estate and surviving family members of a mentally handicapped and epileptic patient, Natalie Barnes. Barnes suffered a coronary embolism that ultimately resulted in her death when she dislodged a catheter from her abdomen while undergoing kidney dialysis treatment at University Hospital. Because of Barnes’ disabilities and a known tendency to pull at or attempt to remove the catheter during her dialysis treatments, the MedLink aides who transported Barnes to the hospital for dialysis were required to remain at her bedside and observe her at all times during the procedure. On the date she suffered the embolism, Barnes was being attended by a new MedLink employee, Endia Hill. Hill left Barnes unattended in the dialysis treatment area for an extended period, and was in another part of the building when Barnes dislodged the catheter, causing her fatal injury. It was later determined at trial that Hill did not meet Medlink’s stated minimum educational standard to be hired as a home health aide. Hill had also admitted on her employment application that she had a prior felony conviction.
Barnes’ estate and family members sued the hospital and MedLink seeking damages for wrongful death and on survivorship claims. The parties exercised their option under R.C. 2701.10 to resolve the case through “private judging,” and signed a written agreement to a jury trial under the supervision of a retired judge the parties would select. The agreement included a provision confirming both sides’ acceptance of the authority of the private judge and foregoing any rights to challenge that authority on appeal. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages of $100,000 on the survivorship claim and $3 million on the wrongful death claim, plus an additional award of $3 million in punitive damages. University Hospitals paid its share of the damages, set by the jury at 10 percent, and is no longer a party in the case.
MedLink filed motions with the trial court seeking reduction or elimination of the punitive damage award and asking for a hearing on those motions. The private judge denied the motions without an evidentiary hearing. In his opinion, the judge held that the jury’s punitive damage award was not “grossly excessive” under the standard applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell (2003).
MedLink appealed the private judge’s ruling to the 8th District Court of Appeals, asserting among other claims that he had failed to review the punitive damage award according to three specific standards set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in BMW of North America v. Gore. MedLink also asserted that the trial court’s decision should be set aside in its entirety because the private judge did not meet the statutory qualifications to serve as a private judge. The private judge had retired from the bench after having been appointed to a vacant position by Governor Bob Taft, but had never been elected to judicial office. The court of appeals affirmed the private judge’s eligibility to hear the case, and upheld his ruling that the punitive damage award was not excessive.
MedLink appealed the 8th District’s decision, asserting five assignments of error. The Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments only on the issues of the private judge’s eligibility to hear the case and whether the trial court erred by failing to specifically apply the three Gore criteria in ruling on whether the punitive damage award was excessive.
Writing for the Court in today’s decision, Justice Lanzinger affirmed the ruling of the court of appeals that the private judge who presided over the trial met the eligibility criteria set forth in the private judging statute. While acknowledging that the definition of a “voluntarily retired judge” eligible to serve as a private judge in Gov.Jud.R. VI(C)(2) includes only a person “who was elected to and served on an Ohio court...,” Justice Lanzinger wrote: “The text of R.C. 2701.10 clearly does not differentiate between appointed judges and elected judges concerning eligibility for private judging. Either a ‘voluntarily retired judge’ or ‘any judge who is retired under Section 6 of Article IV, Ohio Constitution’ (emphasis added.) may be eligible to serve as a private judge.... The rule seems to limit the term ‘voluntarily retired judge’ to one who has been ‘elected to’ an Ohio court. The omission of appointed judges from the definition overlooks the alternative method by which judges take office. For this reason, the definition appears to be underinclusive in its scope. The definition in Gov. Jud. R.VI(C) of ‘voluntarily retired judge’ improperly restricts eligibility to elected judges when there is no evidence that the legislature had any such restriction in mind in drafting R.C. 2701.10. Thus, the definition violates the principle that rules for implementing a statute may not add to or restrict the terms of the statute.”
Noting that Section 6, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution specifically refers to the “election or appointment” of a judge, Justice Lanzinger concluded: “Because the statute refers to the constitutional provision which recognizes the two methods of judicial selection, the statute may be read to include both elected and appointed judges, thereby harmonizing the rule and the statute. Thus, the statute itself is not ambiguous and neither it or the rule excludes non-elected retired judges from accepting civil referrals. Accordingly, we hold that a retired judge who has never been elected but who has been appointed to the position of judge is eligible to receive civil referrals and serve as a private judge pursuant to R.C. 2701.10.”
In ruling on the separate issue of whether the trial court’s punitive damage award was “grossly excessive,” the Court reversed the 8th District’s ruling upholding the $3 million figure set by the jury and remanded the case to the court of appeals for analysis of the punitive award under the specific criteria set forth in Gore.
Justice Lanzinger wrote: “A line of cases announced by the United States Supreme Court, starting with Gore, guides us in reviewing punitive damage awards alleged to be unconstitutionally excessive. ... The court set forth three guideposts to use in evaluating whether a lack of notice renders a punitive damage award grossly excessive and therefore unconstitutional: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct, (2) the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive-damages award, and (3) the difference between the award and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. ... In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, the court reversed the Utah Supreme Court’s reinstatement of a $145 million punitive damage award, holding that ‘[w]hile States enjoy considerable discretion in deducing when punitive damages are warranted, each award must comport with the principles set forth in Gore.’ Thus, while Gore advised that states apply the guideposts, State Farm turned the advisory into an edict.”
She concluded: “Thus, a court reviewing an award of punitive damages for excessiveness must independently analyze (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the party’s conduct, (2) the ratio of the punitive damages to the actual harm inflicted, and (3) sanctions for comparable conduct. The principles set forth in Gore must be implemented with care to ensure both reasonableness and proportionality. The court of appeals erred in failing to consider these factors in assessing the award in this case.”
The majority opinion was joined in its entirety by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Maureen O’Connor and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Paul E. Pfeifer concurred with the majority’s holding that a retired appointed judge is eligible to serve as a private judge, but dissented from the Court’s reversal and remand of the punitive damages issue to the court of appeals. He wrote: “The appellants in the court of appeals extensively briefed the Gore guideposts. The court of appeals stated, ‘Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and the arguments of all parties, we find no merit in any of the assignments of error....’ Instead of assuming that the court of appeals ignored the Gore guideposts, we should presume that the court did what it says it did: it considered all relevant constitutional standards. Thus, there is simply no reason to remand this cause so that the court of appeals can repeat its review of the Gore guideposts.”
Justice Terrence O’Donnell entered a dissent, joined by Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, indicating that he would vacate the entire trial court decision and verdict and remand the case for retrial based on this Court’s 2006 holding in State ex rel Russo v. McDonnell. In Russo, Justice O’Donnell noted, the Court held that the plain language of the private judging statute confers jurisdiction on private judges to conduct only bench trials. He wrote: “Here, a retired judge conducted a jury trial in contravention of R.C. 2701.10, which authorizes only bench trials. These actions were unauthorized, unlawful, and therefore void. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, vacate the verdict, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. If the parties request a jury trial, then those proceedings should be conducted by a judge elected or appointed in accordance with law.”
Contacts
James M. Roper, 614.221.2121, for MedLink of Ohio.
Paul W. Flowers, 216.344.9393, for Robert Barnes (father and executor of Natalie Barnes).