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In re: Special Docket No. 73958, Case no. 2006-1279
8th District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
Board of Education of the Columbus City Schools v. Franklin County Board of Revision, Franklin County Auditor, and 2100 Maple Canyon Plaza, Case no. 2006-1429
State Board of Tax Appeals (Franklin County)
State of Ohio v. Joseph W. Jones, Case nos. 2006-1606 and 2006-1851
7th District Court of Appeals (Mahoning County)
State of Ohio v. Brian K. Siler, Case no. 2006-0185
5th District Court of Appeals (Ashland County)
Jane Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, Case no. 2006-1155
1st District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
In re: Special Docket No. 73958, Case no. 2006-1279
8th District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: Under recent ‘tort reform' legislation, do the defendants in a group of pending asbestos-related lawsuits have the right to immediately appeal a ruling in which a trial court denied their blanket motion to dismiss all pending claims before that court in which the plaintiffs have not made a prima facie showing of current malignant lung disease or of other actual physical impairment attributable to asbestos exposure?
BACKGROUND: Under H.B. 292, which became effective Sept. 2, 2004, all plaintiffs bringing asbestos-related lawsuits in Ohio trial courts are required to file medical evidence of current malignant lung disease or of current physical impairment attributable to non-malignant lung disease. In cases where the plaintiff does not make such a showing, the court before which the plaintiff's suit is pending is required to “administratively dismiss” his case, with the proviso that the plaintiff's claim may be refiled without prejudice at a later date if and when the plaintiff makes a showing of the required medical symptoms.
H.B. 292 included language applying the proof-of-current-impairment and administrative dismissal requirements retroactively to pending cases in which plaintiffs claimed injury from asbestos exposure that occurred prior to the effective date of the bill. However, the retroactive language in the bill included an exception to the administrative dismissal requirement if the trial court before which a case was pending found that dismissal would “impair a substantive right” of the plaintiff in violation of the Ohio Constitution. H.B. 292 also amended R.C. 2505.02, the state law defining what types of trial court rulings are “final” and thus immediately reviewable by a court of appeals. The amendment added rulings on the eligibility of an asbestos case for administrative dismissal to the definition of “provisional remedies,” a class of legal matters which may qualify as “final orders” subject to immediate appellate review under certain conditions.
Because of a backlog of thousands of unheard asbestos-related lawsuits that have been filed in the Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas, that court created Special Docket No. 73958, which consists exclusively of asbestos cases. Three fulltime judges are assigned to hear and decide those cases on an expedited basis. After the provisions of H.B. 292 took effect, a group of companies named as defendants in hundreds of pending Cuyahoga County asbestos cases filed a motion asking the “asbestos court” to issue a blanket order administratively dismissing all pending cases included on the special docket in which the plaintiffs had not filed prima facie evidence of current lung cancer or current impairment caused by non-malignant lung disease.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the defendants' motion. In their decision, the special docket judges made a general finding that the H.B. 292 proof-of-current-impairment requirement could not be applied to dismiss all pending cases of plaintiffs who had not made a showing of current medical impairment, because such a ruling would unconstitutionally eliminate the claims of some plaintiffs who filed their lawsuits before H.B. 292 was enacted, and whose claims must therefore be adjudicated under the previous, less-restrictive common law evidence standard for asserting a claim.
The defendants attempted to appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to the 8th District Court of Appeals. The 8th District declined to hear their appeal, holding that it did not have jurisdiction to review the ruling of the asbestos court judges because their denial of a blanket motion to dismiss hundreds of cases did not qualify as a “final appealable order” under R.C. 2505.02 –notwithstanding the amendment of that statute by H.B. 292.
The defendants now ask the Supreme Court to overrule the 8th District and order that court to accept jurisdiction and review the asbestos court's denial of their motion to dismiss. They argue that it was the intent of the legislature in amending R.C. 2505.02 to define any trial court ruling granting or denying the administrative dismissal of an asbestos claim as a “final order” subject to immediate appellate review.
Attorneys for the plaintiffs assert that under R.C. 2505.02, the grant or denial of a “provisional remedy” qualifies as a final appealable order only if it “determines the action” with regard to a specific case and if the appealing party would have no meaningful or effective legal remedy if an immediate appeal is not heard. In this case, they argue, the trial court's denial of a blanket order dismissing hundreds of cases did not “determine the outcome” of any one of those cases, and if it had, the defendants would still have a legal remedy by simply appealing the denial of an administrative dismissal in that individual case.
Contacts
Richard D. Schuster, 614.464.5475, for
the appellant asbestos case defendants.
Mark C. Meyer, 412.471.3980 or Christopher J. Hickey, 216.241.1872, for the appellee asbestos case plaintiffs.
Board of Education of the Columbus City Schools v. Franklin County Board of Revision, Franklin County Auditor, and 2100 Maple Canyon Plaza, Case no. 2006-1429
State Board of Tax Appeals (Franklin County)
ISSUE: In setting the taxable value of real property that is subject to a continuing lease, does a county board of tax revision err by accepting an appraisal that is based on the replacement value of the land and building, rather than relying on the actual price paid for the leased property in a recent arm's length sale?
BACKGROUND: In June 2003, a company, 2100 Maple Canyon Plaza, purchased a parcel of real property within the Columbus City School District for $2.9 million. The property consisted of land and a five-year-old retail structure that had been built to order as a chain drug store and had been leased since its completion by two different drug store chains. Under the purchase agreement, Maple Canyon obtained not only title to the real property but also the previous owner's interest in its lease agreement with the tenant, CVS Pharmacies. At the time of the sale, the tax valuation of the property set by the Franklin County Auditor was $1,760,000.
In 2004, Columbus City Schools filed a complaint with the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) asserting that the tax valuation of the property was too low, and that its value should be adjusted to $2.9 million to reflect the recent sale price in an arm's length transaction. At a hearing before the BOR, the owner presented testimony by an appraiser, Robin Lorms, who set the value of the land at $620,000 and current replacement cost of the building at $1,094,810, for a total appraised value of $1,716,800. The BOR adopted the owner's appraisal as the true tax valuation of the property.
The school board appealed the BOR's ruling to the State Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). Both sides waived a hearing before the BTA. Based on the parties' written pleadings and its review of the record of the BOR proceedings, the BTA held that under the Supreme Court of Ohio's 2005 decision in Berea City School District v. Cuyahoga Board of Revision, the true tax value of the property was the $2.9 million that Maple Canyon had paid the previous owner to acquire it in a recent arm's length sale.
Maple Canyon has exercised its right to appeal the BTA's decision to the Supreme Court. Attorneys for the property owner note that under Ohio's tax laws, real property is taxed on its “fee simple” value (i.e., the current market value of the land and improvements themselves, not including additional value arising from the owner's use of the property to generate business revenue.) In this case, they assert, the $2.9 million Maple Canyon paid the previous owner purchased not only the fee simple value of the land and building, but also the value of a multi-year income stream arising from a lease agreement under which CVS was contractually obligated to pay the property owner monthly rents for a known future period. They say the BTA erred by ignoring the evidence their appraiser presented to the BOR regarding the market replacement value of the land and building, and instead adopting the full amount they paid to acquire both the property and the lease as the taxable value of the property.
Attorneys for the school district urge the Court to affirm the BTA's ruling. They point out that, since this case has been in litigation, Maple Canyon sold the property at issue for $4.2 million, supporting their claim that the true value of the property in 2003 was much higher than the $1.7 million estimated by the owner's appraiser and accepted by the BOR. They argue that Maple Canyon did not submit a copy of its lease agreement with CVS to either the BOR or the BTA to support its claim that a large part of the $2.9 million they paid for the property was based on an income stream from the lease. In the absence of specific and persuasive evidence to the contrary, they assert, Berea and several other recent Supreme Court decisions have held that the actual price paid for property in a recent arm's length sale is presumed to be the true value for property tax purposes.
Contacts
Todd W. Sleggs, 216.771.8990, for
2100 Maple Canyon Plaza, LLC.
Mark H. Gillis, 614.228.5822, for the Columbus City School District.
State of Ohio v. Joseph W. Jones, Case nos. 2006-1606 and 2006-1851
7th District Court of Appeals (Mahoning County)
ISSUE: Under Ohio's Rules of Criminal Procedure, before accepting a defendant's proffered plea of guilty to a criminal offense, is a trial court required to determine not only that the defendant understands the rights he is waiving and the effect of a guilty plea, but also to determine that the defendant understands the effect of entering an alternative plea of no contest?
BACKGROUND: In August 2004, Joseph Jones of Austintown was charged with three counts of domestic violence for allegedly beating his fiancé's three children. After initially pleading not guilty, entering pretrial motions seeking dismissal of the charges and requesting a jury trial, Jones later entered into a plea bargain in which he agreed to plead guilty to a single count of domestic violence and the state agreed to drop the other two counts.
Before accepting Jones' plea of guilty, the trial judge who presided over his hearing engaged in a courtroom colloquy (conversation) with the defendant required under Ohio Criminal Rule 11 in which the judge advised Jones that he had the right to go to trial before a jury at which the state must prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, to subpoena witnesses and to decline to testify or be cross examined. Jones was also advised that his guilty plea was an admission of the crime with which he was charged, and informed of the maximum penalties the court could impose for that offense. Jones affirmed that he understood the rights he was giving up and the effects of pleading guilty, and entered a guilty plea. The judge accepted his plea and sentenced Jones to 180 days in jail with 170 days suspended and a fine of $150 plus costs. The court also ordered Jones to attend anger management classes, obtain a psychological evaluation, and attend counseling if the evaluation found that counseling was necessary.
Jones subsequently filed a motion for leave to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial on the domestic violence charges. After a hearing, the trial court denied that motion, holding that Jones' guilty plea had been entered knowingly and voluntarily and was therefore binding.
On review, the 7th District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered that Jones be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty and have his case decided at trial. The court of appeals held that the trial court's colloquy with Jones at the time it accepted his guilty plea was insufficient because the judge did not also explain what the effect on Jones would be if he entered a plea of no contest, as opposed to a plea of guilty.
Arguing on behalf of the state, and supported by an amicus curiae (friend of the court) brief submitted by the Ohio Attorney General's Office, the Mahoning County prosecutor asserts that the 7th District's ruling applied an excessive and overly rigid standard for a trial judge's plea colloquy with a misdemeanor offender. They argue that that, by requiring the judge to explain the effects of a plea (no contest) that was not at issue in Jones' case, the 7th District set a standard for misdemeanor cases that is more stringent than the colloquy requirements set by the Supreme Court for felony cases in State v. Griggs (2004). They urge the Court to hold that a trial court “substantially complies” with the Crim R. 11 requirement to assure that a proffered guilty plea is “knowing and voluntary” if the judge's colloquy ensures that the defendant “knows what he is waiving,” and is accurately advised of the potential penalties he will face as a result of his plea and conviction.
Attorneys for Jones point to language in Crim R. 11(E) requiring that a judge must inform a defendant of the “effect of a plea of guilty, no contest and not guilty” before a plea of guilty or no contest can be accepted. They argue that this requirement is clear and unambiguous, and that the 7th District was correct in holding that the trial court in this case did not conduct a legally sufficient colloquy with Jones because it failed to explain the effects of a no-contest plea before allowing him to plead guilty.
Contacts
Rhys B. Cartwright-Jones, 330.740.2330, for
the State of Ohio and Mahoning County prosecutor's office.
Brent L. English, 216.781.9917, for Joseph Jones.
State of Ohio v. Brian K. Siler, Case no. 2006-0185
5th District Court of Appeals (Ashland County)
ISSUE: Under the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington, does a trial court's admission into evidence of hearsay testimony by police officers relating statements made to them during questioning of a three-year-old violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him?
BACKGROUND: On the afternoon of Sept. 20, 2001, the body of Barbara Siler of Ashland was found hanging from a rope affixed to the overhead door track in her garage. Forensic evidence later established that she had been dead for approximately eight hours before the body was discovered. Barbara. Siler and her husband, Brian Siler, had a history of domestic conflict, and Brian had recently moved out of the family home and made hostile statements to friends about his wife after she obtained a protective order against him.
Police called to the scene questioned the Silers' three-year-old son, Nathan, whom they found asleep in the house, about what he may have seen or heard. During two different periods of questioning by officers that covered approximately 90 minutes, Nathan indicated that he had been frightened the preceding night by loud knocking on the door, and had later seen his mommy and daddy arguing and saw his daddy hurting his mommy. After an officer demonstrated several different types of physical attacks on a female child services worker, Nathan reportedly indicated that his father had grabbed his mother by the throat.
Based on the couple's history of domestic violence, Nathan's statements to police, DNA evidence linking Brian Siler to the rope involved in the hanging and other evidence, Siler was arrested and charged with the first-degree murder of his wife. At trial, after overruling objections by defense counsel, the judge allowed the state to present testimony by police officers relating Nathan's statements about his father's alleged presence and actions at the crime scene on the night of his wife's death. The jury returned a guilty verdict and recommended the death penalty, but the judge reduced the sentence to life imprisonment without parole.
Siler appealed his conviction and sentence, asserting among other claims that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the jury to consider hearsay testimony by the police regarding Nathan's statements to them. On review, the 5th District Court of Appeals affirmed the admission of the officers' testimony, citing an exception to the general rule barring hearsay testimony where the statements at issue were “excited utterances.” The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to review the case at that time.
In June 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court released its decision in Crawford v. Washington, which bars as unconstitutional the introduction of hearsay evidence relating “testimonial” statements of a witness who does not appear at trial unless the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross examine the absent witness. Siler entered a federal appeal alleging that, under Crawford, the hearsay testimony at his trial relating Nathan's statements had violated his federal Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the 5th District's judgment and remanded the case with a directive that the court of appeals review its prior decision in light of Crawford. On remand, the 5th District found that the statements officers had elicited from Nathan through their questioning were testimonial in nature, and therefore should not have been admitted at trial by means of hearsay testimony. The court therefore reversed Siler's conviction and directed that he be given a new trial.
The state now appeals the 5th District's grant of a new trial to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The state argues that the 5th District erred in determining that Nathan's statements repeated by the police at trial were “testimonial” in nature simply because they were made to a police officer investigating a crime. Prosecutors point to another federal case decided after Crawford, Davis v. Washington, in which they say the U.S. Supreme Court held that some statements made to police are not testimonial if the declarant is not speaking with the intent or expectation that his statements will be used at trial. In cases like this one involving a child witness, they contend, the youthful declarant cannot “intend” that his statements will be used at trial, and thus they are not testimonial statements precluded from introduction as hearsay evidence.
Attorneys for Siler argue that the state's analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Crawford and Davis ignores plain language in both opinions holding that, while there may be some debate about what constitutes a “testimonial” statement, any statement elicited by police in the course of questioning a witness after a crime scene has been secured is clearly testimonial in nature and therefore may not be related at trial by way of third-party hearsay testimony.
Contacts
Ramona J. Rogers, 419.289.8857, for the
State of Ohio and Ashland County prosecutor's office.
Jill E. Stone, 614.466.5394, for Brian Siler.
Jane Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, Case no. 2006-1155
1st District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
ISSUE: Does the legal doctrine of “equitable estoppel” allow a woman to avoid statutes of limitations that would otherwise bar her claims and pursue a current lawsuit against the Catholic Church for alleged false statements made to her in 1965 by church representatives who persuaded her to give up for adoption her out-of-wedlock child fathered by a priest?
BACKGROUND: In December 2004, a woman identified as Jane Doe filed a civil lawsuit against the Catholic Archdiocese of Cincinnati based on alleged false statements and misrepresentations that were made to her in 1965, when at the age of 16 she became pregnant as a result of a sexual relationship with her parish priest, Father Normal Heil.
In her complaint, Doe alleged that Heil and one of her teachers, Sister Mary Patrick, “intimidated” her into giving up her child for adoption by making false or misleading statements on which she relied, including that she was solely responsible for the pregnancy, that giving up the child was God's punishment for her premarital sex, that if she kept her child or disclosed the identify of the father the child would not be baptized, and that Heil would have to leave the priesthood if she kept the child and the diocese was forced to pay child support. Doe asked the court to award her damages for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with familial relations, loss of consortium with her child, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence by the archdiocese in supervising and retaining its employees.
The archdiocese filed a motion to dismiss all of Doe's tort claims on the basis that the statutes of limitations (legal time limits) for her to assert such claims based on events that took place in 1965 had long since expired. The trial court agreed, and dismissed Doe's entire case. On review, the 1st District Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of three claims, but remanded Doe's claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of filial consortium and negligent supervision to the trial court for further proceedings. The court of appeals held that the archdiocese was barred from asserting the expiration of statutory time limits as a defense against Doe's complaint under the legal doctrine of “equitable estoppel.” Under equitable estoppel, a party that would normally have a legal right against another may not exercise that right if it is shown that the other party in good faith relied upon false or misleading statements by the first party to its detriment.
Attorneys for the archdiocese have appealed the 1st District's ruling to the Supreme Court. They point out that the 1st District's decision in this case was handed down prior to the Supreme Court of Ohio's 2006 decision in a very similar case, Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati. In that case, they note, the Supreme Court rejected a claim of equitable estoppel and held that complaints of sexual abuse asserted by a plaintiff against a church employee for actions that took place decades earlier were barred because they had not been filed within the statutory time limit. The archdiocese also argues that, whether or not barred by statutes of limitations, Jane Doe's complaint was properly dismissed by the trial court because it did not identify any statements or actions by church employees subsequent to Doe giving up her child for adoption that misinformed her about her legal rights against the diocese or interfered with her ability to assert those rights by filing a timely lawsuit.
Attorneys for Doe point out that the court of appeals did not pass judgment on whether the statements made to Doe by church employees at the time of her pregnancy actually were misleading or whether her reliance on those statements prevented her from exercising her legal rights. They say the 1st District's decision merely held that some of Doe's claims should not have been summarily dismissed because the conduct described in her complaint was sufficient to raise a material question of equitable estoppel that, if reviewed by the trial court and decided in her favor, would allow Doe to pursue recovery from the archdiocese despite the expired statutes of limitations.
Contacts
Mark A. VanderLaan, 513.977.8200, for the
Archdiocese of Cincinnati.
Marc. D. Mezibov, 513.723.1600, for Jane Doe.
These summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information solely to help news reporters determine if they want to cover the arguments. The summaries are not part of the case record and are not considered by the Court at any point during its deliberations.
Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.