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Kevin Bellman et al. v. American International Group et al., Case no. 2005-2162
6th District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)
Mid-American Fire and Casualty Company et al. v. William C. Heasley, Jr., Case nos. 2005-2399 and 2006-0249
11th District Court of Appeals (Lake County)
State of Ohio v. Lacina Batchili, Case no. 2005-2420
6th District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)
State of Ohio v. Michael Carswell, Case no. 2006-0151
12th District Court of Appeals (Warren County)
State of Ohio v. Jeremy E. Parker, Case no. 2006-0236
11th District Court of Appeals (Ashtabula County)
Kevin Bellman et al. v. American International Group et al., Case no. 2005-2162
6th District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)
ISSUES: Under R.C. 1343.03(A) and the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Hartmann v. Duffey, when an injured claimant and an insurance company representing the tortfeasor have negotiated an oral settlement agreement:
BACKGROUND: This case involves a class action suit filed in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas by Kevin Bellman and 27 other plaintiffs who are seeking to recover post-settlement interest from a number of different insurance companies for what they allege were deliberate delays in the payment of settled claims. Bellman and the other plaintiffs allege that they accepted oral settlement offers from the defendant insurance companies to resolve claims against policyholders, but that the insurers then deliberately delayed sending them payment for a number days or weeks in order to continue collecting the “float” (day-to-day accumulation of interest) on amounts that were due and payable to the plaintiffs from the date of the oral agreement.
The insurance companies filed a pretrial motion seeking summary dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims, and the trial court granted summary judgment. On review, the 6th District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's action.
The appellate panel ruled that: (1) a plaintiff's claim for post-settlement interest must be asserted against the insured tortfeasor (the party who actually caused the plaintiff's damages) rather than against the tortfeasor's insurance company; and (2) no post-settlement interest was claimable by the plaintiffs because the “settlement dates” of their claims was not the date of an alleged oral agreement between the parties, but rather the date on which the plaintiffs accepted payment from the insurer for the proffered amount and signed an agreement expressly releasing the insurer from any additional liability.
Bellman and his co-plaintiffs sought Supreme Court review of the 6th District's decision, and the Court accepted the case as a discretionary appeal.
The plaintiffs argue that the trial court and court of appeals failed to read the Ohio statute that grants plaintiffs a right to post-judgment interest in light of the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Hartmann v. Duffey. In Hartmann, they assert, the Court held that once a party becomes liable to another for money damages under the terms of a civil judgment or settlement, the creditor is entitled to interest on the agreed amount of those damages from the date of settlement to the date payment is received. They point to specific language in Hartmann stating that this entitlement to post-settlement interest “is allowed not only on account of the loss which a creditor may be supposed to have sustained by being deprived of the use of his money, but on account of the gain being made from its use by the debtor.”
In this case, they argue, it is not the individual tortfeasor/policyholder, but rather the tortfeasor's insurance company that entered into a settlement agreement with a plaintiff, controlled the timing of payment to the plaintiff and benefited financially from unduly delaying payments in order to continue earning the day-to-day interest “float” on those monies. They argue that the lower court rulings requiring the plaintiffs to seek post-settlement interest from a policyholder who had no control over his insurer's payment practices and gained no benefit from the insurer's undue delay in paying a settlement ignore the public policy underlying Hartmann and should be reversed. They also assert that the settlement releases signed by the plaintiffs in this case did not state that the date of the release was also the “date of settlement,” and say the releases waived any additional damages based on the underlying tort claim, but did not release the insurance companies from liability for interest based on the insurer's post-settlement actions enriching themselves through delayed payments to the plaintiffs.
Attorneys for the insurance companies respond that Ohio case law bars the plaintiffs in this case, who have no contractual relationship with those companies, from asserting interest claims against the insurers rather than against its policyholders who caused their injuries. They argue that, when parties accepting a settlement have signed a written release relieving other parties from all additional liability in the case, courts must determine the duties of the parties to each other based solely on the contents of the written release, and may not consider “parol evidence” of other alleged agreements that were not incorporated into the written settlement and release.
Contacts
Patrick J. Perotti, 440.352.3391, for
Kevin Bellman and other Class Action Plaintiffs.
Barry W. Fissel, 419.241.6000, for American International Insurance Grp. et al.
Mid-American Fire and Casualty Company et al. v. William C. Heasley, Jr., Case nos. 2005-2399 and 2006-0249
11th District Court of Appeals (Lake County)
ISSUES:
BACKGROUND: In this case, William Heasley suffered head and neck injuries in a July 2001 traffic accident caused by an uninsured motorist. Heasley was not engaged in work-related activity at the time of his accident. After collecting the limit of uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) benefits from his own personal auto insurance policy, Heasley sought additional recovery under his employer's policies with Mid-American Fire & Casualty and Midwestern Indemnity Company. Both companies denied coverage.
In July 2003, Heasley filed suit against Mid-American and Midwestern based on the Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance. In Scott-Pontzer, the Court held that employees who suffered accident damages caused by an uninsured or underinsured motorist were entitled to UM/UIM coverage under their employers' motor vehicle policies, and that coverage was provided by an employer's policy whether or not the employee was injured in the course of employment. In November 2003, while Heasley's suit was proceeding, the Supreme Court issued a new decision, Westfield Insurance Co. v. Galatis, that significantly narrowed its earlier ruling in Scott-Pontzer by holding that an employee was entitled to UM/UIM coverage under an employer's policy only if the claimant's injuries occurred in the course of employment.
After the Galatis decision was announced, the insurance companies filed a motion to dismiss Heasley's suit on the basis that his injuries were not incurred in the course of employment. Before the trial court could rule on the insurers' motion to dismiss, Heasley exercised his right to voluntarily dismiss his suit “without prejudice” (i.e., without forfeiting his legal right to re-file the same claim against the employer's policies at a later time). The insurance companies then filed an action in the Lake County Court of Common Pleas seeking a declaratory judgment that, based on the Supreme Court's holding in Galatis, Heasley had no UM/UIM coverage under their policies and was therefore barred from bringing any future suit against them based on his 2001 injuries.
Heasley moved to dismiss the insurers' declaratory action, on the basis that he had no current claim pending against their policies and no legal basis to bring a suit at the current time, so any declaratory judgment issued by the trial court would amount to an “advisory opinion” about a potential future lawsuit —something not permitted by Ohio's declaratory judgment statute and prior court decisions.
The trial court agreed with Heasley's arguments and dismissed the insurers' declaratory action. On review, the 11th District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, but certified that its ruling in this case was in conflict with a 2005 decision, Indiana Ins. Co. v. Forsmark, in which the 9th District granted a declaratory judgment to an insurer in a similar case. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear arguments to resolve the conflict between appellate districts.
The insurance companies argue that the declaratory judgment they sought in this case was not an “advisory opinion” because Heasley's voluntary dismissal of his 2003 suit did not extinguish his legal right to reassert a future claim against them at any time within a 15-year statute of limitations from the date of his injuries. They contend that, under these circumstances, the fact that Heasley was involved in a traffic accident at a time when he was employed by their policyholder establishes a “justiciable legal controversy” about the terms of coverage in their policies on which the trial court could and should have issued a declaratory judgment. The insurers also urge the Court to hold that an appellate court reviewing the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action should review all the evidence considered by the trial court on a de novo basis, and apply its own independent judgment to affirm or reverse the trial court's holding.
Attorneys for Heasley respond that the lower courts in this case followed well-established precedent when they refused to issue a declaratory judgment barring any possible future claim by Heasley at a time when (1) he had no current claim pending against the insurance companies; and (2) he had admitted that, under state insurance law as interpreted in the Galatis decision, he had no current legal basis on which to assert a claim. They note that the insurers in this case failed to file a counterclaim in Heasley's original suit, and allege that the insurance companies are now attempting to make up for that omission by obtaining an improper “advisory” judgment that would bar Heasley from reinstating his claim under the theoretical possibility that the Supreme Court might someday reverse Galatis and again allow employee UM/UIM claims based on non-work-related accident injuries. Heasley asserts that every Ohio court of appeals district has held that the correct standard for appellate review of dismissal of a declaratory action is the “abuse of discretion” standard followed by the 11th District in this case. Under that standard, they say, an appellate court may reverse a lower court's dismissal of a declaratory action only if it finds that the dismissal was clearly unreasonable.
Contacts
Larry S. Klein, 216.861.0111, for
William Heasley.
Shawn W. Maestle, 216.241.6602, for Mid-America fire & Casualty Company.
State of Ohio v. Lacina Batchili, Case no. 2005-2420
6th District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)
ISSUE: When a driver is stopped for a minor traffic offense, under what circumstances does a police officer's suspicion of additional criminal activity constitute reasonable grounds to extend the traffic stop to allow a “drug sniff” of the vehicle, and under what conditions does such extended detention constitute an “unreasonable seizure” that renders any evidence obtained through a subsequent vehicle search inadmissible?
BACKGROUND: In this case, Lacina Batchili was driving a minivan with New York license plates when he was stopped by state trooper Stacey Arnold on the Ohio Turnpike near Toledo for driving outside of a marked traffic lane. Although Batchili's driver license was valid, there were no warrants in his name and the van was properly registered and not listed as stolen, Arnold summoned another officer and a drug-detecting dog to the location of the stop and had the dog “sniff” the vehicle. When the dog “alerted” to possible illegal drugs in the van, the officers performed a warrantless search of the vehicle and found blanket-covered boxes containing 144 pirated videotapes and 95 pirated DVDs.
Batchili was not cited for any traffic violation, but was charged with multiple offenses based on possession of the tapes and DVDs. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress all evidence obtained through the vehicle search, arguing that his detention by Arnold at the scene of the traffic stop without any reasonable ground to suspect other illegal activity was an “unreasonable seizure” under the Fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution that led to an unlawful search. The trial court overruled the motion to exclude the search evidence. Batchili went through a jury trial and ultimately obtained verdicts of acquittal on all charges except one count of receiving stolen property, for which he was sentenced to six months in jail and four years of community control.
Batchili appealed, and in a 2-1 decision the 6th District Court of Appeals vacated his conviction and sentence, holding that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the results of the vehicle search. The court of appeals found that the reasons given by Arnold for initiating her pursuit of Batchili's van and for suspecting him of criminal conduct beyond a minor traffic offense were not sufficient to justify detaining him at the scene of the traffic stop while she summoned a drug-sniffing dog to check the vehicle. Since the dog's “alert” provided the only legal justification for the vehicle search that ultimately turned up contraband materials, the court of appeals ruled that the search was unconstitutional and evidence obtained through the search was inadmissible.
The state asked the Supreme Court to review the 6th District's decision, and the court has agreed to hear arguments in the case.
Arguing on behalf of the state, the Lucas County prosecutor's office asserts that Arnold identified a number of separate factors justifying her suspicion of Batchili, including his failure to stop for two miles after she turned on her flashing lights, nervous demeanor when pulled over, contradictory statements when asked about the owner of the van, and blanket-covered cargo visible through the driver's window. They contend that these factors, considered together, justified Arnold's suspicion of criminal activity beyond a traffic offense, and argue that the 6th District erred by considering and rejecting each of the trooper's observations individually rather than cumulatively. The state also argues that Arnold's summoning of another officer with a drug-detecting dog who arrived within 10 minutes of the initial stop did not delay the traffic stop beyond the normal time it would take to check on a stopped driver's license and registration and issue a ticket or warning. They cite prior court decisions holding that 15-20 minutes was not an unreasonable period to conduct a traffic stop, and that an external “drug sniff” of a vehicle during the normal duration of a traffic stop does not constitute an unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Attorneys for Batchili point to Arnold's testimony at trial: that she began her pursuit of Batchili's van without observing any unlawful conduct of any kind; that she detained him at the scene of the traffic stop without ever writing a ticket for the alleged “lane change” violation; that Batchili did not speak English as a first language and did not appear to initially understand the officer's questions about the ownership of the van; and that Arnold summoned a back-up unit and drug-sniffing dog despite personally finding no visual evidence or smells suggesting the presence of drugs or alcohol, and despite computer checks that showed Batchili had a valid driver's license and the vehicle was legally registered and not reported stolen. They urge the Supreme Court to affirm the 6th District's holding that Arnold's observations did not justify extending her traffic stop of Batchili to call in a drug-detection unit.
Contacts
Kevin A. Pituch, 419.213.2051, for the State of Ohio and
Lucas County prosecutor's office.
Douglas A. Wilkins, 419.246.3777, for William Heasley.
State of Ohio v. Michael Carswell, Case no. 2006-0151
12th District Court of Appeals (Warren County)
ISSUE: In this case, the Supreme Court has agreed to review for the first time the impact of the ”Marriage Amendment” that was added to the Ohio Constitution in 2004 on the enforcement of state criminal statutes addressing domestic violence.
BACKGROUND: Article XV, Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution, often referred to as the “Marriage Amendment,” was adopted by a statewide voter initiative in November 2004. The amendment states that unmarried persons may not be given a “legal status” afforded to married persons, and that no state law may “approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.”
This case involves a felony domestic violence charge that was filed against Michael Carswell of Warren County in February 2005 for assaulting Shannon Hitchcock. Carswell and Hitchcock lived together, but were not married. Carswell was charged under a provision of R.C. 2919.25 that prohibits actual or attempted acts of violence by an offender against “a family or household member,” a category that specifically includes “a person living as a spouse.” The statute includes explicit language applying its provisions not only to violence against a person to whom the offender is legally married, but also to violence against a person with whom the offender is “in a common law marital relationship (or) who is otherwise cohabiting with the offender.”
Carswell, who was charged with a third-degree felony under the domestic violence statute because of two prior offenses, filed a motion in the Warren County Court of Common Pleas seeking dismissal of the felony indictment. He argued that that he could not be charged for an assault on Hitchcock under the “cohabiting” provision of the domestic violence statute because that provision unconstitutionally conferred on unmarried couples who were “living like spouses” the same legal status afforded to persons who were married. The trial court granted Carswell's motion to dismiss the felony indictment, and amended the charge against him to a misdemeanor count of assault.
On review, the 12th District Court of Appeals held that the domestic violence statute was not unconstitutional as applied to Carswell's case, and reinstated the felony indictment. Carswell appealed the 12th District's ruling to the Supreme Court, and the Court has agreed to hear arguments in the case.
Attorneys for Carswell argue that prior court decisions cited by the 12th District in support of its holding are not applicable to this case. They say the cited cases involved newly enacted legislation that was challenged as being contrary to pre-existing provisions of the state constitution. In those cases, they assert, the courts gave proper deference to the legislature by presuming its intent to comply with existing constitutional provisions. In this case, Carswell argues, what changed was not the language of a statute but the adoption of a new underlying constitutional principle by action of the people, under which the constitutionality of all pre-existing state laws and new enactments of the legislature must be evaluated.
They contend that R.C. 2929.25 grants persons living together out of wedlock the same legal status and special protections afforded to legally married couples with regard to domestic violence. They argue that, by conferring the same legal rights and privileges on unmarried domestic partners as those granted to partners in state-recognized marriages, the “living as a spouse” provision of the domestic violence statute is clearly contrary to the intent and plain language of the Marriage Amendment.
Attorneys for the state respond that nothing in the intent or operation of the domestic violence statute is in conflict with the purpose of the Marriage Amendment, which they say is to prevent the formal recognition in state law of same-sex marriages or civil unions between unmarried heterosexual couples. They say the domestic violence statute merely recognizes that there is a special risk of physical harm to those who live under the same roof with an abusive person, and argue that provisions extending the law's protection to unmarried partners who share a residence as well as to married spouses does not grant any special or privileged legal status to cohabiting couples.
Contacts
Joshua S. Engel, 513.695.1325, for the State of Ohio and Warren County prosecutor's office.
Thomas G. Eagle, 937.743.2545, for Michael Carswell.
State of Ohio v. Jeremy E. Parker, Case no. 2006-0236
11th District Court of Appeals (Ashtabula County)
ISSUE: When an offender is charged with multiple offenses arising from the same incident, and those charges will require separate trials, must all untolled days the defendant spends in jail in lieu of posting bond for any of the offenses be triple-counted toward the speedy-trial time limit within which the defendant must be brought to trial on one of the charged offenses?
BACKGROUND: Under Ohio's “speedy trial” statute, R.C. 2945.71 to 2945.73, trial courts are required to dismiss felony charges pending against a criminal defendant if the state does not bring the defendant to trial within 270 days. The statute includes a requirement that, when a defendant awaiting trial is held in jail in lieu of bond, every day of incarceration must be triple-counted toward the speedy trial deadline - effectively setting a 90-day time limit for the state to bring such a defendant to trial.
Jeremy Parker and several co-defendants were arrested at an Ashtabula motel on Nov. 6, 2002, when a sheriff's officer patrolling the area investigated a parked truck owned by one of the defendants and discovered that it was being used as a mobile laboratory to manufacture methamphetamine.
Parker was charged with felony counts of possession and manufacture of illegal drugs and a misdemeanor count of carrying a concealed weapon (CCW). Parker was arraigned on all three charges in Ashtabula Municipal Court on Dec. 3, 2002, and separate bonds were set for the felony and misdemeanor charges at that time. Indictments were returned and pretrial proceedings were initiated in the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas to try Parker on the felony counts, while the CCW charge remained pending in the municipal court. Parker remained in jail in lieu of bond for 79 days after his arrest. He posted bond on
the felony charges on Jan. 24, 2003, and was released from jail four days later, after posting the separate bond that had been set for the misdemeanor CCW charge. On the same day he was released, the state dismissed the CCW charge, leaving only the felony counts in place.
Following a series of motions and continuances, on June 19, 2003, Parker filed a motion seeking dismissal of the felony counts on the basis that the state had failed to bring him to trial within the statutory speedy-trial time limit. The trial court denied that motion and a jury trial was ultimately conducted in which Parker entered a no-contest plea. He was convicted of illegal drug possession and sentenced to one year in prison and a six-month driver license suspension.
Parker appealed the trial court's denial of his speedy-trial motion to the 11th District Court of Appeals, which voted 2-1 to vacate his conviction and sentence. The appellate majority held that the 79 days that Parker was incarcerated between the date of his arrest and the date he was released on bond must be triple-counted toward the speedy-trial deadline, consuming 237 of the 270 days the state had to commence trial proceedings. When added to other elapsed time between his arrest and trial during which the speedy trial “clock” continued to run, the 11th District found that more than 300 countable days had elapsed before Parker's trial commenced, clearly exceeding the 270-day statutory maximum. The state appealed the 11th District's ruling on the speedy-trial issue, and the Supreme Court has agreed to hear arguments in the case.
The Ashtabula County prosecutor, arguing for the state, contends that the 11th District erred when it required that the 79 days Parker spent in jail in lieu of bond must be triple-counted toward his speedy-trial deadline. They cite prior Ohio court decisions that they say held jail time should not be triple-counted in cases where a defendant is facing multiple charges that require separate trials. Because Parker was incarcerated while awaiting both a trial in common pleas court on the felony counts and a separate municipal court trial on the misdemeanor CCW count, they assert, his time in jail should only have been counted on a straight day-for-day basis and, applying that standard, his trial was not delayed beyond the 270-day limit.
Attorneys for Parker respond that the decisions cited by the state are not applicable to this case, because the criminal defendants in those cases were charged with multiple crimes arising from separate incidents or criminal acts, not with multiple charges all of which arise from the same incident. They cite cases in which they say the triple-counting requirement has been enforced for jail time served by a defendant where all pending charges were based on the same event or incident, and where the court proceedings initiating all of the charges against the defendant and setting bond for all offenses were conducted at the same time and place. They argue that, if the state's interpretation of the speedy-trial statute in this case is affirmed, it will mean that prosecutors can flout the statutory mandate to act faster when a defendant is in jail simply by charging every offender with both felony and misdemeanor counts, and using the fact that those charges must be heard in two different courts as a loophole to dodge the triple-counting requirement.
Contacts
Shelly M. Pratt, 440.576.3662, for the
State of Ohio and Ashtabula County prosecutor's office.
Marie Lane, 550.998.2628, for Jeremy Parker.
These summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information solely to help news reporters determine if they want to cover the arguments. The summaries are not part of the case record and are not considered by the Court at any point during its deliberations.
Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.