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2007-0740. Kraynak v. Youngstown City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., Slip Opinion No. 2008-Ohio-2618.
Mahoning App. No. 05 MA 200, 172 Ohio App.3d 545, 2007-Ohio-1236. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-2618.pdf
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(June 5, 2008) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that in cases requiring teachers or other professionals to report “known or suspected” child abuse, the former version of R.C. 2151.421 required the application of a subjective standard. The Court’s 7-0 decision, written by Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, partially reversed a decision of the 7th District Court of Appeals.
The case involved a civil lawsuit filed by Donald Kraynak of Youngstown against the Youngstown City School District and teacher Helen Marino, who taught a 4th-grade language arts class in which Kraynak’s son, D.K., was enrolled during the 1999 school year. The suit sought damages from the school district (Marino was initially named as a defendant but later dropped from the case) based on Marino’s alleged failure to comply with a former version of R.C. 2151.421, a state law that required teachers, physicians, nurses and certain other professionals to make a report to police or a children services agency whenever they “know or suspect” that a child has suffered a physical or mental injury that reasonably indicates abuse.
In his complaint, Kraynak alleged that the school district was liable for damages because Marino failed to comply with the reporting statute after reading entries describing abusive conduct by his mother that D.K. had made in a “creative writing journal” that he kept for Marino’s language arts class. Kraynak asserted that a reasonable person in Marino’s position reading the journal entries should have suspected abuse and reported that suspicion to police or child welfare authorities.
The case went to trial before a jury. In instructing the jury, the judge stated that, in deciding whether Marino had violated the reporting statute, jurors should review the evidence and circumstances of the case and subjectively determine whether or not Marino actually suspected that D.K. had been abused. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the school district. Kraynak appealed, and the 7th District Court of Appeals vacated the jury’s verdict and remanded the case for a new trial. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in advising the jury that former R.C. 2151.421 employs a subjective standard. Rather than being instructed that it was to determine whether Marino herself suspected abuse, the appellate panel concluded that the jury should have been instructed that it was to determine whether a “reasonable person” would have suspected child abuse, i.e., an objective standard.
Writing for the Court in today’s decision, Justice Stratton said the plain language of the former statute imposed a reporting requirement based on the subjective standard of what a person required to report actually knows or suspects. She wrote: “The applicable version of R.C. 2151.421(A)(1)(a) provided:
‘No person described in division (A)(1)(b) of this section who is acting in an official or professional capacity and knows or suspects that a child under eighteen years of age ... has suffered or faces a threat of suffering any physical or mental wound, injury, disability, or condition of a nature that reasonably indicates abuse or neglect of the child, shall fail to immediately report that knowledge or suspicion to the public children services agency or a municipal or county peace officer ... ’ The court of appeals concluded that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury that the relevant standard is subjective. We disagree. … The trial judge’s conclusion that the former version of the statute contained a subjective standard is correct. The statute asks whether the school employee knows of child abuse or suspects child abuse. The statute does not ask whether the school employee ‘knew or should have known’ or ‘suspected or should have suspected’ or ‘knew or had reasonable cause to suspect’ child abuse. Rather, R.C. 2151.421(A)(1)(a) simply asks whether the school employee ‘knows or suspects’ child abuse.”
Beyond the plain language of the former statute, Justice Stratton noted that the current version of R.C. 2151.421 clearly illustrates the difference between a subjective and objective standard, and the legislative intent in amending the law. “The new version of the statute changes the standard from ‘knows or suspects’ (a subjective standard) to ‘knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect based on facts that would cause a reasonable person in a similar position to suspect,’ a clearly objective standard,” wrote Justice Stratton. “Accordingly, we hold that pursuant to former R.C. 2151.421, in determining whether a person knows or suspects child abuse for purposes of reporting it to the proper authorities, the standard is subjective.”
While today’s ruling reversed the holding of the 7th District on the subjective vs. objective standard issue, Justice Stratton went on to note that the 7th District’s remand of the case for a new trial was also based on a separate finding that the trial court erred by allowing an expert witness, law school professor Kathryn Mercer, to go beyond stating her opinion and to present testimony that gave incorrect and improper guidance to jurors on how they should interpret the reporting statute.
“The court of appeals held that allowing Mercer to interpret for the jury what the statute requires was erroneous. Consequently, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Mercer to testify to this extent. We agree. This issue was not appealed to this court. Therefore, the Seventh District’s holding regarding Mercer’s testimony stands. Because the facts in this case are very close, Mercer’s extensive and incorrect testimony could have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. Thus, although the court of appeals erred in determining that the statutory standard was objective, the court of appeals’ reversal as to Mercer’s incorrect testimony stands as an independent ground for reversal.”
“Because we hold that pursuant to former R.C. 2151.421, in determining whether a person knows or suspects child abuse for purposes of reporting it to the proper authorities, the standard is subjective, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals with regard to that issue and remand the cause to the court of appeals,” Justice Stratton concluded. “Because the appellate court’s reversal of the jury verdict and granting a new trial were based on the combined effect of the jury instruction and inadmissible testimony, we remand to the court of appeals so that court can consider in the first instance whether the error in admitting part of Mercer’s testimony alone requires reversal of the jury’s verdict, or whether it was harmless error under Civ.R. 61.”
Contacts
Joel Levin, 216.928.0600, for
Donald Kraynak.
John C. Pfau, 330.702.9700, for the Youngstown City Schools Bd. of Education.