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Rev. Iyabo Nadra v. Susan Mbah and Mindy Grote, Case no. 2007-0525
10th District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
Linda B. Wohl v. Tyler C. Swinney et al., Case no. 2007-0593
12th District Court of Appeals (Butler County)
State of Ohio v. Jermaine C. Baker, Case no. 2007-1184
9th District Court of Appeals (Summit County)
Rev. Iyabo Nadra v. Susan Mbah and Mindy Grote, Case no. 2007-0525
10th District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
ISSUE: Is a civil lawsuit brought in state court claiming violations Section 1983 of the U.S. Civil Rights Act subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Ohio R.C. 2305.10, or to the four-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.09(D)?
BACKGROUND: In February 2005, Iyabo Nadra of Columbus filed a civil lawsuit against two employees of Franklin County Children Services (FCCS), Susan Mbah and Mindy Grote, for allegedly violating her civil rights under Section 1983 of the federal civil rights act. Following an FCCS investigation of two reports that Nadra was abusing her minor son, identified as M.M., Mbah and Grote filed a complaint in juvenile court that led to Nadra’s loss of legal custody of her son.
In response to Nadra’s suit, Mbah and Grote entered a motion seeking summary judgment in their favor. They argued that Nadra had not filed her complaint within the statute of limitations (legal time limit) for Section 1983 actions, which they asserted was two years from the date of injury. After initially granting partial summary judgment to the defendants, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas later reviewed a new motion and awarded summary judgment in favor of Mbah and Grote on all claims. The trial court based its ruling on a finding that the two-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.10 was applicable to Nadra’s claims under Section 1983, and her suit had not been filed within two years of the events on which those claims were based.
On review, the 10th District Court of Appeals partially reversed the trial court. The appellate panel held that the statute of limitations applicable to Section 1983 claims asserted in an Ohio court is four years, as provided in R.C. 2305.09(D). Since Nadra’s civil rights claims were asserted within the four-year limit, the 10th District reinstated those portions of Nadra’s suit and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Mbah and Grote now ask the Supreme Court to overrule the 10th District and reinstate the trial court’s summary judgment in their favor. They note that, because Congress did not include a specific statute of limitations in Section 1983, federal courts have ruled that when such claims are filed in state courts, they are subject to the provisions of that state’s laws applicable to “personal injury” claims. They point to a 1989 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Owens v. Okure in which the Court held that, when a state (such as Ohio) has multiple statutes of limitations applicable to different types of personal injury claims, state courts considering Section 1983 complaints should apply the “general or residual” statute of limitations for personal injury cases. In determining which provision of Ohio law should be applied in this case, they urge the Court to follow a 1989 decision by the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Browning v. Pendleton, which held that the two-year limitations period set forth in R.C. 2305.10 is the “general or residual” provision applicable to federal Section 1983 claims.
Because the case involved a claim asserted against state employees and arose from their performance of official duties, the state of Ohio, represented by the Attorney General’s Office, has entered an amicus curiae brief supporting the position of Mbah and Grote, and has been authorized to share the 15 minutes of oral argument time allotted to them.
Nadra did not file a responsive brief in the case, and is therefore not eligible to participate in oral argument before the Court.
Contacts
R. Matthew Colon, 614.462.3555, for Susan Mbah and Mindy Grote.
Iyabo Nadra, pro se: No contact information available.
Linda B. Wohl v. Tyler C. Swinney et al., Case no. 2007-0593
12th District Court of Appeals (Butler County)
ISSUE: This case involves a dispute about whether the wording of an auto insurance policy is ambiguous about who it covers for uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) claims, and therefore requires the company to provide UIM coverage for a non-family member of a policyholder who was driving the policyholder’s car with her permission at the time of an accident.
BACKGROUND: James Slattery was driving a car owned by Linda Wohl, with Wohl riding in the car as a passenger, when they were struck by another vehicle. Both suffered serious injuries. The driver of the other vehicle, Tyler Swinney, was determined to be at fault. Swinney’s insurance company settled with Wohl and Slattery for the $500,000 limits of his liability coverage, with all but $1 of that amount allocated to Wohl. Slattery then filed a claim against Wohl’s auto insurance policy with Motorists Mutual Insurance, seeking UIM benefits.
Motorists denied coverage, noting that Slattery’s own personal auto insurance policy with American States Insurance provided him with $12,250 of UM/UIM coverage, and claiming that an exclusion in its policy precluded payment of UM/UIM benefits to any occupant of an insured vehicle if that person had UM/UIM coverage in another auto insurance policy.
Motorists sought a declaratory judgment in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas supporting its denial of UM/UIM benefits to Slattery based on the language of Wohl’s policy. Slattery filed pleadings opposing the requested judgment, asserting that as a “permissive driver” of Wohl’s car he fell within the definition of an insured party under her Motorists policy, and was therefore entitled to UM/UIM coverage. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court rejected Motorists’ reading of the policy language and granted summary judgment in favor of Slattery, holding that he was covered for underinsured damages up to the policy limit of $250,000, less the $1 he had recovered in the settlement with Swinney’s insurer. Motorists appealed. On review, the 12th District court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, but certified that its holding was in conflict with a decision by the 8th District which had denied UM/UIM coverage to a similarly situated claimant based on the same Motorists policy language at issue in this case. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear arguments to resolve the conflict between appellate districts.
Attorneys for Motorists assert that the language of its policy exclusion clearly precludes underinsured motorist coverage to any occupant of an insured vehicle if that person is a named insured person in another auto insurance policy that provides him with UM/UIM coverage. Because Slattery was covered for UM/UIM damages under his own policy with American States, they argue, he is clearly and unambiguously excluded from such coverage under their policy issued to Wohl.
Slattery, who is an attorney, argues on his own behalf that the language of the Motorists policy exclusion is at best ambiguous about who it covers and excludes from coverage for UM/UIM losses. Citing conflicting court decisions interpreting the disputed policy language differently, and a line of Supreme Court cases holding that any ambiguity in the wording of an insurance contract must be interpreted in favor the policyholder, Slattery urges the Court to affirm the rulings of the trial court and 12th District that he is entitled to UIM coverage under Wohl’s policy with Motorists.
Contacts
T. Andrew Vollmar, 937.222.2424, for
Motorists Mutual Insurance Co.
James Slattery: pro se, 513.503.5074.
State of Ohio v. Jermaine C. Baker, Case no. 2007-1184
9th District Court of Appeals (Summit County)
ISSUE: In order to be a “final, appealable order” eligible for review by a court of appeals, must a trial court’s written sentencing order include in a single document a verdict of conviction, a sentence, and a statement of the defendant’s plea at arraignment?
BACKGROUND: This case asks the Court to resolve a procedural conflict between the 9th and 12th District courts of appeals regarding what information must be included in a trial court’s sentencing entry in order for that entry to a “final appealable order” eligible for appellate review.
In April 2007, Jermaine Baker of Akron was convicted by a jury on one felony county of possessing a weapon under disability and one misdemeanor count of obstruction of official business, and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for the weapons charge and a concurrent 90-day term of imprisonment on the obstruction charge.
The entry made by the Summit County Court of Common Pleas in its journal recording the disposition of the case accurately reported Baker’s convictions and sentences, but did not indicate what plea he had entered to the charges at the time of his arraignment. When Baker attempted to appeal his convictions and sentence, the 9th District granted a motion by the state to dismiss his appeal on the basis that the trial court’s sentencing entry was incomplete (and therefore not a “final, appealable order”) because it lacked a statement of the defendant’s plea. The 9th District later certified that its ruling in this case, which followed its decisions in two prior cases, was in conflict with a 2002 ruling of the 12th District Court of Appeals on the same legal issue. The Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments to resolve the conflict between appellate districts.
Attorneys for Baker argue that the 9th District’s ruling in this case, and in the two prior decisions it cited in dismissing Baker’s appeal, are based on a faulty reading of the applicable Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure, Crim.R. 32(C). They argue that the rule simply requires that, in addition to identifying the crime(s) for which a defendant was convicted and the sentence imposed, a trial court must note in its sentencing entry one of three plea-related outcomes a) the defendant entered a guilty plea and was convicted; b) the defendant entered a no-contest plea, and the trial court made necessary findings to support a conviction; or c) the defendant went to trial before a judge or jury and was found guilty.
They point out that the journal entry in Baker’s case clearly indicated that he had been found guilty by a jury – an outcome that is possible onlywhen the defendant has entered and maintained a plea of not guilty. They assert that a defendant’s plea at arraignment is of no legal consequence to a court of appeals reviewing a trial court’s judgment and proceedings, whereas there are important differences between the appeal rights of defendants who ultimately enter guilty pleas and those who do not. They contend that the intent of Crim.R. 32(C) is to require that trial court entries include the information necessary for a court of appeals to review their decisions, and urge the Supreme Court to hold that the entry in Baker’s case met that requirement. They also argue that nothing in Ohio’s criminal sentencing statutes or rules of criminal procedure requires that a defendant’s convictions, sentence and plea status must be recorded in a single document. They urge the Court to hold that a trial court record is complete and “final” so long as all the information required by Crim.R. 32(c) is journalized and available in the case record forwarded to an appellate court.
The Summit County prosecutor’s office, representing the state, responds that the language of Crim.R. 32(C) requires that in criminal cases trial courts must record “a judgment of conviction” – language that they contend supports the 9th District’s holding that a single entry must be made including all of the required elements. They also point to multiple decisions in which the 9th District has held that a judgment entry is incomplete and therefore not a final order if any of the components required by the rule are missing. While a less stringent application of the rule might be seem to be a reasonable proposition, they assert, its plain language requires specific items to be included, and one of those items is the plea entered by the defendant.
Contacts
Donald Gallick, 216.496.3427, for
Jermaine Baker.
Richard Kasay, 330.643.2800, for the State of Ohio and Summit County prosecutor’s office.
These summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information solely to help news reporters determine if they want to cover the arguments. The summaries are not part of the case record and are not considered by the Court at any point during its deliberations.
Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.