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VIL Laser Systems, LLC v. Shiloh Industries, Inc., and Shiloh Corporation et al., Case no. 2007-0996
3rd District Court of Appeals (Shelby County)
Leonard Maynard v. Eaton Corporation, Case no. 2007-1069
3rd District Court of Appeals (Marion County)
Cincinnati Bar Association v. William I. Farrell, Case no. 2007-2395
VIL Laser Systems, LLC v. Shiloh Industries, Inc., and Shiloh Corporation et al., Case no. 2007-0996
3rd District Court of Appeals (Shelby County)
ISSUE: When a trial court enters an order setting aside a jury verdict and giving the plaintiff a choice between a new trial on the issue of damages or “remittitur” (accepting a court-adjusted award lower than that voted by the jury),and that order gives the plaintiff 14 days to accept or reject the remittitur, does the 30-day time period within which a party in the case must appeal the court’s final judgment begin to run on the date the new trial or remittitur order is issued, or on the date that the plaintiff files a written acceptance or rejection of the proffered remittitur?
BACKGROUND: This case involves a dispute between two businesses in which VIL Laser Systems asserted claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment against Shiloh Industries in the Shelby County Court of Common Pleas. The court issued a summary judgment finding Shiloh liable in the case, and conducted a jury trial to determine VIL’s damages. The jury awarded VIL damages totaling $2,290,000. Shiloh filed a motion alleging that the jury’s damage award was not supported by the evidence and asking the judge either to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, order a new trial on the issue of damages, or exercise the option of remittitur. The power of remittitur authorizes a trial court to reduce a jury award the court finds excessive to an amount that the court finds to be supported by the evidence, and to offer the plaintiff a take-it-or-leave-it option either to accept the remittitur amount as full compensation for its damages or go through a new trial.
On Dec. 15, 2006, the trial court entered an order setting aside the jury’s damage award and granting a new trial on damages or, in the alternative, remittitur to VIL in the amount of $2,016,416.22, including prejudgment interest. The order included language indicating that it was “an appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(3),” and gave VIL 14 days to accept or reject the remittitur. On Dec. 29, VIL filed a written acceptance of the remittitur. On Jan. 25, 2007, Shiloh filed an appeal of the trial court’s judgment in the 3rd District Court of Appeals. VIL entered a motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis that it had not been filed within 30 days after the trial court entered its final order deciding the case. The 3rd District granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the 30-day time limit within which Shiloh was required to appeal had begun to run on Dec. 15, and therefore had expired before Shiloh’s appeal was filed on Jan. 25. Shiloh sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 3rd District’s ruling.
Attorneys for Shiloh argue that the company’s Jan. 25 notice of appeal was filed within the 30-day time limit because the trial court’s order of Dec. 15, 2006, did not become a “final appealable order” until VIL chose between the options set forth in that order by accepting the proffered remittitur amount on Dec. 29. While there are no prior Ohio court decisions addressing when a new-trial-or-remittitur order becomes “final” for purposes of appeal, they point to federal procedural rules which specify that a remittitur order issued by a federal court is not ripe for appeal until the prevailing party has accepted or rejected the adjusted award. They also note that nine states have adopted similar guidelines for state court remittitur proceedings, and urge the Supreme Court to adopt the federal standard in order to keep Ohio’s judicial procedures uniform with those in other jurisdictions.
Attorneys for VIL point out that the trial court’s Dec. 15 new-trial-or-remittitur order was clearly labeled as “final and appealable,” placing Shiloh on notice that it had 30 days from that date to file an appeal if it chose to do so. They note that R.C. 2505.02, which sets forth procedures for appealing state court decisions, specifies that the event making a ruling final and appealable must be an “order” or judgment issued by a court. Under that definition, they argue that VIL’s Dec. 29 delivery of a letter to the trial court accepting the proffered remittitur amount was not and could not be an “order” that made the court’s judgment final and triggered Shiloh’s appeal period. With regard to Shiloh’s argument regarding uniformity with other courts, they assert that federal law does not specifically identify types of trial court rulings that are subject to immediate appeal, whereas Ohio’s legislature has adopted specific statutory provisions identifying what types of rulings by state courts are and are not “final appealable orders.” They contend that the 3rd District correctly followed R.C. 2505.02 in dismissing Shiloh’s appeal as not timely filed, and urge the Court to affirm that decision.
Contacts
Thomas D. Warren, 216.621.0200, for Shiloh Industries, Inc.
James L. Thieman. 937.492.1271, for VIL Laser Systems LLC.
Leonard Maynard v. Eaton Corporation, Case no. 2007-1069
3rd District Court of Appeals (Marion County)
ISSUE: Did an amendment to R.C. 1343.03 that took effect on June 2, 2004, adjusting the rate of post-judgment interest payable on unpaid court judgments, apply retroactively to reduce the interest rate payable after June 2, 2004, on judgments that had already been awarded prior to the effective date of the amendment, but in which appeals were still pending on the date the law changed?
BACKGROUND: Section 1343.03 of the Ohio Revised Code sets a standard rate of post-judgment interest that is payable to the prevailing party in any civil lawsuit when the non-prevailing party does not make immediate payment of a court-ordered judgment award. Post-judgment interest is typically accrued during a period of time during which the non-prevailing party withholds payment of a judgment while it pursues an appeal of the trial court’s decision. For several years prior to June 2004, the statutory rate of post-judgment interest payable under R.C. 1343.03 was set at 10 percent. In 2004, the legislature enacted H.B. 212, which amended the post-judgment interest rate from 10 percent to a variable rate to be recalculated annually by applying a statutory formula to the current federal funds rates. The effective date of the amendment was June 2, 2004. The language of the amended statute specified that the new interest rate “applies to actions pending on the effective date of this act.”
This case involves an “intentional tort” lawsuit filed by Leonard Maynard against his former employer, Eaton Corporation, based on injuries Maynard suffered in a workplace accident. A Marion County common pleas court jury awarded Maynard damages totaling $1.15 million, and the trial court recorded a final judgment entry in the case on April 3, 2003.
Eaton withheld payment of the judgment amount while it pursued appeals of the trial court’s decision and damage award. After all of its appeals were denied, on Jan. 25, 2005, Eaton sent Maynard a check for $1,315,426.40, which it asserted was payment in full for the jury award plus statutory post-judgment interest for the 21 months from April 2003 to January 2005. Eaton calculated the amount of its post-judgment interest obligation by applying the 10 percent rate in effect at the time judgment was entered from April 3, 2003 to the effective date of H.B. 212, and then applying the amended statutory formula to calculate the interest payable from June 4, 2004, to Jan. 25, 2005.
Maynard challenged Eaton’s interest calculation, and obtained rulings from both the trial court and 3rd District Court of Appeals that he was entitled to interest at the 10 percent rate in force at the time the trial court judgment was entered for the entire 21-month period. The 3rd District certified, however, that its ruling on the calculation of interest was in conflict with decisions of the 8th and 10th appellate districts on the same issue. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear arguments in the case to resolve the conflict among the courts of appeals.
Attorneys for Eaton assert that the language used by the legislature in H.B. 212 indicates legislative intent that, if a trial court judgment issued before June 2, 2004, remained pending on appeal on or after that date, the old 10 percent statutory rate should be used to calculate post-judgment interest payable from the date of judgment to the effective date of the new law, but that the new formula adopted as part of H.B. 212 should be used to calculate interest payable from June 2, 2004, to whenever the judgment was paid in full. They argue that retroactive application of the amended interest rate to judgments entered before enactment of H.B. 212 is not in violation of a constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws because that prohibition applies only to laws that affect a “substantive right,” whereas the post-conviction interest statute is “remedial” in nature.
Attorneys for Maynard argue that there is no need for the Court to address the constitutional retroactivity issue raised by Eaton, because the plain language of R.C. 1343.03 makes it clear that whatever statutory rate of post-judgment interest was in effect on the date a judgment became “due and payable” is applicable from that date until the judgment is satisfied. They point to multiple court decisions holding that a legal action remains “pending” only until the court of original jurisdiction has entered judgment. They argue that when this ordinary understanding of the term is applied to the language of H.B. 212, it is clear that the legislature intended to apply the new interest rate formula only to cases that were still “pending” before a trial court (i.e., in which no final judgment had been entered) as of June 2, 2004. If the Court does consider the issue of constitutional retroactivity, they argue that the language of H.B. 212 does not indicate a sufficiently clear legislative intent to make the interest rate change retroactive to overcome the strong presumption that all new laws are to be applied only prospectively.
Contacts
Harry T. Quick, 216.664.6900, for
Eaton Corporation.
Laren E. Knoll, 614.228.2050, for Leonard Maynard.
Cincinnati Bar Association v. William I. Farrell, Case no. 2007-2395
Cincinnati attorney William I. Farrell has filed objections to a recommendation by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline that his law license be suspended for two years, with the second year of that term stayed on conditions.
The board’s recommendation is based on its findings that Farrell violated state attorney discipline rules by forging his wife’s signature on an application he used to increase the equity line of credit on their jointly owned home, by inducing another attorney to notarize his wife’s purported signature in her absence, and by fabricating multiple other fraudulent and fictitious documents, including letters purportedly from the U.S. Postal Service, to convince his wife that he had left his private law practice for more lucrative employment.
Farrell has admitted the improper conduct with which he was charged, but argues that the disciplinary board has recommended an excessive penalty. He urges the Court to instead impose a 12-month suspension with all of that term conditionally stayed – the sanction recommended by the Cincinnati Bar Association, which prosecuted the charges against him.
Contacts
William F. McAdams Jr., 513.352.3332, for the Cincinnati Bar Association.
John J. Mueller, 513.621.3636, for William Farrell.
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