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2006-1608. State v. Schlee, Slip Opinion No. 2008-Ohio-545.
Lake App. No. 2005-L-105, 2006-Ohio-3208. Certified question answered in the affirmative and judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
Lundberg Stratton and Cupp, JJ., concur in judgment only.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-545.pdf
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(Feb. 20, 2008) In a 5-2 ruling announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that, under the plain language of Criminal Rule 57(B), a trial judge may look to the state’s Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance when no rule of criminal procedure is applicable to a motion made by a party in a criminal case.
In applying that holding to the case of criminal defendant Larry Schlee, however, the Court ruled that the trial judge did not err in converting Schlee’s motion for relief from judgment under a civil rule into a motion for postconviction relief under a section of the state’s criminal sentencing statute, and did not err in subsequently denying that motion because the deadline for seeking postconviction relief in Schlee’s case had expired.
In 1993, Larry Schlee of Lake County was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 20 years. In 2002 Schlee was granted a new trial. Following a new trial in 2004, Schlee was again found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 15 years. Schlee appealed that conviction, which was upheld by the 11th District Court of Appeals.
Schlee then filed a pro se motion with the trial court that he identified as a “Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B).” In his motion, Schlee alleged prosecutorial misconduct in both of his trials and also alleged that he had been unconstitutionally subjected to double jeopardy. The trial judge recast his motion as a petition for postconviction relief subject to the procedural requirements of R.C. 2953, and dismissed the motion as not having been filed within the statutory time limit applicable to petitions for postconviction relief.
The 11th District Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court, but certified that its holding was in conflict with a decision of the 1st District, State v. Lehrfeld, in which that court held that a criminal defendant was eligible to seek relief from a trial court judgment under Civ.R. 60(B), and that the trial court had exceeded its authority by re-casting and dealing with such a motion as a petition for postconviction relief. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case to resolve the conflict between appellate districts.
Writing for the Court in today’s decision, Justice Paul E. Pfeifer pointed to the plain language of Ohio Criminal Rule 57(B) which provides: “If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules of criminal procedure, and shall look to the rules of civil procedure and to the applicable law if no rule of criminal procedure exists.”
Justice Pfeifer suggested that some of the disagreement among courts of appeals over such apparently clear language might be attributable to a 1990 Supreme Court decision, State ex rel. National Broadcasting Company v. Lake County Court of Common Pleas, in which the majority opinion held that a civil rule “does not apply” in a criminal case.
“Today we hold that the plain language of Crim.R. 57(B) permits a trial court in a criminal case to look to the Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance when no applicable Rule of Criminal Procedure exists. We therefore overrule Natl. Broadcasting Co. to the extent that it stands for a contrary proposition of law,” wrote Justice Pfeifer.
In reviewing the trial court’s action with regard to Schlee’s motion, Justice Pfeifer said the key question was “whether Schlee properly resorted to Civ.R. 60(B) in this case, that is, whether the absence of an applicable Criminal Rule justified invoking a Civil Rule in its place.” In ruling on that issue, he agreed with the state’s argument that Crim.R. 35, which sets forth the procedure by which criminal defendants can file petitions for postconviction relief, was available to Schlee and served the same purpose as the Civ.R. 60(B) motion he filed.
“The Civ.R. 60(B) motion filed by Schlee was filed subsequent to his direct appeal, claimed a denial of constitutional rights, and sought reversal of the judgment rendered against him. We conclude, therefore, that the Civ.R. 60(B) motion filed by Schlee could have been filed as a petition for postconviction relief. Thus, it is not necessary to look to the Civil Rules or other applicable law for guidance in the way Crim.R. 57(B) intends, because a procedure ‘specifically prescribed by rule’ exists, i.e., Crim.R. 35. ... (T)he trial court in this case did not err when it considered Schlee’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion as if it were a petition for postconviction relief.”
Justice Pfeifer’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Maureen O’Connor, Terrence O’Donnell and Judith Ann Lanzinger.
Justice Robert R. Cupp entered a separate opinion, joined by Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, in which he concurred with the majority holding that Schlee’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion should have been filed as a postconviction petition, but disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court acted appropriately in recasting it as such.
Citing the Supreme Court’s 2002 ruling in State v. Bush, Justice Cupp wrote: “I do not believe that trial courts – and specifically the trial court in this case – should ‘recast’ motions that are clearly labeled. The motion filed by Schlee was not an ‘irregular “no-name”’ motion requiring the court to categorize it. Rather, it was specifically delineated as a Civ.R. 60(B) motion. In such situations, the proper course for a trial court, in my view, is to simply deny the motion as improper under the rules, with, if appropriate, an explanation for the denial. Such a practice would allow the filing party to refile the motion under the proper procedural rule and is more consistent with our disposition in Bush.”
Contacts
Craig A. Swenson, 440.279.2105, for
the State of Ohio and Lake County prosecutor’s office.
Douglas R. Cole, 614.281.3659, for Larry Schlee.