|
|
State of Ohio v. George Evans, Case no. 2005-1692
8th District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
State of Ohio v. Ralph R. Wilson, Case no. 2005-2186
8th District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
Debra Shay v. Larry Shay, Jr., et al, Case no. 2005-2277
6th District Court of Appeals (Fulton County)
State of Ohio v. Eric L. Palmer, Case nos. 2006-0022 and 2006-0370
11th District Court of Appeals (Portage County)
In re: Application of Reza Yazdian, Case no. 2006-1406
Board of Commissioners on Character & Fitness
State of Ohio v. George Evans, Case no. 2005-1692
8th District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUES: When a trial court has found a defendant guilty of multiple offenses and imposed a separate sentence for each conviction, and the defendant has appealed all of his sentences, may a court of appeals vacate all of the defendant's sentences and remand the entire case for resentencing based solely on a finding that the sentence imposed for one offense was improper?
BACKGROUND: George Evans of Cleveland was convicted of rape and kidnapping. The trial court also found that he used a gun in the commission of both crimes, and met the legal criteria for enhanced sentencing as both a repeat violent offender (RVO) and a sexually oriented predator. Evans was sentenced to concurrent 10 year prison terms for the rape and kidnapping convictions; one additional year for the firearm specification; three additional years for the RVO specification, and an additional indeterminate sentence of up to life imprisonment for the sexually oriented predator specification.
Evans appealed his convictions and all of the sentences imposed by the trial court, alleging that the trial judge had imposed excessive terms of imprisonment for his offenses to “punish” Evans for declining a plea bargain and forcing the court to conduct a trial.
On review, the 8th District Court of Appeals affirmed Evans' convictions, but found that the trial court had not made necessary factual findings to support the sentence it imposed for the RVO specification. Based on that single holding, the court of appeals vacated Evans' entire sentence and remanded his case to the trial court for resentencing on all charges. In its opinion, the 8th District stated that its action on the RVO issue eliminated the need to address the merits of Evans' legal challenges to his other sentences.
The state appealed the 8th District's ruling, and the Supreme Court has agreed to hear arguments in the case.
Arguing for the state, the Cuyahoga County prosecutor's office asserts that the 8th District's action in this case is contrary to a Supreme Court decision released earlier this year, State v. Saxon. In Saxon, they note, the Supreme Court held that when a criminal defendant has been convicted and sentenced for multiple offenses, each sentence must be reviewed individually rather than as part of a “package,” and if a court of appeals finds the sentence for one conviction to be defective, that finding is not grounds for vacating the defendant's other sentences for separate offenses. Because the 8th District only found that Evans' three-year sentence for being a repeat violent offender was improper, the state argues, the Supreme Court should overrule the dismissal and remand of his other sentences.
While a ruling reversing the court of appeals based on Saxon would normally call for returning the case to the 8th District to complete its review of Evans' other sentences, the state points out that another Supreme Court decision announced earlier this year, State v. Foster, found portions of Ohio's criminal sentencing statutes unconstitutional. Because Foster requires trial courts to resentence offenders (like Evans) whose sentences were enhanced beyond statutory minimums based on factual findings made by a judge, the prosecutor urges the Supreme Court to remand Evans' case directly to the trial court for resentencing consistent with Foster, but with his original sentences still in place except for the RVO specification.
Attorneys for Evans argue that his case is distinguishable from Saxon, because the trial court in Saxon vacated portions of a defendant's sentence that the defendant had not appealed. Unlike Saxon, they say, Evans appealed all of his sentences and is therefore entitled to have the court of appeals rule on all of his claims before his case is remanded to the trial court. They urge the Supreme Court to return the case to the 8th District with a directive that it rule on Evans' legal objections to the remaining portions of his sentence, and then remand the case to the trial court for resentencing consistent with the court of appeals' ruling and the requirements of State v. Foster.
Contacts
T. Allan Regas, 216.443.7800, for
the State of Ohio and Cuyahoga County prosecutor's office.
Donald Gallick, 216.496.3427, for George Evans.
State of Ohio v. Ralph R. Wilson, Case no. 2005-2186
8th District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: In order to properly reverse a trial court's ruling that an offender is or is not a “sexual predator” under Ohio law, must a court of appeals find that the lower court's holding was “clearly erroneous,” or may the reviewing court apply a less deferential standard?
BACKGROUND: Following a two-day hearing in March 2004, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas found that Ralph Wilson of Cleveland should be classified as a “sexually-oriented offender” rather than as “sexual predator,” and thus subject to less restrictive regulations than those imposed on sexual predators by R.C. 2950.09. Wilson was convicted of rape in 1977 and had spent additional time in prison for subsequent criminal convictions, none of which involved a sex-related offense.
The state appealed the trial court's decision, arguing that prosecutors had produced more than sufficient evidence to support Wilson's classification as a sexual predator. The 8th District Court of Appeals voided the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new classification proceeding. In a 2-1 majority opinion, the court of appeals held that the trial court's ruling was “against the manifest weight” of the evidence presented at Wilson's hearing. Wilson appealed the 8th District's ruling to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear arguments in the case.
In their written pleadings, both the state and Wilson point to a lack of uniformity in prior rulings by Ohio's 12 appellate districts regarding what evidentiary standard they should apply when reviewing trial court decisions regarding the classification of sex-crime offenders under R. C. 2950.09.
Attorneys for Wilson argue that the 8th District in this case did not give proper deference to the judgment of the trial court, which heard and evaluated two days of testimony including expert witnesses and testimony by a psychiatrist who had been meeting with Wilson on a weekly basis stating that he considered Wilson a low risk for future sexual offenses. They urge the Court to reverse the 8th District and hold that a trial court's classification of a sexual offender may not be overturned on appeal unless the reviewing court finds that decision “clearly erroneous.” They cite decisions of the 1st and 9th appellate districts applying that standard, which they say permits reversal only if a reviewing court finds that the trial court's decision was unsupported by “any competent or credible evidence.” In this case, they assert, the 8th District's decision did not analyze the evidence cited by the trial court and determine that it was not “competent or credible,” but rather cataloged other evidence that the trial court found less persuasive, and impermissibly substituted its own judgment for that of the trial court.
The state responds that, because the purpose of R.C. 2950.09 is remedial rather than punitive, the correct evidentiary standard for reviewing a trial court's judgments under that statute is the civil standard of “manifest weight of the evidence.” The prosecutor cites decisions from multiple Ohio appellate districts in similar cases that he says have based their rulings on an independent review of all the evidence presented at a hearing, and a determination that the trial court did or did not decide the case consistent with the clear weight of that evidence. In this case, the state asserts, the 8th District properly reviewed all the evidence presented at Wilson's hearing and found that the trial court's “low risk” classification was clearly contradicted by evidence that the defendant had committed multiple rapes involving violence or violent threats, had been diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder, and had scored in a moderate-to-high risk of reoffending category on one standard evaluation tool.
Contacts
Mary H. McGrath, 216.443.7800, for
the State of Ohio and Cuyahoga County prosecutor's office.
John T. Martin, 216.443.7583, for Ralph Wilson.
Debra Shay v. Larry Shay, Jr., et al, Case no. 2005-2277
6th District Court of Appeals (Fulton County)
ISSUE: Under the version of Ohio's uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) statute in effect in January 2001, did the renewal of a pre-existing auto insurance policy after the effective date of S.B. 267 effectively provide the policyholder with broadened UM/UIM coverage pursuant to S.B. 267, even though the express terms of the prior policy had not been amended and those terms were guaranteed to remain in effect beyond the date of the latest renewal?
BACKGROUND: R.C. 3937.18 and related statutes regulate the availability and conditions of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage in Ohio auto insurance policies. Those laws were amended by the legislature a number of times between 1994 and 2002. One such amendment, which took effect in September 2000 as part of S.B. 267, barred insurers from excluding UM/UIM coverage under their policies for insured persons who suffered bodily injury in a traffic accident that was caused by a member of their own household.
This case involves an uninsured motorist claim filed by Debra Shay, who suffered serious injuries in March 2001 when her husband, Larry Shay, lost control of the couple's minivan and crashed into a tree. Both Larry and Debra were named insured parties under an auto insurance policy issued by Ohio Mutual Insurance Co. Because the Ohio Mutual policy excluded liability coverage for injuries an insured driver caused to a member of his or her own family, Debra Shay was unable to recover damages from the insurer of the at-fault driver who caused her injuries (her husband), thereby making her the victim of an “uninsured” motorist.
Debra filed an uninsured motorist claim under the Ohio Mutual policy. The company denied coverage citing another policy exclusion — this one excluding UM/UIM coverage for accident damages suffered by an insured person that were caused by a member of his or her own household. The Shays filed suit against Ohio Mutual in the Fulton County Court of Common Pleas. They pointed out that S.B. 267, which became effective in September 2000, had specifically barred enforcement of “household” exclusions of UM/UIM coverage in Ohio auto insurance policies. Since the Shays had renewed their Ohio Mutual policy in January 2001, after the effective date of S.B. 267, and the accident leading to their claim also occurred after the new law took effect, they moved for summary judgment requiring the insurer to honor Debra's UM claim. Ohio Mutual filed its own summary judgment motion, arguing that the UM family exclusion in the Shays' policy was still in force at the time of the accident despite enactment of S.B. 267. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Shays.
On review, the 6th District Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's judgment in favor of the Shays, but certified that its holding was in conflict with a 2003 ruling by the 3rd District in a similar case, Flowers v. Ohio Mutual Insurance Group. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear arguments to resolve the conflict between appellate districts.
Attorneys for Ohio Mutual argue that the trial court and 6th District did not follow a Supreme Court decision from 2000, Wolfe v. Wolfe, which held that insurers must honor the terms of an auto insurance contract for a minimum period of two years from the date of issuance, with each renewal following the original two-year guarantee period locking in the terms of the “new” policy for another two years. In this case, they say, the Shays bought their original Ohio Mutual policy in July 1998, so its original terms were guaranteed to remain in force until July 2000.
They argue that when the Shays renewed their existing policy in July 2000, that transaction locked in the same policy terms, including the exclusion of UM/UIM coverage for injuries caused by a family member, for another two-year period (until July 2002). Thus, they assert, even though S.B. 267 took effect in September 2000, and the Shays subsequently paid a new six-month premium on their auto policy in January 2001, the earliest date on which the terms of the insurance contract between Ohio Mutual and the Shays could be modified to incorporate changes mandated by S.B. 267 would have been July 2002, at the end of the current two-year policy guarantee period.
Attorneys for the Shays urge the Court to affirm the holdings of the trial court and 6th District requiring Ohio Mutual to provide UM/UIM coverage for Debra's injuries. They point to a general provision in Ohio Mutual's policy that “automatically” amends the policy to incorporate any provision of a state law that conflicts with a term or condition of the policy. They note that S.B. 267 not only banned “family exclusions” from UM/UIM coverage after September 2000, but also included language specifically allowing changes that increase or improve coverag e of policyholders to be added to Ohio auto policies within an ongoing two-year policy guarantee period. In response to the insurer's claim that the trial court order enforcing S.B. 267 before July 2002 was an impermissible “retroactive” application of the bill, the Shays assert that the UM/UIM statute amended by S.B. 267 is “remedial” in nature because it does not create a new legal right or infringe an existing one. Even if the Court were to find enforcement of the new legal provisions in this case to be retroactive, they argue, Ohio case law permits legislative enactments to be applied retroactively so long as they are remedial rather than substantive in nature.
Contacts
Glenn E. Wasielewski, 419.243.6148, for
Ohio Mutual Insurance Group.
Michael J. Leizerman, 419.243.1010, for Debra Shay.
State of Ohio v. Eric L. Palmer, Case nos. 2006-0022 and 2006-0370
11th District Court of Appeals (Portage County)
ISSUE: Does a criminal defendant's delay in responding to the state's reciprocal discovery request until 60 days after receiving that request, absent a motion by the state to compel production at an earlier date, constitute a “period of delay occasioned by the neglect of the offender” that delays the running of the speedy trial time limit within which the defendant must be brought to trial?
BACKGROUND: Under Ohio's “speedy trial” statute, R.C. 2945.71 to 2945.73, trial courts are required to dismiss charges pending against a criminal defendant if the state does not bring the defendant to trial within 270 days after indictment. The statute includes a requirement that, when a defendant awaiting trial is held in jail in lieu of bond, every day of incarceration must be triple-counted toward the speedy trial deadline - effectively setting a 90-day time limit for the state to bring such a defendant to trial. The statute sets forth certain circumstances under which the speedy-trial “clock” in a case is tolled (temporarily stops running). One of those “tolling” circumstances is a “period of delay occasioned by the neglect or wrongful act of the accused.”
In this case, Eric Palmer unlawfully entered the home of John Sams in rural Portage County while armed with a loaded handgun and a hunting knife with the intent of robbing Sams, who was not home at the time. Upon his return, Sams discovered the break-in and called police, who found Palmer asleep inside the house and arrested him. Palmer was indicted on multiple felony counts on March 26, 2004. He was unable to pay the bond set by the trial court and remained in custody pending trial, triggering the statutory 90-day time limit for bringing an incarcerated defendant to trial. The parties agreed that two actions initiated by Palmer, a request for continuance of his preliminary hearing and a discovery request for police records, tolled the 90-day limit for a total of 12 days.
On May 3, after complying with Palmer's request for records, the state filed a reciprocal discovery request asking Palmer to disclose any documents he intended to introduce as evidence, any tests or examinations he had undergone and the names and addresses of any witnesses he intended to call at trial. Palmer did not respond to the state's discovery request until July 2, 60 days after the request was received. On July 6, Palmer's attorneys filed a motion to dismiss all charges against him, asserting that the 90-day deadline for bringing him to trial had expired.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that 30 days of Palmer's 60-day delay in responding to the state's discovery request was “a period of delay occasioned by the neglect of the accused” and had therefore stopped the running of the speedy trial limit long enough that his scheduled July 13 trial date fell within the statutory deadline. On July 13, Palmer entered a no contest plea, was convicted of aggravated burglary and other offenses and was sentenced to prison terms totaling eight years. Palmer then appealed the denial of his speedy trial motion. The 11th District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and vacated Palmer's convictions and sentence. In a 2-1 opinion, the appellate panel held that the trial court could not stop the running of speedy trial time based on a defendant's delay in providing discovery information until the state filed a motion asking the trial court to compel production of that material. Since the state never filed a motion to compel production in this case, the court of appeals majority said the speedy trial clock must continue to run, and therefore had expired before Palmer was brought to trial.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the state's appeal to resolve a conflict between the 11th District's ruling in this case and the 9th District's contradictory ruling in a 1995 decision, State v. Larsen
Arguing for the state, the Portage County prosecutor's office claims that the 11th District's ruling ignores the mandatory language of Ohio Criminal Rule 16, which requires that upon a written discovery request, each party “ shall forthwith (immediately) provide the discovery ” requested by the opposing party. They argue that this language in and of itself, without the filing of any additional motion asking the court to compel production, imposes a duty of prompt compliance and allows a trial court to identify any unreasonable delay by a defendant in supplying requested discovery as “a delay occasioned by the neglect of the accused” that stops the running of the speedy trial clock. The state also points out that the trial court assessed only 30 days of the defendant's 60-day delay as resulting from neglect, showing that the trial court did not improperly begin tolling speedy trial time on the date the state initiated its discovery request, but only “stopped the clock” after Palmer had failed to respond within a reasonable period.
Attorneys for Palmer equate the tolling of a defendant's speedy trial time with other sanctions that may be imposed by a trial court on a party that fails to provide timely discovery materials. They argue that the 11th District's decision in this case correctly followed the Supreme Court's 1987 ruling in City of Lakewood v. Papadelis, which held that sanctions for failure to comply with a discovery demand may only be invoked after the complaining party has filed a motion asking the trial court to compel production. They also assert that in Palmer's case the trial court erred when it found Palmer's delay to “neglect” and stopped the running of speedy trial time without making a finding that the delay in some way prejudiced the state's case or impaired its ability to proceed to a trial within the 90-day limit.
Contacts
Pamela J. Holder, 330.296.3850, for
the State of Ohio and Portage County prosecutor's office.
Stephen C. Clawson, 330.296.4451, for Eric Palmer.
In re: Application of Reza Yazdian, Case no. 2006-1406
Board of Commissioners on Character & Fitness
The Board of Commissioners on Character and Fitness has recommended that the Supreme Court disapprove the current application of Reza Yazdian of Cincinnati to take the Ohio Bar Examination, but that Mr. Yazdian be permitted to file a new application after Feb. 1, 2007, and demonstrate at that time that he has the requisite character and fitness to qualify for admission to the practice of law.
Mr. Yazdian has filed objections to the board's recommendation, and the Court has agreed to hear oral arguments in the case.
In its report and recommendation to the Court, the board found that Yazdian's intemperate actions and statements pursuant to his 2003 character and fitness interview with the Cincinnati Bar Association (CBA) admissions committee indicate that he presently lacks the requisite judgment and discretion for admission to the bar. The board cited Yazdian's unsupported allegations of misconduct against of one of the CBA panel members who interviewed him, his unreasonable insistence that a delay in his approval to take the bar examination was caused by the interviewer's personal bias rather than the board's independent doubts about his fitness, and Yazdian's refusal to accept responsibility for his own actions and inaccurate statements as evidence that he presently lacks the requisite character for admission as an attorney.
In his objections to the board's findings and recommendation, Yazdian asserts that the circumstances of his fitness interview and a subsequent six-month delay in his approval to take the bar examination justified his retention of legal counsel and letters to the board accusing Allen of bias and misconduct. He further asserts that if he made misstatements in seeking redress for what he believed to be valid complaints, those misstatements were not as severe as in similar cases where applicants have been disapproved to take the bar examination on character and fitness grounds.
Contacts
Andrew J. Gottman, 937.449.6790, for the
Dayton Bar Association (successor to Cincinnati Bar Association).
Dianna M. Anelli, 614.228.7710, for Reza Yazdian.
These summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information solely to help news reporters determine if they want to cover the arguments. The summaries are not part of the case record and are not considered by the Court at any point during its deliberations.
Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.