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2007-0293 and 2007-0304. State v. Bates, Slip Opinion No. 2008-Ohio-1983.
Miami App. No. 06-CA-08, 2006-Ohio-7086. Judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-1983.pdf
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(May 1, 2008) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that, under Ohio’s criminal sentencing statutes as modified by the Court’s 2006 decision in State v. Foster, a trial court sentencing a criminal defendant has the authority to order that the prison sentence imposed for a new offense must be served consecutively to a prison sentence previously imposed on the same offender by another Ohio court for a different offense.
The Court’s 7-0 decision, authored by Justice Robert R. Cupp, affirmed a ruling of the 2nd District Court of Appeals.
The case involved an appeal by Robert Bates of the sentence imposed on him in 2005 for three felony offenses he committed in Miami County. At the time of his Miami County convictions, Bates was already serving a 10-year prison sentence for robbery and firearms convictions from Montgomery County in an unrelated case. The Miami County trial court sentenced Bates to three, three-year terms to run concurrently with each other, but ordered that the aggregated three-year term be served consecutively to the 10-year sentence previously imposed in Montgomery County.
Bates appealed his sentence. He argued that, in light of the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in State v. Foster, which severed (removed from the statute) some sections of Ohio’s felony sentencing law as unconstitutional, state law now authorizes a judge to order that prison terms for multiple offenses be served consecutively only when those sentences are imposed by a single court in a single proceeding. Because his Miami County and Montgomery County sentences were imposed in different proceedings, Bates contended that the Miami County trial court exceeded its statutory authority in ordering that his sentence from that court be served consecutively to his Montgomery County sentence. The 2nd District Court of Appeals rejected Bates’ argument and affirmed the imposition of consecutive sentences, but certified that its holding was in conflict with a 2002 decision of the 5th District, State v. Thompson, on the same legal issue.
The Supreme Court agreed to review the case. Writing for a unanimous Court in today’s decision, Justice Cupp affirmed the judgment of the 2nd District, but did so based on a different legal rationale than that cited by the court of appeals.
Noting that the Supreme Court’s holding in Foster severed most of the legislative language that previously set guidelines for the imposition of consecutive sentences, Justice Cupp wrote: “A long-standing principle of constitutional law is that the authority for a trial court to impose sentences derives from the statutes enacted by the General Assembly. ... Once the legislature has defined the crime and has established the punishment that the trial court is to impose through its sentencing authority, the foregoing constitutional law principle further holds that ‘in the absence of statute [stating otherwise], it is a matter solely within the discretion of the sentencing court as to whether sentences shall run consecutively or concurrently.’ Stewart v. Maxwell (1963).”
“The severance and excise of former R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and former R.C. 2929.41(A) in their entirety by Foster ... leaves no statute to establish in the circumstances before us presumptions for concurrent and consecutive sentencing or to limit trial court discretion beyond the basic ‘purposes and principles of sentencing’ provision articulated and set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12,” wrote Justice Cupp. “As a result, the common law presumptions are reinstated. Accordingly, the trial court now has the discretion and inherent authority to determine whether a prison sentence within the statutory range shall run consecutively or concurrently, and we hold that the trial court may impose a prison sentence to be served consecutively to a prison sentence imposed on the same offender by another Ohio court.”
Contacts
Michael R. Gladman, 614.469.3939, for
Robert Bates.
James D. Bennett, 937.440.5960, for the state and Miami County prosecutor’s office.