|
|
2006-1973. State v. Sarkozy, Slip Opinion No. 2008-Ohio-509.
Cuyahoga App. No. 86952, 2006-Ohio-3977. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, and O'Donnell, JJ., concur.
Lanzinger and Cupp, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-509.pdf
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/ROD/newpdf/. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
(Feb. 14, 2008) The Supreme Court of Ohio today ruled that a Cleveland man’s guilty plea on charges that included attempted murder was invalid because the trial court judge did not tell him at the time his plea was accepted that a term of post-release control would be part of his sentence.
Summarizing the majority holding in today’s 5-2 decision, Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton wrote: “(W)e hold that if a trial court fails during a plea colloquy to advise a defendant that the sentence will include a mandatory term of postrelease control, the defendant may dispute the knowing, intelligent and voluntary nature of the plea either by filing a motion to withdraw the plea or upon direct appeal. Further, we hold that if the trial court fails during the plea colloquy to advise a defendant that the sentence will include a mandatory term of postrelease control, the court fails to comply with Crim.R. 11, and the reviewing court must vacate the plea and remand the cause.”
Michael Sarkozy of Cleveland entered guilty pleas in May 2005 to felony counts of attempted murder with firearm and repeat-violent-offender specifications, aggravated robbery and kidnapping. Prior to accepting his guilty pleas, the trial judge advised Sarkozy of the prison terms applicable to each of his offenses, but did not inform him that he would also be subject to a mandatory term of post-release control of five years, or that he could be returned to prison for up to half the length of his prison sentence for violating the terms of post-release control. Sarkozy appealed his convictions and 27-year sentence, claiming that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently because the judge had failed to advise him of the post-release control.
On review, the 8th District Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing on other grounds, but held that the trial court had “substantially complied” with Criminal Rule 11, the procedural rule governing acceptance of a guilty plea, and that Sarkozy was not entitled to a new trial.
In today’s decision, the Supreme Court reversed the 8th District, vacated Sarkozy’s guilty pleas and remanded the case for a new trial.
“We disagree with the court of appeals’ finding of substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11. Rather, we find that there was no compliance with Crim.R. 11,” wrote Justice Stratton. “The trial court did not merely misinform Sarkozy about the length of his term of postrelease control. Nor did the court merely misinform him as to whether postrelease control was mandatory or discretionary. Rather, the court failed to mention postrelease control at all during the plea colloquy. Because the trial court failed, before it accepted the guilty plea, to inform the defendant of the mandatory term of postrelease control, which was a part of the maximum penalty, the court did not meet the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).”
Justice Stratton rejected an argument advanced by the state that Sarkozy’s guilty plea should be upheld absent a showing that he was “prejudiced” by the judge’s incomplete disclosure (i.e., would not have entered the same plea if all aspects of his sentence had been disclosed), holding that “(a) complete failure to comply with the rule does not implicate an analysis of prejudice.”
The court found that under the current system of post-release control, a violation of post-release control could add another term of incarceration of up to 50 percent of the original sentence. If an offender did not know that his or her sentence would include a term of post-release control, Justice Stratton wrote, then his or her plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered because the offender did not understand the full consequences of the guilty plea.
Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Maureen O’Connor and Terrence O’Donnell joined Justice Stratton’s opinion.
Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger entered a partial dissent that was joined by Justice Robert R. Cupp in which she concurred with the majority holding that it is mandatory for the trial court to inform a defendant of the post-release control before accepting a guilty plea, but dissented from the majority’s conclusion that a failure to notify automatically vacates the plea.
“A defendant who challenges a guilty plea on the basis that it was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made must also show a prejudicial effect. In determining if prejudice exists, we have stated that ‘[t]he test is whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’ If the defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice, the plea stands,” Justice Lanzinger wrote. “I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to the trial court to determine whether Sarkozy has met his burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the failure to notify him of postrelease control at the time he entered his guilty plea.”
Contacts
John T. Martin, 216.443.3675, for
Michael Sarkozy.
Kristen L. Sobieski, 216.698.2226, for the State of Ohio and Cuyahoga County prosecutor’s office.