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Defense Motion Stops Running of Speedy Trial ‘Clock,’ But U.S. Immigration Detainer Does Not
2005-1034. State v. Sanchez, 2006-Ohio-4478.
Lucas App. No. L-04-1169, 162 Ohio App.3d 113, 2005-Ohio-2093. Judgment reversed and conviction reinstated.
Moyer, C.J., Resnick, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
Pfeifer, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/newpdf/0/2006/2006-Ohio-4478.pdf
(Sept. 13, 2006) In a 6-1 decision announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a defendant's motion to limit prosecution evidence at her upcoming trial stops for a reasonable period the running of the statutory 270-day time limit within which she must be brought to trial. The Court also held that the filing of a ‘detainer' notice against a criminal defendant by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency does not nullify the requirement that each day a defendant spends in jail awaiting trial must be “triple-counted” toward the speedy trial limit.
Article 1, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution guarantees all persons accused of criminal offenses the right to a “speedy public trial.” That right has been codified by the legislature's adoption of:
In this case, Belia Larios-Sanchez was a passenger in an SUV that was stopped for a traffic violation on the Ohio Turnpike. When the state trooper who made the stop found the driver's explanation of the car's ownership and registration suspicious, he had the car tested by a drug-sniffing dog that indicated the presence of contraband. A search of the vehicle revealed no illegal drugs, but officers found over $500,000 in cash hidden in a hollowed-out compartment inside the vehicle's rear seat.
Sanchez, who is not a U.S. citizen, was arrested along with two companions and charged with felony counts of money laundering and possession of criminal tools. Bond was set at $100,000 for each of the defendants. All three remained in jail pending trial in lieu of bond. Five days after her arrest, a detainer notice naming Sanchez was filed with Lucas County by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE—formerly known as the Immigration and Naturalization Service). The filing of an ICE detainer alerts local officials that federal immigration authorities have questions about the citizenship status of a prisoner, and requests local authorities to notify the agency regarding the disposition of criminal charges and changes in custody status before the named person is released.
After Sanchez had been incarcerated for 89 days that counted toward her speedy trial limit, her attorney filed a motion asking the trial court to bar prosecutors from mentioning her citizenship status at trial. Three days later, Sanchez entered a motion to dismiss the charges against her based on the state's failure to bring her to trial within the statutory speedy trial time limit. Sanchez's motion asserted that she had been held in jail in lieu of bail for 92 “countable” days, and that since all of those days should be triple-counted under R.C. 2945.71(E), she had been held for more than 270 days without a trial.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that Sanchez's limiting motion had “tolled” (stopped the running of) the statutory time limit for bringing her to trial at 89 days. In opposing the motion to dismiss, the state also raised the argument that 87 of Sanchez's 92 days of imprisonment should not be triple-counted against the speedy trial time limit because she was being held in custody not only to await trial on the felony charges but also based on the ICE detainer that had been filed against her.
Later, Sanchez entered a no-contest plea to the money laundering and criminal tools charges and received a sentence of community control. She appealed her convictions and sentence to the 6th District Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court should have granted her motion to dismiss the charges on speedy trial grounds.
The 6th District reversed and vacated Sanchez's convictions and sentence. The court of appeals held that the speedy trial deadline for bringing her to trial was not tolled by her motion to limit evidence because the state had not shown that Sanchez's motion to exclude mention of her immigration status at trial had delayed the state or distracted prosecutors from proceeding with her trial. The court of appeals also rejected the state's argument that Sanchez's days in jail should not be triple-counted based on the ICE retainer that had been filed against her.
In today's Supreme Court decision, written by Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger, the majority held that Sanchez's motion to exclude any mention of her immigration status from her trial stopped the running of the speedy-trial “clock” for a reasonable period to allow the state to consider and respond to that motion.
Justice Lanzinger cited specific language in R.C. 2945.72 providing that speedy trial time limits may be extended by “(a)ny period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea … motion, proceeding or action made or instituted by the accused” and wrote that, contrary to the 6th District's ruling, “The statute does not require a showing that a motion caused delay before the running of speedy trial time may be suspended.”
Noting that the trial court had relied on cases from six different appellate districts holding that motions in limine automatically toll the running of speedy trial time, Justice Lanzinger wrote: “We agree with those courts. … Defense motions made orally, such as motions for continuance, may be disposed of through immediate oral rulings. Here, however, a motion in limine raised evidentiary concerns that arguably called for an adversarial response to allow the court to rule appropriately. We do not agree that the state has an affirmative duty to show that a motion diverted the prosecutor's attention or caused a delay in the proceedings before speedy trial time is tolled.”
The majority opinion went on to affirm the 6th District's holding that the filing of a “detainer” notice by federal immigration authorities against Sanchez was not an order that she be held in custody on an independent charge, and thus did not nullify the statutory requirement that each day she spent in jail awaiting trial on state charges must be triple-counted against the speedy trial deadlines.
Citing Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Justice Lanzinger wrote that an immigration detainer such as the one filed against Sanchez “is a request that (the custodial) agency advise the Department (of Homeland Security) prior to release of the alien, in order for the Department to arrange to assume custody, in situations where gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible. It can be seen from this provision that a detainer does not ‘hold' the accused. Instead it declares the
government's intention to seek custody in the future and requests notification before the accused is released from his or her present confinement.”
Justice Lanzinger's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer and Justices Alice Robie Resnick, Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Maureen O'Connor and Terrence O'Donnell.
Justice Paul E. Pfeifer entered a separate opinion concurring with the majority holding that the filing of an immigration detainer does not nullify the triple-counting requirement for determining the speedy trial deadline of defendants held in jail pending trial. He dissented, however, from the Court's holding that the calculation of speedy trial time may be “automatically” tolled based on the filing of a defense motion.
Citing the Supreme Court's holdings in State v. Singer (1977) and State v. Brown (2002), Justice Pfeifer wrote that the tolling of speedy trial time based on the filing of a defense motion requires the trial court to determine that the filing of the motion caused an actual delay in the proceedings and the length of that delay. Pfeifer wrote: “It was up to the trial court in this case to determine the specific period of delay actually caused by the filing of a defendant's motion in limine. Since the trial court made no such finding – likely because the state never responded to it and there was no practical effect on the proceedings – it should not have extended the speedy trial time ….”
Contacts
Kevin A. Pituch, 419.213.2001, for the
State of Ohio and Lucas County prosecutor's office.
Steven D. Hartman, 419.255.5990, for Belia Larios-Sanchez.
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