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2006-1304. Leininger v. Pioneer Natl. Latex, 2007-Ohio-4921.
Ashland App. No. 05-COA-048, 2006-Ohio-2673. Judgment reversed.
Moyer, C.J., and Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Pfeifer, J., dissents.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/newpdf/0/2007/2007-Ohio-4921.pdf
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(Sept. 27, 2007) Based on a determination that Ohio's current civil rights laws provide a “full range of remedies” for persons who assert statutory claims of wrongful discharge from employment because of their age, the Supreme Court of Ohio held today that there is no non-statutory “common law” right of action in state courts for wrongful discharge based on the public policy against age discrimination. The Court's 6-1 decision was written by Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger.
The case involved a civil lawsuit filed by Marlene Leininger of Ashland County against her former employer, Pioneer National Latex, for alleged wrongful termination from her job based on age discrimination. Leininger, who was 60 years old at the time of her firing, claimed that Pioneer wrongfully discharged her in 2001. Later, many of her former duties as a human resources administrator were assigned to a 21-year-old worker.
Leininger's complaint was based on a “common law” tort cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of the state's public policy against age discrimination in employment. Pioneer filed a motion for summary judgment dismissing Leininger's claim, arguing that she missed the deadline for filing a statutory claim and that Ohio law did not provide her with an alternative “common law” cause of action. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Pioneer.
Leininger appealed. The 5th District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court of appeals cited a 1997 Supreme Court of Ohio decision, Livingston v. Hillside Rehabilitation Hospital , in which the Court reversed without opinion an appellate decision that refused to allow an age-based “common law” claim for wrongful discharge. Pioneer appealed the 5th District's ruling, and the Supreme Court agreed to review the case.
Writing for the Court in today's decision, Justice Lanzinger noted that the Livingston decision was handed down prior to the legislature's adoption of amendments to state civil rights statutes that expanded the range of remedies available to victims of age-based discrimination.
Justice Lanzinger traced a line of cases in which the Court has analyzed various provisions of Ohio's civil rights statutes to determine whether the statutory remedies they provide against various forms of discrimination are adequate to protect the public interest, or whether gaps or limitations in the statutory remedies for certain types of discrimination place the public interest “in jeopardy,” requiring that claims asserting a separate common law right of action also be recognized.
“After considering our prior decisions, we conclude that it is unnecessary to recognize a common-law claim when remedy provisions are an essential part of the statutes upon which the plaintiff depends for the public policy claim and when those remedies adequately protect society's interest by discouraging the wrongful conduct,” wrote Justice Lanzinger.
Applying that standard to the remedies provided under the age discrimination provisions of R.C. Chapter 4112, Justice Lanzinger noted that the chapter allows a successful claimant to obtain a variety of remedies including a cease and desist order barring any further discriminatory acts, reinstatement to his/her former position with back pay, restored seniority and fringe benefit credit, any and all damages, including punitive damages, and attorney fees.
“Based on the above, we hold that the jeopardy element necessary to support a common-law claim is not satisfied, because R.C. Chapter 4112 adequately protects the state's policy against age discrimination in employment through the remedies it offers to aggrieved employees.”
Justice Lanzinger's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O'Connor, Terrence O'Donnell and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Paul E. Pfeifer entered a dissent stating that, in his view, “The relevant inquiry is whether there has been an expression of public policy that may support a common-law exception to employment at will; the extent of available statutory remedies is not a primary concern. The role of the common law is not to fill in gaps left by statutory remedies, but to adjust the acceptable breadth of employment at will, a common-law creation. There is no reason that the statutory tail should wag the common-law dog in this area of the law.... The fact that statutory law may have caught up with the common law as far as remedies are concerned does not mean that the common-law cause of action recognized by this court in Livingston disappears.”
Contacts
Corey V. Crognale, 614.462.2281, for
Pioneer National Latex, Inc.
Michael T. Conway, 330.220.7660, for Marlene Leininger.