|
|
| 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000 | Search | Upcoming cases |
Public Information Home
Political Subdivision May Be Liable for Accident that Occurs Beyond its Limits
2005-1194 and 2005-1247. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Dayton Freight Lines, Inc., 2006-Ohio-6498.
Montgomery App. No. 20651, 161 Ohio App.3d 444, 2005-Ohio-2773. Judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., Resnick, Pfeifer, O'Connor, O'Donnell and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
Lundberg Stratton, J., dissents.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/newpdf/0/2006/2006-Ohio-6498.pdf
(Dec. 27, 2006) In a case involving a multi-car traffic accident on I-70 in Preble County that was allegedly caused by smoke from a nearby trash fire, the Supreme Court of Ohio today ruled that a political subdivision can be liable for damages when a hazard created by its employees in the performance of their duties within its borders contributes to an accident that occurs outside the limits of the subdivision.
The 6-1 decision, which affirms a ruling by the 2nd District Court of Appeals, does not address the merits of the underlying liability claims but allows them to go forward.
On Feb. 7, 2000, Village of Lewisburg employees were burning Christmas trees and other yard and lumber waste in an area behind the village's water plant, which is located 2,000 to 3,000 feet from Interstate 70. The burning was performed under a permit that required that all fires be extinguished by 4 p.m. In mid-afternoon a supervisor told the employee who had been primarily responsible for burning the materials to extinguish the fire. The employee did so by pushing all the burning materials together and covering the area with dirt and mud, and then went home.
Around 11 that night, a multi-vehicle collision occurred on eastbound Interstate 70, near the Lewisburg exit but outside the village limits of Lewisburg. Twelve or more vehicles were involved in the accident, which the drivers attributed to near-zero visibility conditions on the interstate due to a combination of smoke and fog. Firefighters responding to the accident reported smoldering piles behind the Lewisburg power plant as a source of smoke that stayed near the ground and moved toward the interstate. A fire department tanker truck and crew were dispatched from the accident scene to the trash burning site, where they extinguished the smoldering pile with water.
Numerous personal injury and property damage claims related to the accident were filed in Preble and Montgomery counties. On April 21, 2004, Lewisburg filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming sovereign immunity from civil liability as a political subdivision. The Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County concluded that, under statutes in effect at the time of the accident, Lewisburg was immune from liability for the accident and granted summary judgment in its favor.
The case was appealed to the 2nd District Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court's finding of immunity under the revised code section addressing negligence by a political subdivision. The appellate panel noted that the negligence statute grants immunity unless both a negligent act and a resulting injury occurred on public grounds controlled by the subdivision. It also noted, however, that under a different code section addressing the duties of a political entity to keep public highways and lands free of nuisances, the statutory exception to immunity required only that the nuisance (but not the injury) occur on public ground. The 2nd District therefore reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and found that Lewisburg could be subject to liability under the “preventing nuisances” portion of the law.
The 2nd District certified to the Supreme Court that its decision on the latter point of law was in conflict with a decision from the 7th District Court of Appeals. The Court agreed to hear the case to resolve the conflict. In their pleadings and argument before the Court, attorneys for Lewisburg cited earlier Ohio court cases holding that, despite the location of a nuisance within the boundaries of a political subdivision, that subdivision could not be held liable for accidents attributable to the nuisance if they occur outside the borders of the subdivision, on property over which it has no legal jurisdiction or control.
In today's opinion, the Supreme Court held that the precedents cited by Lewisburg were not applicable to the current case because they involved significantly different situations.
“Former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) provided that ‘[p]olitical subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property caused by their failure to keep * * * public grounds within the political subdivisions * * * free from nuisance,'” wrote Justice Pfeifer. “Immunity is lost, according to the plain language of the statute, when a political subdivision fails to keep its public grounds free from nuisance and an injury results from that failure. The statute makes only one factor regarding the injury relevant – that it is caused by the nuisance. There is no requirement that the injury must also occur on the property of the political subdivision. There is only a requirement that the nuisance arise on public property. Former R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) is not ambiguous; to interpret it as Lewisburg urges would require this court to add language to the statute.”
Justice Pfeifer's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Alice Robie Resnick, Maureen O'Connor, Terrence O'Donnell and Judith Ann Lanzinger.
Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton entered a dissent in which she argued that the village's liability for a nuisance within the political subdivision does not extend beyond the geographic limits of the political subdivision because “…the focus of the analysis should be on whether the village had possession and control over the area where the accidents occurred, not whether the village had possession and control over the area where the nuisance originated.”
“The majority's interpretation means that the village can be held responsible for car accidents that did not happen within the village, but actually happened on a highway 2,000 to 3,000 feet outside the village in an area over which the village had no control,” Justice Stratton wrote. “The village had no authority to close the highway even if the village knew that the smoke would ultimately drift to the highway. How far would the majority extend this liability? Although the village created the smoke, it did not create the fog. According to Lt. Peck, the fog extended to Huber Heights, approximately 20 miles east of the accident scene. And, clearly, the village had no control over the wind that carried the smoke and fog.”
Contacts
James W. Gustin, 513.621.8200, for
the Village of Lewisburg.
Robert M. O'Neal, 937.224.0963, for Dayton Freight Lines.
Please note: Opinion summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions. The full text of this and other Court opinions from 1992 to the present are available online from the Reporter of Decisions: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/ROD/newpdf/. In the Full Text search box, enter the eight-digit case number at the top of this summary and click "Submit."