Supreme Court of Ohio

Opinion Summaries

Landlord Not Liable for ‘Hostile Housing Environment’ Claim Under Civil Rights Statute

2007-0254.  Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., Slip Opinion No. 2008-Ohio-3320.
Summit App. Nos. 23056 and 23060, 170 Ohio App.3d 283, 2006-Ohio-6967.  Judgment reversed.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-3320.pdf

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(July 8, 2008) In a 7-0 decision announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that a landlord may not be held liable under Ohio’s civil rights statutes for failing to take action against a tenant whose racial harassment of another tenant created a “hostile housing environment.” The decision, which reversed a ruling by the 9th District Court of Appeals, was authored by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer.

The case involved a dispute between the families of Fontella Harper and Beverly Kaisk, who lived in neighboring apartments at Van Buren Homes, a public housing development managed by appellant June Davidson and owned and operated by appellant Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority (AMHA). After a series of confrontations between Harper’s family and Kaisk’s family, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC) filed a complaint against AMHA and Davidson. In its complaint and subsequent motion for summary judgment, the OCRC alleged that Harper spoke with a member of the building management about an incident with Kaisk’s daughter and the girl’s father, describing the racially derogatory comments made by Kaisk’s daughter. The OCRC alleged that Harper also submitted written reports to Davidson about subsequent racial harassment. Although the OCRC acknowledged that a member of AMHA’s security department may have investigated one complaint, it alleged that neither Davidson nor the AMHA took any corrective action regarding the harassment. Under the lease signed by Kaisk, AHMA could terminate the lease “for serious or repeated violations of material terms of the lease.” The lease included a provision requiring tenants to conduct themselves in a manner that “will not disturb the neighbors’ peaceful enjoyment of their accommodations.”

Harper subsequently filed a complaint with the OCRC. The commission filed a complaint against AMHA and Davidson, alleging unlawful discrimination based on race in violation of R.C. 4112.02(H)(4).  In particular, the complaint alleged that members of Kaisk’s family had harassed members of Harper’s family, that the harassment was racial in nature, and that AMHA and Davidson had failed to take corrective action against Harper and her family, despite having notice of the nature of the harassment. Harper and Fair Housing Advocates Association (FHAA) later intervened as plaintiffs.

The Court of Common Pleas for Summit County granted summary judgment in favor of AMHA and Davidson. The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in not recognizing a cause of action for “hostile housing environment.”  The Ninth District further held that the following elements are necessary to establish a prima facie case of hostile living environment:  “(1) plaintiffs are members of a protected class, (2) the harassment was unwelcome, (3) the harassment was based on the plaintiffs’ race, (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiffs’ living conditions and create an abusive environment, and (5) either (a) the harassment was committed by a landlord or (b) the landlord, through its agents or supervisory personnel, knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.” (Emphasis added.) The AMHA and Davidson sought and were granted Supreme Court review of the Ninth District’s ruling.

Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in today’s decision, Chief Justice Moyer emphasized that the facts of this case distinguish it from cases in which a tenant alleges that a landlord or building supervisor created a hostile housing environment through his own harassment of a tenant. He noted that today’s ruling does not address the latter situation, but rather considers only whether R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) provides a tenant with a cause of action against a landlord for hostile housing environment based on the landlord’s failure to take corrective action against another tenant who engaged in racially harassing conduct.

“R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) does not expressly recognize a cause of action against a landlord who fails to take corrective action in response to the creation of a hostile housing environment by one of his tenants,” Chief Justice Moyer wrote. “In the absence of an express statutory command, the court of appeals found support for the cause of action at issue here in two types of cases: federal housing-discrimination cases and Ohio workplace-harassment cases.” After surveying the case law cited by the Ninth District, however, the Chief Justice concluded that neither line of cases “provides a compelling argument” in favor of recognizing the cause of action asserted by the OCRC and Harper in this case.

In reviewing six federal housing discrimination cases cited in the court of appeals decision, Chief Justice Moyer observed that three of the six cases involved direct harassment of a tenant by a landlord, a fourth dealt with direct harassment of a tenant by a homeowners’ association, and a fifth case involved harassment committed by the children of building managers and included claims of overt harassment of the plaintiff by the managers themselves.  In the remaining case cited by the court of appeals, a ruling by a federal district court in Virginia, Chief Justice Moyer wrote that the trial court “held that the toleration by the building owner, manager, and employees of harassment of tenants by other tenants was actionable under the Virginia Fair Housing Law pursuant to the court’s broad reading of the statutory language.  We do not find that court’s broad application of the Virginia statute to be persuasive.”

The Court also rejected the Ninth District’s application of state and federal court rulings in cases involving  “hostile work environment” claims to the landlord/tenant relationship at issue in this case. Citing this Court’s 2000 holding in Hampel v. Food Ingredients Specialties, Inc., Chief Justice Moyer wrote: “An employer may be held liable for a nonsupervisory employee’s sexual harassment of his co-worker if the employer, through its agents or supervisory personnel, knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. We reject the argument that our precedent in the employment context requires us to recognize the cause of action in the landlord-tenant circumstances of this case.... The liability of an employer for an employee’s negligence derives from the established principles of agency law.... The agency principles that govern employer-employee liability have no parallel in the context of landlord-tenant disputes.... The amount of control that a landlord exercises over his tenant is not comparable to that which an employer exercises over his employee. As the appellants observe, a landlord does enjoy a measure of control through his ability to evict tenants.... The power of eviction alone, however, is insufficient to hold a landlord liable for his tenant’s tortious actions against another tenant.... We therefore reject the argument that our precedent in the employment context applies to the cause of action at issue here.”

The Chief Justice concluded: “Finally we decline the request by appellees Harper and FHAA to recognize this action under the statutory command that R.C. Chapter 4112 ‘shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes.’... Although the conduct alleged by the appellees is reprehensible, we decline to extend liability to behavior so far beyond the reach of the statutory language, especially in light of the absence of an agency relationship between a landlord and his tenants and the landlord’s comparative lack of control over his tenants. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a tenant may not bring a claim against his landlord under R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) when racial harassment by another tenant creates a hostile housing environment.”

Contacts

Michelle Morris, 330.253.7100, for the Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority and June Davidson.

Elise W. Porter, 614.466.2872, for the Ohio Civil Rights Division.

Andrew Margolius, 216.621.6214, for Fontella Harper & Fair Housing Advocates Association.


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