|
|
2006-0703. Hall v. Banc One Mgt. Corp., 2007-Ohio-4640.
Franklin App. No. 04AP-905, 2006-Ohio-913. Judgment reversed and cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
Lanzinger, J., dissents.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/newpdf/0/2007/2007-Ohio-4640.pdf
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/ROD/newpdf/. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."
(Sept. 26, 2007) The Supreme Court of Ohio today ruled that if one of nine “principal challenges” to a prospective juror spelled out in state law is raised at trial and found valid, that finding establishes a conclusive presumption of disqualification. The Court held that a trial court must dismiss the disqualified juror and may not rehabilitate or exercise discretion to seat that person based on his or her pledge of fairness. The 6-1 majority opinion was authored by Justice Terrence O'Donnell.
The ruling specifically refers to paragraphs (A) through (I) of R.C. 2313.42, the state law that sets forth various relationships between a prospective juror and a party or attorney in a court case that are deemed sufficiently likely to produce bias that they allow an opposing party to challenge that candidate's seating as a juror “for good cause.” Paragraph (J) of the same statute allows a challenge for cause of any prospective juror who “discloses by his answers that he cannot be a fair and impartial juror or will not follow the law as given to him by the court.”
In this case, Anne Hall of Columbus filed suit against her former employer, Banc One Corporation, alleging that the company had engaged in age and sex discrimination and retaliation in its dealings with her over a period of months, culminating in the termination of her employment as a senior corporate executive in January 2000. Banc One moved for summary judgment on all claims. The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas entered summary judgment on behalf of the bank on the age discrimination and retaliation claims, but allowed Hall's sex discrimination claim to proceed to a jury trial.
During voir dire at the trial, Hall challenged a prospective juror, Michael Stein, who acknowledged that two of his sons were currently employed by Bank One, one as the manager of a Columbus-area branch office. Stein also stated that his daughter was at one time employed by the company but had been terminated. Hall moved to exclude Stein from the panel for cause under R.C. 2313.42(E), which authorizes a challenge for cause against any prospective juror whose child is employed by a party in a case. After additional questioning in which Stein stated that he felt no loyalty to Bank One arising from his sons' employment and also did not fault the company for terminating his daughter because that decision was necessitated by economic conditions, the court indicated that it believed Stein would be fair and denied Hall's challenge for cause.
At the end of the trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of Banc One. Hall appealed, asking that the jury verdict be vacated and that she be granted a new trial based on the trial court's improper refusal to dismiss Juror Stein for cause. The 10th District Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in seating Stein. Hall asked the Supreme Court to overrule the 10th District and grant her petition for a new trial, and the Court agreed to hear arguments in the case.
In today's decision, the Court reversed the judgment of the 10th District and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Referencing the specific language of the statute, Justice O'Donnell wrote, “ R.C. 2313.42(A) lists ten specific principal challenges, including many that existed at common law, and it further states that they “are good causes for challenge.” (Emphasis added.) If the legislature had intended a trial court to exercise discretion with respect to these specific challenges, it could have omitted the word “good” or it could have provided for the exercise of judicial discretion, but it did not do so. We cannot add words to a statute to conform it to a meaning not intended by the General Assembly. ... And we are required to give effect to the words used in statutes.”
The majority noted that, unlike motions to disqualify a jury candidate for good cause under Divisions (A) through (I) of R.C. 2313.42, a motion to disqualify under Division (J) of the statute does not require the trial court to make an objective finding about the relationship between a prospective juror and a party in the case, but rather requires the judge “to make a subjective determination about a potential juror's fairness and impartiality and therefore requires the exercise of judicial discretion.” Because Hall's challenge for cause was not based on Division (J) of the statute, Justice O'Donnell concluded that the trial court was barred from exercising discretion and was required to dismiss Juror Stein as soon as it established as valid Hall's claim that the relationship between Stein's sons and Banc One disqualified him from serving on her jury.
Justice O'Donnell's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O'Connor, and Robert R. Cupp.
Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger entered a dissent citing prior court decisions in which she said R.C. 2313.42 has been read to allow a trial court discretion to determine whether a juror may be seated when a principal challenge has been asserted. “Based on a reading of ancient history, fascinating but irrelevant to modern voir dire, the majority retreats from the idea that a trial court may rehabilitate a potential juror upon questioning, and artificially limits the court's discretion, to R.C. 2313.42(J) alone,” Justice Lanzinger wrote. “In my view, the majority's interpretation is an unwarranted restriction on the judge's discretion that is not required by the statute.”Contacts
Russell A. Kelm, 614.246.1000, for
Anne L. Hall.
Robert Kincaid, 614.228.1541, for Banc One Mgt. Corp.