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Death Penalty Affirmed for Gang-Related Double Murder
2003-1766. State v. Bethel, 2006-Ohio-4853.
Franklin C.P. No. 00CR-11-6600. Judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., Resnick, Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/newpdf/0/2006/2006-Ohio-4853.pdf
(Oct. 4, 2006) The Supreme Court of Ohio today unanimously affirmed the convictions and death sentence of Robert Bethel for the aggravated murders of James Reynolds and Shannon Hawks in Columbus in June 1996.
The victims' bodies were found in an isolated field that Bethel, co-defendant Jeremy Chavis and other members of the Southside Crips street gang used as a shooting range. Reynolds, who had witnessed a 1995 killing for which another gang member was facing murder charges, had been shot nine times with a 9-mm pistol and once with a shotgun. Hawks, who was Reynolds' girlfriend, suffered four gunshot wounds including two close-range shots to the back of the head.
The crimes went unsolved until 2000, when an acquaintance of Bethel and Chavis offered information about the killings in exchange for a reduction in federal firearms charges he was facing. Based on information from that informant and other sources, a Franklin County grand jury indicted Bethel on two counts of aggravated murder with death penalty specifications. Chavis was also indicted for both aggravated murders, but because he was a juvenile at the time of the shootings, he was ineligible to receive a death sentence. The two defendants were tried separately, with Chavis' trial scheduled to take place first.
In August 2001, prosecutors offered to drop the death penalty specifications against Bethel in exchange for his entry of a guilty plea and testimony at trial against Chavis. Bethel signed a “proffer” of testimony providing details of the killings and made a recorded statement implicating himself and Chavis in the murders of Reynolds and Hawks. The plea agreement included language indicating that, if Bethel reneged on the terms of the plea agreement, it would become null and void, the original charges against him would be reinstated and the statement made by Bethel detailing his involvement in the killings would be admissible against him at trial. The agreement also included language stating that, if the plea agreement was voided, the parties would be returned to “the position they were in before this agreement.”
The trial court conducted a hearing that was closed to the public at which it reviewed the terms of the plea agreement with Bethel, determined that he understood them, and placed a signed copy of the agreement in the court record under seal. The court then reconvened in open session and accepted Bethel's guilty plea to aggravated murder without death penalty specifications. In November 2001, Bethel refused to testify against Chavis. The trial court granted a motion by the prosecutor voiding Bethel's guilty plea to the reduced charges, and reinstated the death penalty specifications in the original indictment against him.
In June 2003, Bethel was tried for the aggravated murders of Reynolds and Hawks with death penalty specifications. At trial, over the objections of Bethel's attorneys, the judge allowed the jury to hear the taped statement Bethel had made to police in 2001 admitting his involvement in the shootings as part of the voided plea bargain. The court also permitted the state to introduce testimony informing the jury that Bethel had originally entered a guilty plea and agreed to testify against Chavis, but had reneged on that agreement. During the sentencing phase of the trial, Bethel severely limited the range of evidence he would permit his attorneys to introduce in mitigation of the death penalty. In July 2003 the jury recommended the death penalty and the judge imposed a sentence of death.
In today's 7-0 decision, authored by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, the Supreme Court overruled 20 allegations of trial court error that Bethel had advanced as grounds to vacate his convictions or reduce his sentence.
The Court specifically rejected Bethel's claims that the state acted “vindictively” when it reinstated the death penalty specifications against him after he reneged on the plea agreement, and that the trial court acted arbitrarily in imposing the death penalty after it had previously been willing to accept a non-capital sentence as an appropriate sanction for his crimes.
Justice Pfeifer quoted United States. ex rel. Williams v. McMann, a 1970 decision in which a federal court of appeals held that “When a defendant goes back on his promise, ‘it is hardly surprising, and scarcely suggestive of vindictiveness, that the district attorney in turn withdr[aws] his consent to the reduced charge.'” In essence, Justice Pfeifer wrote, “ Bethel claims a constitutional right to renege on his plea agreement, retain the benefit of the bargain that he broke, and avoid the agreed sanction for his breach. We decline to create such a right.”
With regard to the claim that the trial court acted arbitrarily, Justice Pfeifer wrote that “ Bethel argues that, by accepting his guilty plea to aggravated murder without death specifications, the trial court effectively determined that a sentence of life imprisonment was appropriate. … The trial court's acceptance of the plea agreement in this case did not necessarily imply that it considered a life sentence ‘appropriate.' We concur in the view expressed by … the (U.S.) Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in another capital case: ‘That the sentence imposed after trial is more severe than one the judge would have been willing to impose as part of a plea bargain does not * * * impeach the legitimacy of the sentence. * * * [T]he judge could well have approved a settlement calling for a sentence lighter than he himself would have chosen to impose.' McKenzie v. Risley (C.A.9, 1988). The reasoning of McKenzie is consistent with our own reasoning in State v. Webb (1994), that a prosecutor's offer of a plea bargain to a capital defendant did not constitute a concession by the prosecutor that a death sentence was inappropriate.”
Justice Pfeifer noted that the trial court did commit a procedural error by closing to the public the hearing at which it determined that Bethel understood and voluntarily entered into the plea bargain that he later violated. He disagreed, however, with Bethel's claim that he was entitled to a new trial based on that error. “… (T)he remedy for the improper closing of the hearing in this case would be a new, public hearing. A new trial would follow only if the new hearing resulted in some ‘material change in the positions of the parties.' However, under the present circumstances, a new hearing could not result in any change,” wrote Justice Pfeifer. “The purpose of the hearing was to ensure that Bethel understood the terms of the plea agreement before he entered a plea. This purpose no longer has any relevance. Bethel's guilty plea was withdrawn. … Because a new hearing could not materially change the position of the parties, there is no need for either a new hearing or a new trial. A new hearing would be an empty formality; a new trial would be a ‘windfall.'”
Contacts
Richard A. Termuhlen, 614.462.3555, for the
State of Ohio and Franklin County prosecutor's office.
Ravert Clark, 513.587.2887, for Robert Bethel.
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