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2007-0307. Dworning v. Euclid, Slip Opinion No. 2008-Ohio-3318.
Cuyahoga App. No. 87757, 2006-Ohio-6772. Judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-3318.pdf
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(July 8, 2008) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that a public employee alleging employment discrimination in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112 is not required to exhaust the administrative remedy of an appeal to a civil service commission before pursuing a civil lawsuit against the employer as authorized in R.C. 4112.99. The Court’s 7-0 decision was authored by Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger.
The case involved a workplace discrimination lawsuit filed against the city of Euclid by Michael Dworning, who served as a firefighter for almost 30 years. Dworning was serving as the city’s fire chief on March 4, 2004, when the mayor sent a letter to the Euclid Civil Service Commission stating that he was terminated from his position effective Feb. 20, 2004. Although the Euclid city charter allows employees who have been the subject of an adverse employment action to challenge that action through an administrative appeal to the city civil service commission, Dworning did not pursue such an appeal.
In October 2004, Dworning filed a civil lawsuit in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas against the city and several individual defendants asserting among other claims that he had been discharged because of a disability in violation of anti-discrimination provisions of the Ohio Civil Rights Act (R.C. Chapter 4112). Euclid filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Dworning and other city employees were legally barred from pursuing a civil lawsuit against the city arising from an employment action if they had not first completed the administrative appeal procedures set forth in the city charter. The trial court granted the city’s motion and dismissed Dworning’s civil rights claim based on his failure to first exhaust the available administrative remedies.
Dworning appealed, and the 8th District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding that discrimination claims asserted under R.C. Chapter 4112 may be pursued in state courts regardless of whether the plaintiff has exhausted other available administrative remedies.
In today’s unanimous decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the 8th District’s ruling allowing Dworning’s civil action against the city to go forward.
Writing for the Court, Justice Lanzinger acknowledged prior decisions establishing the general principle that “a party seeking relief from an administrative decision must pursue available administrative remedies before pursuing action in a court.” She added however, that “the exhaustion doctrine is not without exception.”
Justice Lanzinger noted that at the time of its initial enactment in 1959, Ohio’s anti-discrimination statute “established an administrative scheme in which complaints of discrimination were presented to the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC). Access to the courts was limited; a party aggrieved by a final order of the OCRC could seek judicial review of that order.” She pointed out, however, that beginning in 1969 the legislature amended the statute several times to allow persons alleging various types of discrimination to pursue recovery of damages through private lawsuits.
“In 1987, the General Assembly amended R.C. 4112.99 to provide: ‘Whoever violates this chapter is subject to a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief ... ’” Justice Lanzinger wrote. “In Elek v. Huntington Natl. Bank (1991), we declared that ‘[a] plain reading of this section yields the unmistakable conclusion that a civil action is available to remedy any form of discrimination identified in R.C. Chapter 4112.’ After the 1987 amendment, one who claims that discrimination has occurred has two avenues of recovery under R.C. Chapter 4112: administrative relief through the OCRC or a civil suit filed in a court of common pleas. In Elek, we allowed an individual to file a civil action to remedy discrimination without invoking the administrative remedies available through the OCRC. We have also held that the filing of a charge of discrimination with the OCRC does not preclude a person from filing a civil action under R.C. 4112.99. Smith v. Friendship Village. of Dublin, Ohio, Inc. (2001).”
In rejecting the city’s argument that exhausting administrative remedies should be seen as merely a precondition rather than a barrier to an employee exercising his right to sue under R.C. Chapter 4112, Justice Lanzinger observed: “(C)ertain discrimination claims, such as age discrimination under R.C. 4112.02(N), must be filed within 180 days. Furthermore, discrimination may not be immediately evident. An employee might not become aware of the public employer’s discriminatory act (such as hiring a younger worker or reinstating a male but not a female employee) within the ten-day period allowed for an appeal to the city’s civil service commission. The employee would then be prohibited from pursuing a discrimination claim under R.C. 4112.99 unless he or she had already filed an administrative appeal. We will not permit a rule of judicial convenience to frustrate R.C. Chapter 4112’s goals of eliminating discrimination and providing redress to its victims. R.C. 4112.08 forbids such a result.”
Contacts
Christopher P. Thorman, 216.621.9767, for Michael Dworning.
Richard A. Millisor, 440.838.8800, for the City of Euclid.