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Charge is ‘Pending’ for Speedy Trial Purposes When Accused Is Indicted, Held or Released on Bail
2005-1788. State v. Azbell, 2006-Ohio-6552.
Richland App. No. 2005-CA-0004, 2005-Ohio-4405. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Resnick, Lundberg Stratton and O'Connor, JJ., concur.
O'Donnell, J., concurs separately.
Moyer, C.J., Pfeifer and Lanzinger, JJ., dissent.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/newpdf/0/2006/2006-Ohio-6552.pdf
(Dec. 20, 2006) The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that the statutory 270-day time limit within which the state must bring a felony defendant to trial does not begin to run until the accused is formally charged in a criminal indictment or complaint, is held in custody pending the filing of charges, or is released on bail or recognizance. The Court's 4-3 majority decision was authored by Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton.
On May 30, 2003, Sandra Azbell was arrested by Ontario, Ohio, police officers after she attempted to obtain dangerous drugs by means of deception. Azbell was taken into custody at a pharmacy and transported to the police station, where she was photographed, fingerprinted and given Miranda warnings. She declined to make a statement, and officers released her without bond. No criminal charges were filed in the case until more than 10 months later, on April 7, 2004, when Azbell was indicted on felony counts of using deception to obtain a dangerous drug and illegal possession of drug documents.
During pretrial proceedings on those charges, Azbell's attorney filed a motion seeking dismissal on the basis that Azbell's right to a speedy trial had been violated because the state did not bring her to trial within 270 days after her arrest, as required by R.C. 2945.71(C). The trial court overruled the motion to dismiss, and Azbell subsequently entered a plea of no contest. She was found guilty on both counts.
Azbell appealed the denial of her motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The 5th District Court of Appeals vacated her convictions and sentence, ruling that the state had failed to comply with the requirements of the speedy trial statute and the trial court therefore should have granted Azbell's motion to dismiss the charges against her. The state, represented by the Richland County prosecutor's office, appealed the 5th District's ruling to the Supreme Court.
Writing for the majority in today's decision, Justice Stratton cited specific language in R.C. 2945.71(C) requiring that “‘A person against whom a charge of felony is pending *** shall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after the person's arrest.'”(Emphasis added). “The crux of the issue in this case is when a charge is considered ‘pending' for purposes of calculating speedy-trial time,” wrote Justice Stratton. “The defendant argues that the time begins to run on the date of a person's arrest. The state argues that a charge is not pending for speedy-trial purposes when a defendant is merely detained and released by law enforcement without being subject to the conditions of bond or being charged in a complaint.”
Justice Stratton cited a number of prior state and federal court rulings that she found supportive of the state's position, including this Court's holding in a 1997 case, State v. Triplett, that “The speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.”
“As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned in United States v. Stead, ‘arrest triggers the speedy trial right only where it is the beginning of continuing restraints on defendant's liberty imposed in connection with the formal charge on which defendant is eventually tried. *** [Thus], the protections of the Speedy Trial Act are not triggered by an arrest when the arrested person is immediately released without formal charge,'” Justice Stratton wrote. “In this case, although Azbell was arrested in May 2003, she was not ‘held to answer' because she was immediately released after being photographed and fingerprinted at the police station. At the time of her arrest, she was not charged with any offense and she was immediately released. Thus, she was never subject to ‘actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.' Because no charge was outstanding and she was not held pending the filing of charges or released on bail or recognizance, Azbell did not become a ‘person against whom a charge of felony is pending' until she was arrested on the indictment in April 16, 2004.”
Based on that analysis of the statute and case law, Justice Stratton concluded that “for purposes of calculating speedy-trial time pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(C), a charge is not pending until the accused has been formally charged by a criminal complaint or indictment, is held pending the filing of charges, or is released on bail or recognizance. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause for proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Justice Stratton's opinion was joined by Justices Alice Robie Resnick and Maureen O'Connor.
Justice Terrence O'Donnell concurred in judgment and in the syllabus of Justice Stratton's opinion, but also wrote separately to express his view that the “speedy trial” statute was not implicated at all under the facts of this case. Justice O'Donnell wrote that “ … the language used by the General Assembly does not refer to the circumstance confronting Sandra Azbell in this case: that of being arrested but not charged. No subsection of R.C. 2945.71 pertains to the circumstance in which a person has been arrested but not charged; nor does the statute require that upon arrest, a charge must be presented against that person within any stated time period. Rather, this statute applies only to those who have charges pending against them.”
Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer entered a dissent that was joined by Justices Paul E. Pfeifer and Judith Ann Lanzinger. The Chief Justice disputed the majority's reading of R.C. 2945.71 as “tortured,” and noted that subsection (C)(2) of the statute “requires that (Azbell) ‘be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after [her] arrest.' It simply says ‘arrest;' it does not say ‘arrest after indictment' or ‘arrest after a warrant is issued.' … “ Azbell was arrested on May 30, 2003. She was taken to the police station, given Miranda warnings, photographed, and fingerprinted. That is an arrest. Her freedom was curtailed.” Moyer wrote. “The plain language of the statute required that she be brought to trial no later than February 25, 2004.”
With regard to the running of speedy-trial time between the state's arrest of a criminal suspect and the filing of formal charges, Chief Justice Moyer wrote: “I am not suggesting that the state be rushed into seeking an indictment before all possible evidence has been obtained. However, in the case at bar, Azbell was arrested while allegedly attempting to purchase a controlled substance with a fraudulent prescription, and she was later indicted for that offense. The state had in its possession all the evidence it needed to go forward at the time of her arrest. The state has presented no evidence … that the 11-month delay between arrest and indictment was based upon a lengthy and diligent search for additional evidence. When all evidence is in the hands of the police, the state must move forward.”
Contacts
Kirsten L. Pscholka-Gartner, 419.774.5676, for
the State of Ohio and Richland County prosecutor's office.
J. Banning Jasiunas, 614.466.5394, for Sandra Azbell.
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