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2006-2072. Pruszynski v. Reeves, Slip Opinion No. 2008-Ohio-510.
Geauga App. No. 2005-G-2612, 2006-Ohio-5190. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Lanzinger, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-510.pdf
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(Feb. 14, 2008)The Supreme Court of Ohio today ruled that a trial court must set a date certain and conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to ruling on a motion for prejudgment interest in a tort lawsuit; but said the nature of the evidentiary hearing to be held is left to the discretion of the trial court. The Court held further that an appeals court does not have authority to rule on a motion for prejudgment interest when the trial court has ruled on that motion without setting a date certain and conducting an evidentiary hearing.
In a 6-1 opinion authored by Justice Maureen O’Connor, the Court held that the requirement of a “hearing” imposed by R.C. 1343.03(C) mandates that the trial judge conduct an evidentiary hearing and may not grant or deny a motion for prejudgment interest without either reviewing timely written pleadings and evidence submitted by the parties on the specific issue of prejudgment interest or conducting an oral hearing on that issue.
Today’s decision stems from an injury lawsuit in which the parents of a child, Lucien Pruszynski, sought damages for injuries Lucien suffered in a 2002 traffic accident in Geauga County. The driver of the car, Sarah Reeves, testified that she swerved at the last second to avoid hitting two children on bicycles who were riding at the edge of the road after dusk without legally required lights or reflectors. The Pruszynskis sued Reeves and the parents of the bicyclists and were awarded $231,540 by a jury.
The Pruszynskis then entered a motion for an additional award of prejudgment interest calculated from the day of the accident, based on a claim that the cyclists’ parents and their insurers had not made a good faith effort to settle with them before trial. The trial court denied that motion without a hearing. The 11th District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying prejudgment interest, and remanded the case with a directive that the trial court calculate and award prejudgment interest to the Pruszynskis.
Justice O’Connor wrote that the courts on both the trial and appellate level erred. “…At no point…did the trial court set a date certain for the submission of evidentiary materials or an oral evidentiary hearing. The court of appeals, therefore, exceeded the scope of its authority in awarding prejudgment interest to the Pruszynskis when the trial court had not conducted a hearing on that motion. The statute requires an evidentiary hearing, and one was not held. The appellate court therefore should not have circumvented the requirements of R.C. 1343.03(C) and awarded prejudgment interest.”
The majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Terrence O’Donnell and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger entered a separate opinion in which she concurred with the majority holding that the appeals court overstepped its authority in awarding prejudgment interest, but dissented from the holding that the trial court was required to hold a hearing.
“The majority recognizes that the statutory procedure for a trial court’s handling of motions for prejudgment interest was subject to differing interpretation by the courts of appeals,” Justice Lanzinger wrote. “In resolving the issue, the majority holds that the trial court has discretion in determining the type of ‘evidentiary hearing’ to be held when a motion for prejudgment interest is filed by a party. But in doing so, it has ignored the statute that allowed a trial judge the discretion to initially decide whether a hearing should be granted at all.”
Contacts
Roger H. Williams, 330.405.5061 and Shawn Schlesinger, 216.696.1433, for
Sarah Reeves et al.
Stephen B. Potter, 440.446.1100, for Lucien Pruszynski.