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Statutory ‘Speedy Trial’ Deadlines Do Not Apply When Appealed Case Remanded for Retrial
2005-0894 and 2005-0984. State v. Hull, 2006-Ohio-4252.
Mahoning App. No. 04 MA 2, 2005-Ohio-1659. Judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., Resnick, Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O'Connor, O'Donnell and Lanzinger, JJ., concur.
Opinion: http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/newpdf/0/2006/2006-Ohio-4252.pdf
(Aug. 30, 2006) The Supreme Court of Ohio held today that, when a criminal conviction has been overturned on appeal, the time limit for the state to commence a new trial is governed by the “reasonable time” requirements of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, not by the statutory “speedy trial” deadlines set forth in O.R.C. 2945.71.
The Court held further that an interval of 149 days between an appellate decision vacating a first degree misdemeanor conviction entered pursuant to a no-contest plea and retrial of the case is constitutionally reasonable and is not presumptively prejudicial to the defendant. The 7-0 decision was authored by Justice Terrence O'Donnell.
Ohio R.C. 2945.71, often referred to as the “speedy trial” statute, provides that a defendant who is charged with a first or second degree misdemeanor is entitled to have that charge dismissed if he/she is not brought to trial within 90 days after being charged.
In this case, Theresa Hull of Austintown was arrested in October 2001 and charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol (OVI). Hull filed a motion to suppress the results of her breath test, but that motion was denied by the trial court. Hull subsequently entered a plea of no contest and was convicted of OVI. She subsequently appealed the denial of her motion to suppress the breath test results. On July 7, 2003, the 7th District Court of Appeals ruled that the breath test results should have been suppressed, vacated Hull's conviction, and remanded the case for a new trial. Hull's new trial was not scheduled until Dec. 4, 2003, 149 days after the remand order was issued.
When her new trial date arrived, Hull moved to dismiss the charges based on the state's failure to conduct her retrial within the 90-day requirement of R.C. 2945.71. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and subsequently retried the case to a jury, which found Hull guilty. Hull again appealed her conviction to the 7th District, this time arguing that the trial court erred in failing to grant her motion for dismissal on speedy-trial grounds. The 7th District affirmed the trial court's decision, but certified that its holding on the speedy-trial issue was in conflict with a 2004 ruling by the 8th District Court of Appeals in a similar case. The Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments in order to resolve the conflict between appellate districts.
Writing for the Supreme Court in today's unanimous opinion, Justice O'Donnell cited the Court's 1982 holding in State v. Fanning that statutory speedy trial time limits were “not applicable to retrials,” and also pointed to several Ohio appellate cases holding that the time limits in R.C. 2945.71 apply only to a defendant's original trial, and specifically declining to extend the statutory requirements to new trials or proceedings resulting from the successful appeal of a conviction.
“R.C. 2945.71(B)(2) specifies that a person charged with a first or second-degree misdemeanor shall be brought to trial within 90 days after arrest or service of summons. The statute does not address those cases in which an appellate court has reversed a conviction and remanded the matter to a trial court for further proceedings,” wrote Justice O'Donnell. “Because the statute is silent as to this circumstance, we are not in a position either to add language to the statute or to surmise legislative intent. If the legislature had intended the statutorily imposed speedy-trial time limitations to apply to convictions reversed and remanded on a plea of no-contest, it could have easily provided for that circumstance. Accordingly, the expressed legislative intent is for the statute to apply only to those situations following the arrest or service or summons upon a person charged with a criminal offense.”
In the absence of a specific statutory time limit for retrying defendants following an appeal, Justice O'Donnell wrote that state and federal court decisions, including the U.S. Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Barker v. Wingo, have held that such proceedings are governed by a general “reasonable time” standard imposed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and, in Ohio, by Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
In assessing whether the 149 days between the remand order in this case and Hull's new trial date was a “reasonable” time frame, Justice O'Donnell cited prior Ohio cases holding that delays of 138 days, five months and six months “are not presumptively prejudicial for the prosecution of first-degree misdemeanor charges involving driving under the influence.”
“In the instant case, we concur with the rationale and analysis offered by the court of appeals and its conclusion that the period within which the trial court adjudicated Hull's case following remand did not deprive her of her constitutional right to a speedy trial.” wrote Justice O'Donnell. “Thus, in this case, we conclude that when an appellate court vacates a first-degree misdemeanor conviction entered pursuant to a plea of no contest and remands the case for further proceedings, the adjudication of the case 149 days thereafter is not presumptively prejudicial and is constitutionally reasonable.”
Contacts
James E. Lanzo, 330.782.8283, for
Theresa Hull.
Rhys B. Cartwright-Jones, 330.740.2330, for the State of Ohio and Mahoning County prosecutor's office.
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