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State of Ohio v. Paul D. Lowe, Case no. 2005-1843
5th District Court of Appeals (Stark County)
Lauri Weinfeld v. Robert E. Welling et al., Case no. 2005-1964
5th District Court of Appeals (Stark County)
Lorain County Auditor and Lorain County Sheriff v. Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission et al., Case nos. 2005-2359 and 2005-2375
9th District Court of Appeals (Lorain County)
In Re: Camryn Foster et al., Case no. 2006-0503
8th District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
State of Ohio v. Paul D. Lowe, Case no. 2005-1843
5th District Court of Appeals (Stark County)
ISSUE: Does a provision in Ohio law banning consensual sexual conduct between a stepparent and his or her competent adult stepchild unconstitutionally infringe on personal privacy interests where there is no coercion and the stepparent was not in a position of authority or control over the other person?
BACKGROUND: In this case, Paul Lowe of Stark County was indicted by a grand jury on a felony count of sexual battery for engaging in consensual sex with the 22-year-old daughter of Lowe's wife. His wife's daughter was not Lowe's biological or adoptive daughter, and was mentally competent.
When the Stark County common pleas court denied Lowe's motion to dismiss the charge, he entered a plea of no contest. He was convicted of sexual battery and sentenced to an additional 120 days in jail, three years of community control, 250 hours of community service and designated as a sexual offender. Lowe appealed, arguing that the provision in Ohio's “incest” statute, R.C. 2907.03 barring consensual sex between an adult stepparent and stepchild was unconstitutional. The 5th District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. Lowe appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, which has agreed to hear arguments in the case.
Attorneys for Lowe argue that:
Attorneys for the state respond that the plain language of R.C. 2709.03 (A)(5) prohibits “sexual conduct with another, not the spouse of the offender,” when “… the offender is the other person's natural or adoptive parent, or a stepparent, or guardian, custodian or person in loco parentis of the other person.” Because the statute is clear and unambiguous, they assert, the trial and appellate courts were required to apply it as written and were not authorized to review legislative history or explore legislative intent as proposed by Lowe.
They also argue that the offense of sexual battery for which Lowe was charged and convicted does not include any requirement that the victim be a minor, and note the Lawrence decision applied to a specific type of sexual conduct between consenting same-sex partners and did not recognize a “fundamental right” of a stepparent to engage in sexual conduct with a stepchild after he or she has reached adulthood.
Contacts
J. Dean Carro, 330.972.7751, for
Paul Lowe.
Ronald M. Caldwell, 330.451.7869, for the State of Ohio and Stark County prosecutor's office.
Lauri Weinfeld v. Robert E. Welling et al., Case no. 2005-1964
5th District Court of Appeals (Stark County)
ISSUE: Does Ohio recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy arising from publicity that unreasonably places another in a false light before the public?
BACKGROUND: This case arose from a dispute between owners of adjoining properties in suburban Stark County. In 1998 Lauri Weinfeld purchased two parcels of land adjacent to the home of longtime residents Robert and Katherine Welling. Weinfeld lived in a house on one parcel and used the other to operate a business known as “Lakeside Center,” a facility which she promoted as a site for banquets, private parties and outdoor weddings.
In the Spring of 1999, Weinfeld began using the Lakeside property for outdoor weddings and receptions on most weekends. An ongoing dispute developed when Weinfeld complained about the Wellings' operation of lawn mowers and other loud equipment on their property while weekend functions and other business activities were taking place at her adjacent party facility. The conflict escalated when Weinfeld installed floodlights and surveillance cameras on her property that were directed toward the Wellings' home.
Weinfeld filed a lawsuit in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Wellings' noisy activities on their property while outdoor events were being held at Lakeside Center were a public nuisance and constituted trespass, invasion of privacy, interference with Weinfeld's business relations and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Wellings counter-sued, alleging that Weinfeld's actions had invaded their privacy.
While those actions were pending, a window in a building at the Lakeside Center was found broken. Weinfeld printed up posters offering a $500 reward for information about the incident. She posted these notices on the door of the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company were Mr. and Mrs. Welling were both employed and at the schools attended by the Wellings' children. The bottling plant and schools were several miles from the Lakeside Center property.
A jury trial was conducted to resolve the disputants' claims and counter-claims. The jury found in favor of the Wellings on all of Weinfeld's claims against them. On the Wellings' counter-claims the jury found that that (1) Weinfeld's videotaping of them in their yard and installation of floodlights and surveillance cameras aimed at their home constituted an invasion of privacy by intruding on their seclusion, and (2) Weinfeld's distribution of the reward posters regarding her broken window at their place of employment and their childrens' schools constituted invasion of privacy by means of publicity portraying the Wellings in a “false light” to the public. The jury awarded the Wellings $5,412.88 in compensatory damages, $250,000 in punitive damages plus $10,000 for their attorney's fees.
The trial court judge denied a motion by Weinfeld that judgment be entered in her favor notwithstanding the jury verdict. The judge did grant a reduction in the jury's award of punitive damages, and offered the Wellings a choice between accepting a reduced punitive damage award of $35,000 or the court's issuance of an order vacating the jury's verdict on their counterclaims and requiring a new trial limited to those claims and the amount of any damages due them. The Wellings refused to accept the reduced punitive damage award, and the trial court vacated the jury verdict and award and ordered a new trial on their counterclaims. On review, the 5th District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's action.
The Wellings sought Supreme Court review of the 5th District's holding. The Court agreed to hear arguments on the sole issue of whether the Wellings' claim against Weinfeld alleging “false light” invasion of privacy is a cause of action recognized under Ohio law.
In their brief, the Wellings' attorneys point out that “false light” is one of four categories of invasion of privacy claims identified by leading legal scholars in the widely cited Restatement of Torts, and note that the Supreme Court of Ohio referenced “false light” invasion of privacy as a generally accepted theory of tort liability in a footnote to a 1982 decision, Sustin v. Fee. They list decisions from more than 20 state and federal courts outside Ohio which have recognized publicity portraying a person in a “false light” as actionable, and urge the Court to follow the example of a majority of state supreme courts that have considered the issue by recognizing “false light” claims in Ohio.
Attorneys for Weinfeld urge the Court to reconsider its grant of jurisdiction to hear this case or to dismiss the Wellings' appeal as improvidently accepted. They argue that the facts underlying the Wellings' counterclaims against Weinfeld would not meet the requirements for a finding of “false light” invasion of privacy even if the Court recognized such claims. They point out that the reward flyer distributed by Weinfeld made no reference to the Welling family, but simply offered a reward for information about the vandalism at Lakeside Center. They also point out that Weinfeld's reward flyer was only distributed to a handful of neighboring residences, the Pepsi plant and two schools, which they say does not meet the requirement that false light claimants must show that misleading publicity about them was widely disseminated to the general public.
Contacts
Clair E. Dickinson, 330.535.5711, for
Lauri Weinfeld.
Ralph F. Dublikar, 330.499.6000, for Robert and Katherine Welling.
Lorain County Auditor and Lorain County Sheriff v. Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission et al., Case nos. 2005-2359 and 2005-2375
9th District Court of Appeals (Lorain County)
ISSUE: When an employee agrees to an employment contract that indicates a limited number of work hours, and is subsequently not scheduled for any hours by her employer for several weeks although she remains available for work, is the employee “voluntarily unemployed” during the weeks she does not work, and thus ineligible for state unemployment compensation benefits?
BACKGROUND: Kristie Brinkman signed an employment contract with the Lorain County Sheriff's Office to perform services as a registered nurse at the Lorain County jail. The contract included no expiration date or exact limit on work hours, but said that Brinkman was classified as an “intermittent employee,” which the contract defined as a worker who works an irregular and unpredictable schedule determined by the fluctuating demands of work, and who is generally required to work less than 1,000 hours per year. As “intermittent” employees, Brinkman and others hired under similar contracts were not entitiled to receive holiday pay, paid vacation or sick leave, were excluded from coverage under the county medical plan and were entitled to only their “straight time” hourly rate for working more than eight hours on the same day.
Brinkman worked some hours during each of the first 46 weeks after she signed the employment contract, but after she had worked approximately 1,000 hours, the sheriff's office cancelled all hours she had been scheduled to work during the final six weeks of the fiscal year, leaving Brinkman with no work and no pay during that period. She applied to the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) for unemployment compensation for the six weeks she was not scheduled to work, and was granted benefits.
When the new fiscal year began, Brinkman was returned to the sheriff's department work schedule and notified ODJFS that she was no longer unemployed. Several months later she was hired into a regular part-time position with the sheriff's office. When ODJFS assessed Lorain County auditor for 70 percent of the unemployment benefits the state had paid to Brinkman, based on her work history during the months preceding her application for benefits, the sheriff contested her eligibility for unemployment coverage. After an administrative hearing before the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission at which both Brinkman and the sheriff's office administrator testified, a state hearing officer affirmed the award of benefits.
The sheriff then appealed to the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas, which reversed the hearing officer's ruling. The judge found that Brinkman was on notice from the time she signed a contract as an intermittent employee that her work under that agreement would be limited to approximately 1,000 hours. By agreeing to the terms of the contract, the trial court held, Brinkman “anticipated and agreed to” being without work after completing 1,000 hours, and thus was not “involuntarily unemployed” and not eligible for state benefits during the six-week period in which her work hours were cut off by the sheriff.
Brinkman and ODJFS appealed. The 9th District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, but certified that its decision in this case was in conflict with rulings by three other Ohio appellate districts on the same issue of law. The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed to hear argument to resolve the conflict among appellate districts.
Attorneys for the Unemployment Compensation Board say that the 9th District's ruling in Brinkman's case is contrary not only to the holdings of other Ohio courts of appeals, but also to the rulings of seven different state supreme courts across the country that have considered the effect of limited employment contracts on a worker's eligibility for unemployment benefits.
They argue that hearing testimony established that Brinkman did not accept the limited work contract offered by the sheriff to ensure that she could stop working at the end of a contract term, but did so because she had to accept those limitations in order to obtain employment in the first place. They note that Ohio's statutory eligibility guidelines for unemployment compensation focus on an applicant's work history, willingness and availability to work and inability to find work despite reasonable efforts to seek it. They assert that Brinkman sought alternative employment and met all the other legal requirements to qualify for benefits, and say her unemployment during the six weeks in question was caused by the cutting off of her hours, despite her desire and ability to continue working, not by any voluntary action she took. The state also argues that, if the 9th District's reasoning in denying Brinkman benefits is affirmed, any worker who enters into a limited employment agreement or a long series of such agreements with the same employer could be held ineligible to receive any unemployment benefits on the basis that he or she “agreed to be unemployed” as of the termination of the latest contract period or completion of a job.
Attorneys for Lorain County urge the Court to affirm the 9th District's holding that a worker who knows and voluntarily agrees in advance to a limited term of employment cannot later claim to be “involuntarily unemployed” and force his or her employer to cover the cost of state benefits when work is cut off according to the prearranged terms of a contract to which both parties consented. They also assert that Brinkman was not entitled to unemployment benefits because there was no “separation” from her employment with the sheriff's office. They point out that Brinkman was neither fired or laid off, but simply dropped from the work schedule for the last several weeks of one fiscal year and then scheduled for more hours on the same basis as before as soon as the new fiscal period began.
Contacts
M. Robert Flanagan, 440.329.5398, for the
Lorain County Auditor and Lorain County Sheriff.
Stephen P. Carney, 614.466.8980, for the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services.
In Re: Camryn Foster et al., Case no. 2006-0503
8th District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUES:
BACKGROUND: In this case, the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court granted a motion by the Cuyahoga County Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) to terminate the parental rights of Wayne Foster over his two minor children, identified as C.F and S.F., and to award permanent custody of the children to DCFS. Foster appealed the juvenile court's action to the 8th District Court of Appeals. The 8th District vacated the portion of the trial court order terminating Foster's parental rights, and remanded the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings.
The 8th District held that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it (1) determined that DCFS had made a sufficient effort to help Foster address the issues that caused him to temporarily lose custody of his children prior to permanently terminating his parental rights, and (2) when it refused Foster's request to conduct in-camera interviews with the Foster children before granting permanent custody of them to the county. The court of appeals certified that portions of its ruling were in conflict with rulings by other Ohio appellate districts. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve the conflict between districts.
Attorneys for DCFS argue that the 8th District departed from its own prior rulings and decisions by other appellate courts when it held that a specific “reasonable efforts” finding imposed by one provision of R.C. Chapter 2151 was applicable to the proceedings in Foster's case, which they say were subject to a different set of procedural requirements that did not require a new “reasonable efforts” finding at this point in the case. They also assert that the 8th District improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the juvenile court on the issue of in-camera interviews, noting that the trial court had discretion either to conduct or not conduct interviews with the Foster children based on the judge's determination regarding whether such interviews would be helpful to the court in determining the children's best interest.
Attorneys for Foster respond that DCFS has not accurately characterized the 8th District's rulings in its pleadings. They assert that the court of appeals overruled the juvenile court based on the specific facts of this case, which included a finding that the initial determination of parental neglect in the case and the first case plan developed by DCFS were based solely on the conduct of the childrens' mother, who had illegally removed them from Foster's home. They say the 8th District found the trial court's action in terminating Foster's parental rights was premature because DCFS never developed a new family reunification plan focusing on Foster's parenting issues, and the county had not provided him with any assistance or services to meet improvement criteria before moving to take permanent custody of his children.
With regard to the in-camera interview issue, Foster argues that the 8th District did not issue a blanket ruling that such interviews must be conducted in all permanent custody hearings, but rather held that, under the unique facts and circumstances of this case, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to permanently terminate Foster's parental rights without allowing the children a chance to tell the court in private about their relationship with their father and their wishes regarding future restoration to his custody.
Contacts
James M. Price, 216.298.6708, for
the Cuyahoga County Dept. of Job and Family Services.
Cullen Sweeney, 216.443.3668, for Wayne Foster, Father of C.F. and S.F.
These summaries are prepared by the Office of Public Information solely to help news reporters determine if they want to cover the arguments. The summaries are not part of the case record and are not considered by the Court at any point during its deliberations.
Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.