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Donald J. Cassarlie et al. v. Shell Oil Company et al., Case no. 2007-1408
8th District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
State of Ohio v. Danny Wayne Roberts, Case no. 2007-1475
1st District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
State of Ohio v. Jennifer L. Jeffries, Case no. 2007-1478
11th District Court of Appeals (Lake County)
In the Matter of: The Guardianship of Bessie Santrucek, Case no. 2007-1545
5th District Court of Appeals (Licking County)
Disciplinary Counsel v. Honorable Jeffrey Jay Hoskins, Case no. 2008-0352
Donald J. Cassarlie et al. v. Shell Oil Company et al., Case no. 2007-1408
8th District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: Is evidence that the subjective intent of a gasoline supplier in setting its wholesale prices to its lessors/franchisees was to drive them out of business relevant to a claim of “bad faith” pricing under the Ohio Uniform Commercial Code?
BACKGROUND: Donald Casserlie and more than 40 other current and former independent operators of Shell Oil Company gas stations in the Cleveland area filed suit against the company in 2000 alleging that Shell breached its contracts with them and violated a provision of the Ohio Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) by deliberately setting the wholesale price of the gasoline it sold to its independent franchisees so high that they could not profitably compete with other stations, including new company-owned Shell stations being opened in the area, and effectively drove the franchisees out of business by means of this “bad faith” pricing.
Following several years of pretrial proceedings, in April 2005 the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment to Shell dismissing the franchisees’ claims. The trial court based its judgment on findings that: 1) the plaintiffs had not met their burden of showing that the wholesale prices they were charged by Shell were outside of an objective “commercially reasonable”price range for that geographic area and time period; and 2) absent objective proof of excessive pricing, evidence of Shell’s subjective intention in setting its prices was legally irrelevant. The franchisees appealed. The 8th District Court of Appeals affirmed the action of the trial court, citing prior federal and state court decisions interpreting the “good faith” provision of the UCC. Two members of three-judge appellate panel entered separate opinions in which they questioned the correctness of the cited decisions, but acknowledged them as binding precedent. The Supreme Court has agreed to review the lower courts’ rulings.
Casserlie and the other franchisees who remain parties in the case argue that the UCC definition of “good faith” requires not only that a party with the contractual right to set prices must set them within reasonable market limits, but also that it act with “honesty in fact,” a standard that they say requires a subjective analysis of the intentions of the parties, and is a question of fact that should be decided by a jury.
Attorneys for Shell argue that the trial and appellate courts acted correctly in following case law that requires courts deciding whether pricing was done in “good faith” to apply an objective analysis of whether prices charged by a supplier are commercially reasonable and justifiable. They assert that requiring an additional subjective review of each party’s “intentions” in cases where prices have been found to be commercially reasonable would needlessly burden the state’s courts with more minor business-to-business disputes, and would subject suppliers to unreasonable and unnecessary litigation costs.
Contacts
Sean S. Kelly, 216.696.0606, for Donald Casserlie and other current and former franchisees.
Thomas R. Lucchesi, 216.621.0200, for Shell Oil Company.
State of Ohio v. Danny Wayne Roberts, Case no. 2007-1475
1st District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
ISSUE: When an offender has been released from prison after completing a judicially-reduced sentence, despite a stay of the trial court order reducing his sentence while the state pursued an appeal, does the subsequent rearrest and resentencing of the defendant for his original offense violate his constitutional right against “double jeopardy?”
BACKGROUND: In 2004, Danny Wayne Roberts of Cincinnati was sentenced to a total of eight years in prison for five counts of gross sexual imposition.
Roberts appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing procedure followed by the judge in his case was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington. On review, the 1st District Court of Appeals upheld Roberts’ claim of error and reduced his prison sentence to two years based on the court of appeals’ interpretation of Blakely. The state sought and was granted a stay of the 1st District’s order reducing Roberts’ sentence while the state pursued an appeal of that order in the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case, then held Roberts’ case (along with more than 100 others raising similar issues) pending the Court’s review of Ohio’s criminal sentencing statutes in light of the Blakely decision.
In January 2006, Roberts completed two years of imprisonment. Despite the fact that the order reducing his sentence had been stayed by the court of appeals, prison officials released Roberts from custody. On Feb. 27, 2006, the Supreme Court of Ohio announced its decision in State v. Foster. In that decision, the Court severed (removed from the statute) parts of Ohio’s criminal sentencing law it found unconstitutional in light of Blakely. It then remanded Roberts’ case (and the others it had been holding pending the Foster decision) to the trial court for resentencing under the new guidelines set forth in Foster.
When the trial court received Roberts’ case back from the Supreme Court, it determined that he was no longer in prison, issued a warrant for his arrest, and resentenced him under the Foster guidelines to the same eight year prison term it had imposed in his original case. Roberts appealed again. Applying the new guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court in Foster, the 1st District affirmed Roberts’ new sentence.
Attorneys for Roberts now ask the Supreme Court to rule that the trial court violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy when it rearrested and resentenced him after he had completed the two year sentence pronounced by the court of appeals and been released from prison. They argue that when the state releases an offender from prison consistent with completion of his sentence as of the date of his release, that action creates a reasonable expectation of finality and invokes the principle of double jeopardy to bar later imposition of “separate and successive punishment” for the same offense.
The Hamilton County prosecutor’s office, arguing on behalf of the state, points out that Roberts knew the 1st District had imposed a stay of its ruling reducing his original sentence to two years, and also knew that the state’s appeal of the shortened sentence was still pending before the Supreme Court. They argue that the prison’s error in releasing him from custody while his sentence was still under appeal did not prevent or invalidate the Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling that he must be resentenced consistent with Foster, and did not bar the trial court from reimposing the same sentence for his crimes that it originally imposed at trial.
Contacts
Charles W. Isaly, 513.752.3451, for Danny Wayne Roberts.
Scott M. Heenan, 513.946.3227, for the state and Hamilton County prosecutor's office.
State of Ohio v. Jennifer L. Jeffries, Case no. 2007-1478
11th District Court of Appeals (Lake County)
ISSUE: Do Ohio’s rules of evidence allow the state to introduce as evidence against a criminal defendant voluntary statements the defendant made to a private polygraph examiner that were disclosed to prosecutors by the defendant’s attorney in connection with an unsuccessful plea negotiation?
BACKGROUND: A provision of the Ohio Rules of Evidence, Evid.R. 410, bars as inadmissible against a defendant who was a participant in plea discussions “any statement made in the course of plea discussions in which counsel for the prosecuting authority or for the defendant was a participant and that do not result in a plea of guilty.”
In this case, Jennifer Jeffries was a suspect in the death of Dustin Spaller. Jeffries’ attorney retained the services of a private polygraph operator who questioned her regarding events surrounding the crime. Defense counsel subsequently approached prosecutors with an offer to be a cooperating witness in exchange for reduced charges. In exploring Jeffries’ proposal, the state requested and was provided with a written statement given by Jeffries to the polygraph operator and a transcript of the questions and answers from her voluntary polygraph test. The state ultimately reject the proffered plea bargain. At trial, the state introduced statements from the disclosed polygraph documents into evidence over defense objections. Jeffries was found guilty of cocaine trafficking, tampering with evidence, murder and complicity to robbery and received a sentence of from 22 years to life in prison.
On review, the 11th District Court of Appeals vacated Jeffries’ convictions and sentence and ordered that she receive a new trial. The appellate panel held that the trial court violated Evid.R. 410 by allowing the state to introduce evidence from the defendant’s polygraph examination despite the fact that evidence was turned over to prosecutors in connection with a plea negotiation.
The Lake County prosecutor’s office now asks the Supreme Court to reverse the 11th District and reinstate Jeffries’ convictions. They argue that the plain language of Evid.R. 410 bars admission of a defendant’s statements into evidence only when those statements are made “in the course of” the actual negotiation of a plea agreement between the defendant and representatives of the state. In this case, they assert, Jeffries’ statements were made to a private polygraph examiner who was not a representative of the state, and were made several months before any “negotiations” were initiated between her attorneys and the prosecutor’s office regarding the possibility of reduced charges in exchange for her cooperation. They also assert that, by providing the polygraph transcript to the state with no stated limitations on its use, Jeffries waived any later claim that her statements would be inadmissible at trial.
Jeffries’ attorneys respond that their specific purpose in arranging the polygraph examination was to generate test results affirming the accuracy of her version of events surrounding the crime, results they could subsequently use as a bargaining tool in negotiating with the state for reduced charges in exchange for her testimony against co-defendants. They assert that such pre-negotiation examinations are a frequent criminal defense strategy, and point to statements by the prosecutors stating that they entered into subsequent plea negotiations with Jeffries largely because of the existence and potential availability of her statements to the polygraph examiner. They argue that the precise purpose of Evid.R. 410 is to prevent the state from using a proffer of a plea agreement to obtain self-incriminating information that a defendant would never otherwise disclose, and then reneging on the plea bargain and using the defendant’s statements at trial.
Contacts
Karen A. Sheppert, 440.350.2683, for the stae and Lake County prosecutor's office.
Vanessa R. Clapp, 440.350.3200, for Jennifer Jeffries.
In the Matter of: The Guardianship of Bessie Santrucek, Case no. 2007-1545
5th District Court of Appeals (Licking County)
ISSUE: When a non-Ohio relative of an incompetent person has participated in a guardianship action by contesting an Ohio probate court’s exercise of jurisdiction in the case, does the non-resident have standing to appeal a ruling by the probate court affirming its jurisdiction and granting guardianship to another relative who is an Ohio resident?
BACKGROUND: This case involves a dispute between two sisters, Victoria Wellington of Granville, Ohio and Jennie Hull of Arizona over which of them should serve as guardian of the their 97-year-old mother, Bessie Santrucek. In April 2006 Wellington arranged for Santrucek to move to Ohio from her lifetime residence in Michigan. A few weeks later, Wellington filed an action in the Licking County Probate Court to have herself appointed guardian over her mother’s affairs. Hull hired an attorney to oppose the guardianship proceedings, alleging among other claims that her mother had been moved from Michigan to Ohio against her wishes, and that an Ohio probate court therefore did not have jurisdiction to appoint a guardian.
The trial court denied Hull’s motions, accepted jurisdiction in the case and issued an order appointing Wellington guardian. Hull attempted to appeal the probate court’s order. On review, the 5th District Court of Appeals dismissed Hull’s appeal for lack of legal standing, holding that under Ohio case law, a relative of a ward who did not file a competing request to be named guardian of the ward does not have standing to appeal a probate court order appointing another relative as guardian.
Hull now asks the Supreme Court to overturn the 5th District’s ruling and order that court to re-open and consider her appeal. Her attorneys point out that, unlike the laws of surrounding states, Ohio’s probate law bars out-of-state residents from applying to serve as guardian of a ward residing in Ohio. Thus, they note, Hull was legally prevented from applying to the probate court to be appointed as her mother’s guardian, and was then denied standing to pursue an appeal of the probate court’s ruling based on her failure to do what the law had barred her from doing. They argue that the 5th District’s narrow interpretation of the law leaves out-of-state relatives with no legal avenue to seek relief from an improper ruling by an Ohio probate court in a guardianship action. They ask the Court to rule that because Hull was a participant in the probate court proceeding by virtue of her motions opposing jurisdiction, she had standing to appeal the probate court’s guardianship order as a party “aggrieved” by that order.
Attorneys for Wellington respond that Ohio law does not recognize the right of an out-of-state resident to seek guardianship of an Ohio resident or even to receive notice that an Ohio guardianship action has been initiated, and clearly does not give a non-resident standing to appeal a probate court order granting guardianship of an Ohio resident. They point out that the probate court in this case appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of Mrs. Santrucek during the Licking County proceedings, and that the guardian ad litem found no basis for an appeal of that court’s ruling.
Contacts
William G. Porter, 614.464.5448, for Jennie Hull.
Kevin R. McDermott, 614.462.5001, for Victoria Wellington.
Disciplinary Counsel v. Honorable Jeffrey Jay Hoskins, Case no. 2008-0352
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline has recommended that Judge Jeffrey Jay Hoskins of the Highland County Court of Common Pleas be permanently disbarred for multiple acts of professional misconduct as a private attorney between 1995 and 2002 and during his service on the bench beginning in February 2003.
Judge Hoskins has entered multiple objections to the board’s findings of ethical violations and its recommended sanction. He asserts that the most serious violations found by the board have been refuted by jury verdicts acquitting him of criminal charges, and argues that a stayed one-year license suspension would be the appropriate penalty for any other violations has committed.
Based on a nine-count complaint filed against Hoskins by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and following five days of evidentiary proceedings before a hearing panel and review of the panel’s findings by the full disciplinary board, the board filed a report with the Court finding that Hoskins was guilty of more than 40 violations of state attorney and judicial discipline rules.
Those violations include findings that, while in private practice, Hoskins engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty or misrepresentation and committed multiple other ethical offenses by repeatedly making improper and unauthorized withdrawals of money for his own use from the estates of several relatives over whose assets he exercised fiduciary control as executor or administrator. The board also found that Hoskins violated his fiduciary duties by failing to timely disburse estate assets to the rightful beneficiaries, failing to keep required records accounting for his withdrawals and disbursements, charging excessive legal fees, and filing incomplete, inaccurate and misleading reports with the probate court that concealed his improper diversion of funds from the estates to his own use.
The board also found that Hoskins violated multiple provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct while serving on the bench by deliberately concealing his personal ownership interest in a building in which a court-related office contracted to lease space, and by entering into discussions with convicted felon David Bliss in which Hoskins suggested that Bliss’s purchase of the above-mentioned building at three times its actual value would be a legal way for Bliss to utilize money he had obtained years earlier through a criminal credit card fraud scheme and had allegedly concealed from authorities while in prison. The board noted that Hoskins was acquitted of criminal charges for his dealings with Bliss, but found that the evidence in that matter clearly supported findings of professional misconduct regardless of the outcome of a criminal prosecution.
With regard to his dealings with Bliss, Hoskins notes that the entire episode arose from a federal “sting” operation intended to ensnare him in illegal acts that he never in fact committed, and that there never were any actual “concealed proceeds” from Bliss’s earlier crimes. While he concedes that he should not have engaged in private conversations with a felon while serving on the bench, and that the transaction they discussed was “unseemly,” Hoskins notes that he was trying to recover $25,000 that Bliss had previously obtained from him by fraud, that he backed away from the scheme after obtaining an attorney’s advice about its legality, and that he was subsequently found not guilty on all charges in two criminal cases arising from the attempted “sting.” Hoskins argues that his private conversations with Bliss were themselves neither unlawful nor unethical, and that the scheme they discussed but abandoned only brought public discredit to his office and the judicial system because of the unwarranted actions of law enforcement and the local prosecutor in bringing unsupported criminal charges against him.
Hoskins also disputes the board’s findings of major misconduct with regard to his financial dealings with the estates of his relatives. He asserts that the monies he withdrew periodically over a period of several years were not misappropriations but fair compensation for his extensive legal services and/or reimbursements to cover estate-related expenses that he had paid out of his own funds. While acknowledging that his undocumented withdrawals for legal fees and expense reimbursements prior to the closing of the estates and without prior permission of the probate court were in violation of local court rules, Hoskins contends that these “shortcut” practices arose from the overlapping interests of the estates he was administering and from his informal familial relationship with the decedents and the beneficiaries of their estates, among whom he was included.
Contacts
Jonathan A. Coughlan, 614.461.0256, for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
George Jonson, 513.241.4722, for Judge Jeffrey Hoskins.
These summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information solely to help news reporters determine if they want to cover the arguments. The summaries are not part of the case record and are not considered by the Court at any point during its deliberations.
Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.